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 This dissertation examines emerging trends in networked politics through 
an analysis of the rhetorical forms and functions of internet memes as a unique response 
to the increasing force of technocratic rhetorics.  Frequently dismissed as mere trivialities 
of networked discourses, memes have increasingly been mobilized to articulate new 
positions and structures of feeling around the significant issues of the day. As new 
iterations of memes are rapidly developed and circulated across networked public 
spheres, these rhetorical technologies provide new opportunities for amateur participation 
in the development of symbolic content. Such participation is particularly important as 
the intensification of control society has enabled technocrats to increasingly govern and 
narrow the domains of more traditional political rhetorics.   
Drawing a synthesis between Bernard Stiegler‘s focus on the importance of 
technics and the rhetorical concepts, methods, and orientations of Kenneth Burke, I argue 
that digital memes – particularly the image macro – are an exemplar of the rhetorical 
affordances and constraints that define the politics of subjectification that drive 
networked publicity.  Through the analysis of three controversies where technocratic and 
memetic rhetoric developed in tension with one another, I argue that through their 
sophistic politics of play memes promote a multitudinous mode of individuation that 
makes them particularly apt resources for the uncoiling and resistance of control. 
Specifically, these amateur dominated technics built meta-narratives that disrupt 
 bureaucratization, remediate terms to destabilize anti-rhetorics, and disrupt national 
memories through their cosmopolitan tendencies. Combined these features lead to the 
conclusion that memes themselves to function as a rhetorical critic par excellence in 
networked rhetorics, fostering a politics of care particularly suited to disrupting the 
proletarianizing force of technocratic rhetorics.   
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Chapter 1 
Introduction: Memes and The Rhetorical Tradition 
―Hey girl…‖ While this colloquial phrase might sound like a simple youthful 
greeting, it is at the center of a networked phenomenon that helped to redefine the career 
of an actor, networked communication, and, most surprisingly, men‘s perceptions of 
feminism. Specifically, the phrase is the defining textual feature of a series of memes 
built around actor Ryan Gosling (figure 1.1). The image in the meme often appears to be 
proclaiming its love/desire for the female viewers of the meme – the ―girl‖ addressed by 
the ―hey.‖1 The power of these memes draws from Gosling‘s reputation as a leading 
figure in romantic films, and, ironically, the social caché of the meme is such that ―hey 
girl‖ emerged as a catch phrase for Gosling despite the fact that Gosling never uttered it 
on screen.
2
  
  
Figure 1.1: First iteration of Feminist Ryan Gosling (left), Foucault example (right).
                                                          
1. The initial iterations of the meme were made popular on the Tumblr ―Fuck Yeah! Ryan 
Gosling.‖ This site now hosts a range of Ryan Gosling memes.  
 
2. Joanna Robinson, ―How Ryan Gosling Tried, and Failed, to Escape the ‗Hey Girl‘ Meme,‖ 
Vanity Fair (March 14, 2015), http://www.vanityfair.com/hollywood/2015/03/ryan-gosling-guillermo-del-
toro-sxsw. 
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 Although the meme enhances Gosling‘s image as a Don Juan, the greatest impact 
of the meme may be how it contributes to feminist critique. Feminist iterations of the 
meme came into being when a graduate student at the University of Wisconsin used the 
―hey girl‖ style of the meme to create a series of flashcards to study the central ideas of 
different gender theorists.
3
 Early posts featured a summary of particular theorists‘ key 
thoughts reinterpreted into the textual form of the meme. The meme framed these ideas 
as responding to the particular image of Gosling the text is imposed over. For example, 
the oldest post features an image of Gosling wiping away a tear under the text 
Hey girl, sometimes I think about Foucault‘s theory of marriage as a 
governmentally developed tool that interferes with the appropriation of 
land rights, normalizes heterosexuality and subjugates a woman‘s 
sexuality and it makes me want to cry with you. (Figure 1.1)
4
 
 
After feminist web magazine Jezebel posted an article about the Tumblr the flashcards 
were posted on, it quickly gained the attention of media outlets, ranging from online press 
giants like The Huffington Post and BuzzFeed to more conventional media outlets like 
CBS, TIME, and The Guardian.
5
 As the meme grew in popularity, it expanded beyond 
theory flashcards, proving an outlet for participants across networked publics to express 
their views on feminism. The memes range from expressing broad feminist themes ―hey 
girl… I mean woman‖6 to commenting on specific issues related to women like ―Hey 
                                                          
3. ―Feminist Ryan Gosling,‖ Know Your Meme, accessed December, 23, 2015, 
http://knowyourmeme.com/memes/feminist-ryan-gosling.  
 
4. An iteration of the meme with image can be found at: 
http://feministryangosling.tumblr.com/post/11171215605.  
 
5. ―Feminist Ryan Gosling,‖ Know Your Meme. 
 
6. The meme can be found at: http://feministryangosling.tumblr.com/post/11171488856.  
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girl, yes means yes.‖7 This ability to place a humorous lens on feminist theory aided in 
their rapid circulation across internetworked sites of communication. In this way, the 
memes became a prominent way in which participants in networked forums thematized 
controversies about gender. 
 Certainly, these memes are entertaining; the Jezebel article proclaims they will 
―cure what ails you.‖8 However, the rhetorical force of these memes is more significant 
than simply being able to elicit a smile. Indeed, social scientific research suggests that 
these seemingly trivial networked texts have the capacity to change the ways that 
participants – both producers and viewers –relate to feminism. In 2015, Researchers at 
the University of Saskatchewan found that when they confronted participants in the study 
with the meme, their pro-feminist sympathies increased upwards of ten percent.
9
 These 
findings suggest that the feminist Ryan Gosling meme not only provides a platform for 
the increased circulation of feminist thought which have the ability to directly change 
attitudes in participants.
10
 The impact of this politically focused meme highlights the 
                                                          
7. The meme can be found at: http://feministryangosling.tumblr.com/post/14469966929.  
 
8. Lane Moore, ―Feminist Ryan Gosling Flashcards Will Cure What Ails You,‖ Jezebel (October 
8, 2011), http://jezebel.com/5847935/feminist-ryan-gosling-flashcards-will-cure-what-ails-you-girl.  
 
9. Tristin Hopper, ―Men More Open To Feminism When It‘s Paired With A Photo Of Canadian 
Actor Ryan Gosling: Study,‖ The National Post (January 27, 2015), 
http://news.nationalpost.com/news/canada/men-more-open-to-feminism-when-its-paired-with-a-photo-of-
canadian-actor-ryan-gosling-study. The researchers presented groups with either the feminist Ryan Gosling 
memes or images of Gosling without text. While they did not study the effects of simply presenting readers 
with feminist messages, they argued this variation was not important to their study because such messages 
do not gain wide circulation in networked participants without the meme.  
 
10. Throughout this dissertation, I generally try to avoid the use of the term audience. This terms 
implies a passive group either reacting to or constituted by a rhetor. However, in recognizing that all 
rhetorical production is collectively constituted, a trend that is both highlighted by and intensified in 
networked rhetorics, I instead use terms like users and participants. These terms position both the speaker 
and audience as co-constituting the rhetoric. Even passive users play into the relationality that defines the 
force of memes. Moreover, as the processes of intertextual reference, remix, and circulation make rhetors 
and audiences ambiguous and at times one in the same in networked media ecologies, this term is also 
simply a more accurate description of the rhetorical environment I seek to explore. When I do use the term 
 4 
larger rhetorical potential of memes. If Ryan Gosling memes can teach about feminism, 
memes as a genre – while often dismissed as trivialities of networked communication –
have the potential to be profound persuasive tools.  
This dissertation takes memes seriously as a site of rhetorical production, arguing 
that memes ought to be critically interpreted as texts significantly shaping public 
deliberation in networked publics. However, taking the rhetorical potential of memes 
seriously is difficult in a discipline firmly rooted in oral communication, the primacy of 
the solo rhetor, and a focus on overtly ―civic‖ discourse. Therefore, before I delve into a 
study of the unique rhetorical force of memes in contemporary political struggles, I must 
first answer a more basic question: are memes a form of public address? More 
specifically, are memes a mode by which publics address one another? As part of this 
question, I must also address if memes have the capability to shape and direct public 
deliberation. Feminist Ryan Gosling‘s capacity to prompt discussion and change minds 
about feminism suggests they can, in addressing publics, stimulate deliberation. This 
chapter charts memes‘ relationship with the rhetorical tradition, identifying points of 
convergence and divergence between traditional models of oral rhetoric and the digitally 
networked rhetorics that now populate political discourse. To outline these contact points 
between rhetoric old and new, I will first elaborate on the history and evolution of the 
concept of meme and its migration to digital rhetorics. Then, to demonstrate their 
rhetorical features, this chapter will situate memes within classical rhetorical concepts. 
Next, to establish the ideological potency of this networked rhetorical form, I locate 
                                                                                                                                                                             
audience it is an effort to remain felicitous to a particular author or theoretical tradition. I similarly avoid 
the term individual because it obfuscates the complex relation between singular actors and the collectivities 
to which they are related and from which they emerge. For more on this later tension see, Paolo Virno, A 
Grammar of the Multitude (Los Angeles: Semiotext(e), 2004). 
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memes within theories of myth, narrative, and genre. Finally, to address their ability to 
function units of political discourse, I will consider the relationship between memes, 
public opinion, and the networked public sphere.  
Memes: From Dawkins to Networked Rhetorics 
The vernacular use of the term ―meme‖ coalesces around assorted genres of 
networked rhetoric. However, the concept of meme originates not in particular forms of 
networked technics but rather as a conceptual heuristic, coined by the evolutionary 
biologist Richard Dawkins, to explain the spread and evolution of cultural phenomena. 
This conception, which still has wide traction in a range of academic fields, does not 
necessarily encompass or define the types of memes in which I am interested in this 
dissertation. That being said, as the root of contemporary understandings of memetics, 
the original sense of the meme provides etymological and historical context relevant to 
understanding internet memes. Moreover, many of the concepts rooted in Dawkins‘ 
evolutionary standpoint continue to inform scholarly understandings and debates 
surrounding internet memes.  
While writing the 1976 book The Selfish Gene, which argues that the gene is the 
central actor in biological evolution, Dawkins ran into a problem – how to explain those 
human behaviors that seem to operate in direct opposition to the survival of genes. A 
notable example of this concern is the presence of voluntary celibacy in human societies, 
which prevents the reproduction of genes.
11
 To explain phenomena such as this, Dawkins 
argues that culture is a force that competes with and can overcome genetic interests. Yet 
                                                          
11. Richard Dawkins, The Selfish Gene (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1976), 198.  
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just as life does not perpetuate itself without the replicatory functions of genes, Dawkins 
needed a concept to explain the way that culture circulated and reproduced. 
 Seeking to explain the replication of culture, Dawkins posited the existence of the 
―meme‖ as the cultural analog to genes, as both memes and genes enable informational 
transmission through a process of evolutionary imitation.
12
 Dawkins derived the word 
meme from the Greek word mimema, meaning ―to imitate.‖ Dawkins then truncated the 
term to ―meme‖ so that it would rhyme with gene, bolstering the parallelism of the two 
concepts.
13
 While genes carry the instructions for the reproduction of particular biological 
traits, Dawkins contends memes carry the instructions for the reproduction of culture. 
Under this definition, memes take a variety of forms ranging from specific cultural 
artifacts such as songs and fashion to broader cultural phenomena including ideologies 
and religion.
14
  
 Because memes can exert force on such a grand scale, Dawkins contends that they 
have the potential to be more powerful than genes.
15
 Their reproduction can influence a 
much larger population more quickly than genes, which take generations to exert new 
force. Moreover, because of their quick spread and ethereal nature they are much less 
likely to be extinguished by the death of a few members of the species. Three 
characteristics, all rooted in evolutionary logics, enable the proliferation of memes: 
                                                          
12. Ibid., 192. 
13. Ibid. Dawkins also notes that meme is also the French word for memory, further justifying the 
truncation.  
 
14. Leslie Hahner, ―The Riot Kiss: Framing Memes as Visual Argument,‖ Argumentation and 
Advocacy, 49 (Winter, 2013): 153. 
 
15. Richard Dawkins, ―Just for Hits‖ Satchi and Satchi New Directors Showcase (June 22, 2012), 
on YouTube https://www.youtube.com/watch?t=305&v=GFn-ixX9edg. 
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gradual movement from individual to society, reproduction via imitation, and diffusion 
through competition and selection.
16
 For followers of Dawkins, memes operate 
independent of human agency, ―jumping from brain to brain.‖17 As ideas spread and 
mutate, they fight to ensure their continued survival, adapting to new cultural forms that 
best allow their reproduction. Just like genes and viruses, some memes will spread widely 
and have a long influence, some will fail to spread beyond a few hosts, some will explode 
and quickly contract (e.g. fads), and others will fail to gain any social traction.
18
 As part 
of this logic, memes may relate to one another to help ensure their survival, creating 
―‗memeplexes,‘ or interdependent families of memes‖ that work together to exert similar 
social force.
19
 Given the vast power of this concept to explain the evolution of culture, 
memetic studies gained popularity in a range of academic fields, even getting its own 
journal in 1997.
20
  
Despite this growing popularity, the concept of the meme is not without its critics. 
Its opponents argue that in its applicability to both concrete phenomena and broad 
cultural concepts, the meme is difficult to define with exactitude, essentializes the 
complexity of human behaviors, and removes the centrality of human agency.
21
 If every 
concept can be theorized as a meme, what is the analytical utility of the term? Further, if 
memes are so powerful, does any consequential sense of human agency get consigned to 
                                                          
16. Limor Shifman, Memes in Digital Culture (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 2014), 29. 
 
17. Susan Blackmore, The Meme Machine (London: Oxford University Press, 1999), 6. 
 
18. Hahner, ―Riot Kiss,‖ 153. 
 
19. Davi Johnson, ―Mapping the Meme: A Geographical Approach to Materialist Rhetorical 
Criticism,‖ Communication and Critical/Cultural Studies, 4 no. 1 (2007): 38. 
 
20. Ibid., 29. 
 
21. Limor Shifman, ―Memes in a Digital World: Reconciling with a Conceptual Troublemaker,‖ 
Journal of Computer Mediated Communication 18 (2013): 364. 
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the dustbin of history? While these criticisms have merit, they do not necessarily apply to 
the variant of networked memes. Under Dawkins‘ logic, the very concept of the meme is 
a meme itself – a verbal configuration that both carries social understanding of 
phenomena and is capable of adapting and evolving. As such, it comes as no surprise the 
term is evolving with the development of networked culture, adopting a new, more 
widely circulated form. As Dawkins asserts: 
An internet meme is a hijacking of the original idea. Instead of mutating 
by random chance, before spreading by a form of Darwinian selection, 
internet memes are altered deliberately by human creativity. In the 
hijacked version, mutations are designed, not random, with the full 
knowledge of the person doing the mutating.
22
 
 
This vernacular use of the term meme challenges many of the criticisms of Dawkins 
original conception.
23
 To explicate this point, I will next outline the ways networked 
culture changed the very concept of the meme. 
Memes Go Digital 
 A wide range of networked phenomena fall under the category of networked 
memes, including reaction photos, misheard lyrics, rage comics, LOLcats, and stock 
character macros.
24
 In the face of this wide range of phenomenon, scholars have 
attempted to find a unifying definition of networked memes. Amongst the most popular is 
Limor Shifman‘s, which defines memes as ―a group of digital content units sharing a 
common content, form, and/or stance.‖25 Ryan Milner‘s definition, focuses more on 
                                                          
22. Richard Dawkins, ―Just for Hits.‖ 
23. Limor Shifman, ―Memes in a Digital World,‖ 364. 
 
24. Shifman, Memes in Digital Culture, 184. 
 
25. Ibid,, 188. As part of clarifying the definition of memes, Shifman delineates between memes 
and virals. Memes circulate through a process of imitation, transmitting the cultural information through 
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process and outcome rather than content. Milner argues ―memes [are] multimodal 
artifacts remixed by countless participants, employing popular culture for public 
commentary.‖26 Contrary to Dawkins‘ theory of the meme, which invests agency in the 
meme at the expense of the human, these definitions focus on the capacity of participants 
to mobilize formal expectations to participate in existing memeplexes. Shifman stresses 
that ―human agency should be an integral part of our conceptualization of memes by 
describing them as dynamic entities that spread in response to technological, cultural, and 
social choices made by people.‖27 Because human rhetorical activity leads to the 
production, reinterpretation, and circulation of memes, they are not independent agents. If 
memes are a communicative techne, they are amenable to rhetorical analysis.
28
  
 With this rhetorical understanding of memes, an internet meme forms when 
participants take any piece of spreadable media (media that is networked and remixable) 
and modify it in such a way that it is participatory, is remixed, and diffuses quickly.
29
 
However, this does not mean that memes exist independently; as Shifman notes, memes 
should not be treated as ―isolated, discreet units, but as the building blocks of complex 
                                                                                                                                                                             
the reproduction and alteration of the original unit. Conversely, users circulate virals in their original form. 
A viral can, and often does, become a meme, but not all memes originate as virals. 
26. Ryan Milner, ―Pop Polyvocality: Internet Memes, Public Participation and the Occupy Wall 
Street Movement‘. International Journal of Communication, 7 (2013): 2357 
27. Shifman, Memes in Digital Culture, 184. 
 
28. Once considered as techne, memes are inexorably linked to the rhetorical canons. Processes of 
invention help explain their creation and circulation, arrangement helps explain formal concerns, and the 
visual nature of memes highlights issues of delivery and style. Finally, as Dawkins highlights, the very 
nature of memes as cultural replicators ties them to memory.  
 
29. Bradley E Wiggins and G Brett Bowers, ―Memes as Genre: A Structurational Analysis of the 
Memescape,‖ New Media & Society 17 no. 11 (2015): 1896. 
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cultures, intertwining and interacting with each other.‖30 Beyond sharing circulatory 
features, memes tend to embrace an aesthetic of amateurism or ugliness. The material 
limitations of early image and video editing software created the expectation that 
authentic internet culture lacked the polish of professional image manipulation.
31
  
 The cultural norms of networked ecologies created the conditions under which 
memes circulate. This led Shifman to conclude, ―only memes suited to their socio-
cultural environment will spread successfully.‖32 However, the question of what exactly 
makes a networked meme situated to a particular rhetorical environment ranges widely; 
explanations include that which drives participation and attention of particular 
audiences,
33
 ambiguity and memetic agency,
34
 multivocal coverage of controversy,
35
 
appealing to shared social function,
36
 or humor, rich intertextuality, and juxtapositions.
37
 
These explanations of the circulatory power of memes all rely on the force created by the 
interplay of varied textual performances by memetic participants. The performances are 
                                                          
30. Limor Shifman, ―An Anatomy of a YouTube Meme,‖ New Media & Society 14 no. 2 (2011): 
189. 
 
31. Nick Douglas ―It‘s Supposed to Look Like Shit: The Internet Ugly Aesthetic‖ Journal of 
Visual Culture 13 no. 3 (2014): 337 
 
32. Shifman ―Anatomy,‖ 188. 
 
33. Ibid., 199. 
 
34. Johnson, ―Mapping,‖ 42. 
 
35. Hahner ―Riot Kiss,‖ 164. 
 
36. Jan Blommaert, ―Meaning as Nonlinear Effect: The Birth of Cool,‖ AILA Review 28 (2015): 
19. 
37. Michele Knobel and Colin Lankshear, ―Online Memes, Affinities, And Cultural Production,‖ 
In A New Literacies Sampler, ed. Michele. Knobel and Colin. Lankshear (New York: Peter Lang, 2007), 
200. 
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grounded in particular cultural and political contexts and are built around a particular 
rhetorical form. 
 Memetic performances take place on a wide array of networked platforms, 
ranging from participatory social media such as Facebook, Twitter, and Tumblr, to more 
static sites including blogs and news media. The popularity of memes is such that users 
even print them to comment on events happening in ―real life.‖38 Although memes 
circulate anywhere a picture or video can be posted, the most prolific sites of memetic 
creation and circulation are 4chan and Reddit. 4chan is ―a[n] imageboard website on 
which users upload and discuss visual images.‖39 As a site dedicated to the discussion of 
images, its focus on memes is perhaps inevitable. Specifically, the /b/ sub-board – which 
is dedicated to random, unmoderated conversation – emerged as a location where memes 
are created through a logic of competition and where awareness of the proper usage of 
memes is a form of cultural capital.
40
 For those users who find 4chan too unruly, with its 
ethos of radically free expression and excessive vulgarity, Reddit is a more mainstream 
social media site where users participate in comment threads built around themes. 
Popular comments, including the particularly impactful use of memes, can be voted to the 
top of the page, increasing their circulation.
41
 The competitive logic of these sites allows 
for the social negotiation of the ―proper‖ form of particular memes and enhances their 
circulation across the larger networked public sphere.  
                                                          
38. Alan White and Sebastian Fiebrig, ―A Door In Germany Broke Down and The Most 
Memetacular Thing Happened,‖ Buzzfeed (March 13, 2015), http://www.buzzfeed.com/alanwhite/this-
sage-of-a-broken-german-door-that-became-a-wall-of-meme?utm_term=.gsnj0Mr9va.  
 
39. Shifman, Memes in Digital Culture, 178. 
 
40. Ibid., 184. 
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The Stock Character Macro 
  
Figure 1.2: Initial iteration of Advice Dog (left), example of other popular iteration 
(right). 
There are a range of genres of networked memes, each with their own unique 
functions and formal expectations. While some are mundane, such as Lip-sync Videos 
and Misheard Lyrics, others have more overtly civic oriented forms. For example, the 
Photo Fad genre, which centers on the form of participants re-creating existing 
photographs, led to the ―I am the 99%‖ meme.42 This meme let networked participants 
around the world to show their solidarity with the Occupy movement. Because of this 
diverse range of possibilities, Shifman argues, scholars must evaluate specific genres of 
memes to best understand their function and circulation.
43
 Consequently, for this 
dissertation, I choose to focus primarily on stock character macros. Certainly, these 
memes have idiosyncratic elements; however, their wide circulation, popularity, and 
roots in established internet aesthetics mean that they function as a representative 
anecdote for memes writ large. In fact, the reach of this particular genre of meme is so 
                                                          
42. Ibid., 143. 
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significant that vernacular uses of the term meme usually refer specifically to stock 
character macros.
44
 
So what exactly is a stock character macro? This genre of memes finds their roots 
in the culture and technological affordances of the internet. Kate Brideau and Charles 
Berret note that the term itself originates in programming culture: 
Image macros are named after macro instructions, scripts that save time 
and effort for a programmer by replacing a lengthy or repetitive task with 
a set of defined procedures. For instance, you might write a macro 
instruction to automatically rename a batch of files. Indeed, many time-
saving features like cut and paste are forms of macro instruction. 
Likewise, rather than opening an image and placing text by hand, meme 
generators take the chosen text and set it automatically. The image itself 
and the style of text are largely fixed within the code of these meme-
generating macro instructions. 
45
 
 
These memes take a variety of forms. The most famous include Socially Awkward 
Penguin, Condescending Willy Wonka, and Scumbag Steve.
46
 While not all stock 
character macros follow identical layouts, the majority abide by the template established 
by the first stock character macro, Advice Dog (Figure 1.2).
47
 Advice Dog features a 
picture of a puppy who seems to be smiling imposed over a rainbow background with 
lines of text above and below the face. This text is almost universally in the Impact font, 
a font chosen both because it was native to most early computer platforms and because it 
was easy to read over images.
48
 In networked vernacular, participants labeled this text 
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―top line‖ and ―bottom line.‖ In each stock character macro, these lines have a unique 
function. In Advice Dog, the top line typically offers a reasonable piece of advice and the 
bottom line twists in a humorous, lewd, or disturbing fashion – e.g. ―live wires // are 
delicious‖ or ―suck helium // defy gravity.‖49 Due to its popularity, users imitated Advice 
Dog through a variety of other so-called ―Advice Animals‖ including Courage Wolf and 
Philosoraptor (Figure 1.3).
50
  
  
Figure 1.3: Examples of Courage Wolf (left) and Philosoraptor (right). 
While beginning with animals dispensing advice, the genre of stock character 
macros has since expanded to include all sorts of characters, not all of whom give advice. 
Each macro performs unique behaviors, attitudes, and affects. Despite this range of forms 
and functions, the genre of stock character macros centers around two formal features: 
the use of an image of a stock character with a particular personality and the use of the 
top-line/set-up bottom-line/punch line textual format. Although these stock character 
                                                                                                                                                                             
 
49. For the sake of clarity, I chose to use ―//‖ to denote the break between the topline and the 
bottom line on a stock character macro.  
 
50. Examples of current advice animals, as well as the ways that memetic participants use 
comments to police/negotiate form can be found on the advice animals Reddit: 
https://www.reddit.com/r/AdviceAnimals/.  
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macros began with users editing images on their computers with programs like Paint or 
Photoshop, these memes diffused to more general use with the rise of websites such as 
Meme Generator, Quick Meme, and Reddit. These sites provided a database of stock 
images and software that enabled participants to easily caption pictures in the 
conventional format. These memes have become more than just humorous pictures: they 
serve as a way to connect participants to communities and politics. Such circulation leads 
Shifman to conclude that although memes ―spread on the micro basis [their] impact is on 
the macro.‖51 If memes are a genre of symbolic action that influences others, then they 
are amenable to a rhetorical hermeneutic; thus, in the next section, I detail contact points 
between memes and the rhetorical tradition. 
Invention and Topoi: Memes and the Classical Tradition 
 Given its roots in Athenian Democracy and the Roman Republic, it is no surprise 
that inheritors of the Greco-Roman rhetorical tradition have – on balance – historically 
privileged public speeches delivered on policy issues. The concepts we turn to as 
originating points often reify this orientation. The Aristotelian definition of rhetoric as 
―the available means of persuasion,‖ Quintilian‘s ―a good man speaking well,‖ as well as 
the focus on civic affairs that spans from the sophists through Cicero all orient rhetoric 
towards questions of the civic good as developed through public deliberation. Certainly, 
the insights of scholars of cultural studies and feminisms with their focus on the personal 
and everyday, the proliferation of internetworked communication technologies, and the 
theorization of alternative modes of subjectivity and social relation all put pressure on 
these classical concepts. However, since 2500 years of influence suggest profound insight 
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into communication, the rhetorical terms of antiquity continue to have explanatory 
power. 
Thus, it is not surprising that one of the tasks of contemporary rhetoric is to 
examine how concepts from classical traditions may inform but also be expanded by 
application outside the realms of the tradition. Such a move is particularly apt considering 
the fact that the norms afforded by networked technologies and culture foster a 
communicative environment that in many ways is closer to the norms of antiquity than 
modernity.
52
 The recognition of the parallels between pre-modern and contemporary 
rhetorical norms not only makes ancient concepts germane to contemporary civic life but 
also helps to legitimate the field of networked rhetoric as its practices are rooted in a 
rhetorical – rather than literary or technical – tradition. As part of the call to update 
rhetoric to the conditions of networked communication, Damien Smith Pfister notes that 
the native terms and concepts emerging from networked media ecologies provide a useful 
way to understand the unique qualities of this new mode/era of communication. 
Moreover, Pfister calls upon critics to explore the new forms of expressiveness that are 
uniquely enabled by digital technology.
53
 It is in the spirit of this call that I have chosen 
to focus this study on internet memes. Digital memes, which are almost exclusively 
networked texts, function as a recurring form of networked discourses that influence 
individual and collective attitudes. This claim can be parsed by exploring how digital 
memes connect to the general tradition of invention and in particular the topoi. 
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Inventive Memes 
Central to Cicero‘s rhetorical pedagogy, the rhetorical canons remain one of the 
most influential attempts to offer a comprehensive and systematic accounting for the 
issues central to rhetorical production. These canons emerged in a rhetorical environment 
primarily focused on democratic discourse and as such are particularly suited to public 
orations delivered to a civic audience. Traditional rhetorical scholarship often gives 
invention primacy amongst the canons. Some of this is no doubt because it is the canon 
most suited to modernist glorification of the rational, liberal, unified subject. However, it 
is also a necessary precondition for the other canons within a rhetorical context. 
Certainly, delivery, memory, style, and arrangement all inform invention. However, 
rhetors cannot activate these canons without some process of invention. Consequently, I 
devote my attention to the ways that memes call for a refiguring of this canon in order to 
argue that while they may seem like small-scale personal musings, memes are part of a 
rich network of public address that is central to contemporary rhetorical life. Specifically, 
I argue that although concepts relating to the content of invention remain useful – stasis 
can be used to diagnose networked controversy as easily as ancient orations and digital 
texts still employ a range of artistic and inartistic proofs – networked rhetorics challenge 
two assumptions that emerged in modern interpretations of invention: the role of a 
unitary author and the novelty of the text.  
First, any theory of networked rhetoric must decenter the role of a unitary rhetor 
as the primary force of invention. Modern usages of the word invention evoke images of 
scientists in a lab shouting ―eureka!‖ as they make their discovery. Under this conception, 
invention focuses on the means available to an individual rhetor to invent the argument 
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most suited to a particular occasion. Such an approach is consistent both with modern 
conceptions of human agency, as well as contemporary vernacular understandings of 
communication and persuasion. However, the proliferation of networked communication 
technologies suggests that such a conception is no longer tenable, if it ever was. In a call 
to update the canons, Pfister asserts that networked technologies afford increased 
intertextuality, remix, and interactivity, making it nearly impossible to consider any one 
participant as the inventor of a rhetorical text.
54
 Therefore, the question of who (or what) 
is the rhetor is central to understanding invention in networked rhetoric. 
On the most basic level, while human action drives internetworked 
communication, the technologies behind this ecology destabilize the possibility of a 
single unified rhetor at the heart of communicative action. This is not to say that the 
rhetor disappears. Linguistic and cultural markers embedded within particular iterations 
gesture to the subjectivity of a particular rhetor.
55
 However, the focus on the anonymity 
of the internet is largely a product of antiquated understandings of the web, when the 
majority of content was the textual production from a single keyboard. Even in these 
cases, the unity of the rhetor is a fantasy. These message board posts or blogs are, at best, 
the distillation of a range of historical and textual forces focused through a particular 
rhetor functioning as a point of articulation. However, newer networked rhetorical 
phenomena complicate this already questionable unity of the rhetor. As networked 
technologies increase the range of information available and connect participants to wider 
networks of symbolic exchange, networked modes of invention becomes increasingly 
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intertextual and socially generated.
56
 Participants hyperlink arguments, add GIFs, re-edit 
videos, and create new iterations of memes. Under these conditions, pinpointing a lone 
rhetor as the genesis of invention seems impossible. Individual participants deploy 
particular iterations of a meme, but the process of invention expands well beyond their 
individual capacities. 
Yet the loss of a definitive rhetor is not a loss for rhetoric; indeed, freeing 
memetic composition from the mythologies of a specific author ―enables generative 
practices and renders the form highly malleable.‖57 In their capacity as remixed 
intertextual texts, much of networked invention takes the form of what Roland Barthes 
would call a writerly text. They are ―incomplete, plural, indeterminate. As open texts, 
they call upon the reader to supply or fill in meaning. …texts that are dispersed and 
designed to be experienced rather than to provide closure.‖58 Following this observation, 
Collin Brooke notes that networked invention is proairetic rather than hermeneutic. 
Brooke critiques hermeneutic understandings of invention because their focus on 
meaning and resolution prevents participants from attending to other functions and 
processes enabled by a text.
59
 Conversely, a proairetic focus not only draws attention to 
the collective nature of networked (and really all) invention but also suggests invention is 
an ongoing, rather than static process. Brooke notes proairetic invention focuses on the  
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generation of possibilities, rather than their elimination until all but one 
are gone and closure has been achieved. Closure is no less important now 
than it ever has been, but with the advent of new media and interfaces that 
resist closure, proairesis provides an important corrective to the 
hermeneutically oriented inventional theory that has prevailed in our field 
to date.
60
 
 
Because of the ―openness‖ of the text, networked rhetorical spaces resemble or enable 
Kenneth Burke‘s unending conversation.61 For example, the history of a meme informs 
any particular iteration of a meme and shape future iterations. No one participant can 
locate the genesis of the conversation, but they can modify its flow via their participation 
in the perpetual process of invention afforded by digital media ecologies.  
While Brooke‘s proairetic stance suggests that any rhetorical iteration is always 
already part of a larger inventional process, the role circulation plays in contemporary 
processes of invention also disrupts the novelty of a particular rhetorical text. On the 
most basic level, the increase of circulation afforded by networked technologies makes 
remix and other intertextual maneuvering proliferate. The more a particular meme 
circulates, the easier it is for networked participants to call on that meme and assume 
other participants will understand its rhetorical trajectory.
62
 The very act of circulation by 
itself is an impactful rhetorical act. Zizi Paracharissi notes that circulation, even without 
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the addition of content, intensifies the affective force of digital texts.
63
 Every user who 
(re)circulates a meme subtly alters its rhetorical force.  
The internetworked nature of memes makes authorship a complicated question, as 
a meme may have hundreds, or even thousands, of participants who added to its 
rhetorical force. However, tracing the constitution of this rhetorical force by pursuing 
questions related to authorship is useful, orienting the critic towards the social 
collectivities that come together to imbue particular meaning/force into a meme or other 
networked text. It is only through multiple users playing with the form of the meme that a 
larger narrative and socially constructed narrative emerges, translating it from a single 
image to a cultural phenomenon capable of political commentary and organizing force. 
Thus, it is the collective invention of memes, an invention that relies entirely on the 
possibility of public conversation, which allows them to function as invented public 
address. Once we move toward a proairetic understanding of invention demanded by 
memes, we can explore the practical implications of this shift through memes‘ 
relationship to topoi. 
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Memes as Networked Topoi 
While the question of proairesis has profound ramifications for considerations of 
the evolving nature of invention and agency in networked rhetorics, the most direct way 
that scholars connected memes to the tradition of rhetoric is through the concept of topoi. 
Ben Wetherbee highlights how memes are instructional in understanding the 
contemporary function of the concept:  
We might begin to reconcile rhetoric and memetics by considering how 
some memes function as rhetorical topoi. Scholars of rhetoric, thanks in 
part to disagreement among ancient rhetoricians, disagree over the exact 
definition of topoi, though the term typically denotes the ‗locations‘ or 
‗places‘ where rhetors can go to invent arguments. Generally, topoi are 
regarded as either heuristic patterns one can follow to generate arguments 
in the right circumstances – a la Aristotle‘s twenty-eight ‗common‘ topics 
– or stock ‗commonplaces‘ the rhetor commits to memory, seen most 
notably in early Roman rhetorical handbooks.
64
 
 
Combining the memetic and rhetorical traditions, Wetherbee expands the definition of 
topoi to include any ―appropriate set of conceptual and emotional associations for a given 
audience within a given cultural context.‖65 When understood within this framework, 
memes exhibit the capacity to function as rhetorical resources for the generation of more 
traditional rhetorical texts.  
To help explain the generative potential implied in understanding memes as topoi, 
scholars turned to the success of pre-digital memetic technologies. Specifically, 
examining political pinback buttons as a historical precursor to memes, Madsen and 
Fritch note that while memetic buttons likely have not changed the outcome of any one 
election, they have functioned to identify community members and distill arguments that 
                                                          
64. Ben Wetherbee, ―Picking Up Fragments of the 2012 Election: Memes, Topoi, and Political 
Rhetoric,‖ Present Tense 5 no. 1 (2015): 2. 
 
65. Ibid., 3.  
 23 
were central to campaigns.
66
 In this way, the buttons function as a material reminder of 
the arguments that were available. As a circulating form of argument, they certainly 
served as a resource for the proairetic invention of other forms of political argument. 
Interlocutors can easily expand a distilled slogan into a larger conversation, the likes of 
which can sway elections. 
 
Figure 1.4: Meme referenced by Ben Carson in a presidential primary debate. 
Focusing on this relational function, Hahner argues that memes, through their 
provision of alternative topoi to established narratives, spur contestation and thus advance 
public argument.
67
 Memes enable this opening of deliberative space because they have 
the potential to both condense argument and make their own arguments through their 
functioning as political topoi. A 2016 South Carolina Republican presidential primary 
debate demonstrates this potential. During the debate, Republican presidential candidate 
Ben Carson used a quotation, incorrectly attributed to Stalin, which came from a meme 
that had been circulating across Republican-dominated networked ecologies (Figure 
                                                          
66. Arnie Madsen and John Fritch, ―100 Million Buttons Can‘t Be Wrong: Argument in Political 
Pinback Buttons‖ Disturbing Argument: Selected Works from the 18th NCA/AFA Conference on 
Argumentation, ed. Catherine Palczeski (New York: Routledge, 2014), 199. 
 
67. Hahner, ―Riot Kiss,‖ 163. 
 
 24 
1.4).
68
 While the information gleaned from the meme was factually incorrect, the meme 
consolidated certain anti-leftist attitudes. The focusing of this sentiment into usable topoi 
inspired Carson to draw directly from the meme, allowing the meme to shape electoral 
discourse and open new topics for public deliberation. 
The Stories Memes Tell: Genre, Narrative, and Myth 
Proairetic invention and the connection to topoi begin to explain the ways that 
memes function as arguments and thus contribute to deliberation between publics. 
However, memes also have the ability to operate independently of other modes of address 
while still fitting within the rhetorical tradition. To evaluate this larger rhetorical 
potential, I will now turn to an evaluation of how memes independently work within 
three concepts central to post-classical conceptions of rhetorical criticism: genre, 
narrative, and myth.  
Rhetorics of Form: Genre and Memes 
The explosion of memes across networked forums led to a proliferation of the 
variety of memes circulated by participants, thousands of memes emerged taking myriad 
forms. To manage this diversity, both popular media – most notably Know Your Meme – 
and academics led by Shifman, devoted great effort to the categorization of different 
families of memes.
69
 Yet, websites and academics do not simply create these categories 
of memes top-down. Participants in networked rhetorical spaces police the norms of 
particular memes from the bottom-up. Specifically, participants often refuse to circulate 
                                                          
68. Ashley Feinberg, ―Ben Carson‘s Fake Stalin Quote Came from a Right-Wing Facebook 
Meme,‖ Gawker (February 13, 2016), http://gawker.com/ben-carsons-fake-stalin-quote-came-from-a-ring-
wing-fac-1759025587.  
 
69. Shifman‘s Memes in Digital Culture provides a detailed categorization of the most influential 
genres of memes.  
 25 
memes that violate generic norms. Further, they chastise usages of those memes that do 
not meet the normative standards established through communal participation in a 
particular meme.
70
 For example, in evaluating the meme Confession Bear, which often is 
used to narrate ―something shitty you did that you regret,‖ users chastised those iterations 
that participants used to issue more boastful confessions (Figure 1.5).
71
 As users both 
create and consume not only memes but also the norms that drive those memes, Wiggins 
and Bowers note ―Memes are a genre, not a medium, of online communication and are 
artifacts of participatory digital culture characterized specifically by an agency of 
consumption-production.‖72 Memes are not just a tool networked participants can use but 
also a unique genre of communication formed through social deliberation. Once created, 
these genres then place constraints on the conditions for deliberation. This orientation 
towards memes highlights their capacity to uniquely enable cross public exchanges.  
  
Figure 1.5: Standard example of Confession Bear (left), criticized version (right). 
                                                          
70. Jacqueline Ryan Vickery, ―The Curious Case of Confession Bear: The Reappropriation of 
Online Macro-Image Memes, Information,‖ Communication & Society 17 no. 3 (2014), 313.  
71. Ibid., 323. 
 
72. Wiggins and Bowers, ―Memes as Genre,” 1896.  
 
 26 
Genre has long been a central concept in understanding rhetorical production. In 
his field re-defining book on rhetorical criticism, Edwin Black notes that genre is central 
to understanding the historically created expectations and functions of families of texts.
73
 
When a rhetor or critic knows the expectations of a genre, they can evaluate if a 
particular text contains the potential to flourish within these norms. In understanding its 
capability to enable particular rhetorical effect, theorists of genre imply that the power of 
genre goes beyond simple categorization. Genre functions as a historically produced 
series of relations, which help define the ways that particular rhetorical iterations can act 
within contingent rhetorical relationships.
74
 From this perspective, Campbell and 
Jaimison argue that form is central to genre. As they note, ―formal similarities establish 
genres.‖75 For example, the genre of the eulogy not only demands a rhetor define their 
relationship to the deceased and confront mortality but also uses the qualities of the 
deceased to establish community values and set future goals.
76
 The form shapes not only 
the content but also the political function of the rhetoric. 
 Yet, deciphering the power of form does not simply involve the identification of 
similar structural characteristics. As opposed to this formalist approach, I use form in the 
Burkean sense. Burke defines form as ―the creation of an appetite in the mind of the 
auditor, and the adequate satisfying of that appetite.‖77 Thus for Burke, form is predicated 
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upon negotiation and identification between participants in a rhetorical exchange. Such a 
relation implies that form has persuasive impact because ―forms can induce participation 
by others.‖78 This is not to say that a singular form defines any particular genre; rather, 
generes emerge as a ―constellation of forms‖ that develop across related texts.79 Arguing 
genre exerts persuasive force beyond particular iterations, Miller asserts that the action 
that participants use form to accomplish is central to the character of a genre.
80
 While 
seeking to deemphasize form, Miller does not abandon it, noting that genre is a particular 
type of form focused on the creation of action. For Miller, although critics still use genre 
as an ―index to cultural patterns and as tools for exploring the achievements of particular 
speakers and writers,‖ genre has a different function for consumers of rhetorical acts: it 
teaches participants how to engage in the community for whom the genre exists.
81
 Simply 
put, it is only in understanding the way that a genre is both constituted by and constitutive 
of community that a single user begins to operate within and influence that community.  
Consequently, form – following the Burkean definition – is key to understanding 
how rhetorical actors engage in action. Barry Brummett notes that for Burke, literature is 
only able to function as ―‗equipment for living‘ because it connects to our lives formally, 
and is thus able to offer advice as to how to live.‖ 82 Rhetorical forms establish the 
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patterns that order the world and shape participants‘ thought. Brummett notes that in this 
capacity, form is eminently rhetorical:  
[Form] becomes the template for how we organize wide swathes of 
experience, text, and media. Our own subjectivity, the world, and our 
experiences in the world body forth from form. The seed planted by 
repeated exposure to single texts is internalized and grows into the kudzu 
vine of form hooking wide ranges of life into itself through its formal 
tendrils.
83
 
 
Brummett‘s focus on form underlines Miller‘s claim that to understand the social force of 
genre requires a focus on form. This relation is particularly important as form functions 
as a persuasive force that underlies the production of rhetorical texts. While the specific 
content of an individual text does matter, it can neither be interpreted nor exert force 
without the generic forms that come to define it. For example, the text, ―one does not 
simply // ignore the political economy of memes,‖ suggests the importance of attending 
to larger political/economic conditions that allow for the creation of memes (Figure 1.6).  
 
Figure 1.6: Example of the “One Does Not” meme. 
However, when read within the formal expectations of the meme, which dictate that the 
bottom line is an action taken at grave peril (such as walking into Mordor in the Lord of 
the Rings universe – the inspiring line of the meme), the meme suggests an intensity of 
this warning not possible in the words alone. 
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 Because networked spaces bring together diverse participants, often without 
previous connection, genre is particularly salient in the creation of networked 
communities. Specifically, particular technologies, such as computer programs including 
meme-generating software, play a key role in the development and proliferation of 
genres.
84
 By creating constraints on the structure, length, and form of networked 
communication, these technologies often define the relationships and functions of 
networked participants and texts. Through this ability, they are central to the function of 
genre in networked spaces. Consequently, Shifman contends that the study of genre is 
particularly useful in the networked public sphere: 
digital culture seems to represent a new amalgamation between top-down 
mass-mediated genres and bottom-up mundane types of rhetorical actions. 
Thus if, previously, acts of ‗vernacular creativity‘ – everyday innovative 
and artistic practices that can be carried out by simple means of production 
– were ‗hidden‘ in domestic settings, in the digital era they were re-
formulated as highly visible public culture.
85
 
 
The unique relations between rhetorical producers in network space make genre more 
fluid and, I think, more democratic. Within networked media ecologies, the thematization 
of genre is a public process where all participants engage in defining the norms of 
rhetorical culture. For example, the Scumbag Steve meme, used to criticize particular 
actions, attitudes, or policies as undesirable, is a locus for the negotiation of social values 
(Figure 1.7). Each iteration of the meme offers judgment on a new action or affect. The 
community decides if the iteration is an acceptable fit within the form of the meme, 
effectively judging the social desirability of the action and offering metacommentary 
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about the generic fit. As users make new memes, circulate popular ones, and condemn 
those they think do not fit a particular meme, the form emerges as not simply the use of a 
picture and a specific textual format. Instead, formal expectations are negotiated through 
affective and narrative judgment. In the case of Scumbag Steve, social negotiations of 
what it means to be a scumbag emerge as central to the form. 
  
Figure 1.7: Examples of the Scumbag Steve meme 
Narratives from Fragments 
 Beyond the rhetorical force exerted through the construction and deployment of 
memetic genres, memes also exert rhetorical force through their creation of, and 
commentary on, varied social narratives. The rhetorical influence of narratives has long 
been established: not only are narratives experientially central to communication 
processes, but the rhetorical negotiation of symbols within narrative structures is key to 
how participants make sense of them.
86
 On face, as minute textual/visual fragments, it 
would be easy to dismiss the role memes play regarding larger narratives. However, 
rhetorical texts are not just the amalgamation of traditional texts and the contextual 
                                                          
86. Walter R. Fisher, ―Narrative as a Human Communication Paradigm: The Case of Public Moral 
Argument,‖ Communication Monographs 51 (1984), 2. 
 31 
fragments that surround them. Instead, following Michael McGee‘s claims about how 
contemporary public culture offers fragments of texts rather than ―finished‖ discourses, 
textual fragments may also be constructed by participants and critics into a larger, more 
consequential rhetorical text/narrative.
87
 From this perspective, memetic fragments 
engage narratives in three ways: they may construct ―new‖ narratives, they affectively 
recast existing narratives, or they perform narrative metacommentary.  
 First, memes have the capacity to coalesce diffuse public sentiment or affects into 
a concrete narrative. Specifically, with their focus on an embodied subject in a particular 
context, image macros often function as a dramatized version of the morality of digital 
cultures.
88
 For example, Scumbag Steve serves as a sort of metonym for scumbaggery. A 
disdain for overly self-interested individuals is not a new phenomenon. However, through 
the implied and embodied presence of Scumbag Steve, the personification of a certain 
variety of young male egotism, this feeling of disdain gets a body to focus upon.
89
 
Moreover, the framing of the photo in a doorway gives this body a story (Figure 1.8). The 
scumbag-ness of Steve comes from not just Steve‘s attitude but also the figure‘s 
imposition on your space – entering the door towards the viewer of the meme. This 
common story (especially among younger meme producers and circulators) of a scumbag 
crashing a party enables identification between participants. This identification creates 
conditions that enable a specific affective response that comes to life in the narrative it 
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constructs. Specifically, this enthymematic narrative creates identification around the 
sense of empathy between the varied participants in the meme.
90
 Each iteration extends 
this narrative, as each meme demonstrates Steve engaging in a new action, adding more 
detail to the narrative of Steve‘s assorted scummy exploits. 
 Yet the rhetorical force of a meme is not just in the public enjoyment of a 
recognizable narration of social understandings of affects. Instead, memes also function 
to incorporate existing actors and narratives; doing so enables participants to deploy 
memetic action to comment on and affectively recast existing narratives and events. 
Specifically, in their ability to mimic existing social narratives, memes create spaces to 
promote particular ―affective resonances.‖91 Participants can then use these resonances to 
judge events. Textually commenting on an event over the image of scumbag Steve 
equates the event with scumbag-ness.
92
 Similarly, the creation of a meme around the 
infamous image of a Californian police officer pepper spraying college protesters 
recasted the events. Andrew Peck argues that as participants in the production of Casually 
Pepper Spray Everything Cop memes were able to impose the officer onto different 
social struggles, they were able to propagate 
a sense of marginalization by institutional forces, framing themselves as 
victims of everyday coercion, force, and obfuscation. Similarly, the 
practice of sharing these photoshops was framed by users as an alternative 
discourse that represented freedom of expression, civic engagement, and 
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exposing abuses of power in a flawed system of institutions. In effect, 
photoshopping came to represent a fight against these institutions and the 
marginalization they represented.
93
 
 
Memes thus function as a tool for assorted networked participants to circulate their 
affective response to already existing narratives. While some of these memes may 
support dominant narratives, these affective expressions often circulate a remediation of 
events. This proliferation of competing narratives then opens deliberative space, as 
citizens debate the disparities between these differing evaluations of events.
94
 When the 
Obama administration announced the killing of Osama bin Laden, they released a photo 
of the situation room watching the raid. Meme users repurposed this image by recasting 
the image, inserting other figures and repositioning the participants (Figure 1.8). For 
example, one iteration of the meme recast the viewers in the situation room as members 
of the Justice League, recasting them as cartoon heroes rather than serious American 
leaders. These reframings of the image serve to question the seriousness of the event as 
well as appeals to American values, creating a space for debate over the killing of bin 
Laden. 
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Figure 1.8: Original Situation Room photo (left), a memetic recast (right). 
Beyond constructing and commenting on social narratives, memes also engage 
narrativity by highlighting the implicit norms of existing narratives. As condensations of 
complex social relations into a single image, memes undeniably rely on stereotype. 
Moreover, as many meme creators (and subjects) are white privileged men, these 
stereotypes are often those that reinforce dominant social relations.
95
 However, this does 
not mean that memes are uncritically reinforcing stereotypes, although many users 
circulate them in this manner. Instead, Shifman argues that memes can function as a form 
of hypersignification, a state where ―the code itself [is] no longer concealed, but [is] 
turned into a sign.‖96 Hypersignification then turns the stereotypes of memes into a 
productive force. For many memes, because the stereotype is central to understanding the 
meme, it turns these unspoken social codes into the subject of discussion. The 
highlighting of these assumptions demands critical reflection. For example, the meme 
Successful Black Man relies heavily on the differing economic power of different racial 
groups in the US. As part of this, the image behind the meme highlights what 
presentations of the black body social stereotypes assume most likely lead to success 
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(Figure 1.9). Moreover, the meme‘s textual form relies heavily on negative stereotypes of 
the black community. The top line typically contains stereotype such as ―I left my wife 
and kids‖ or ―I got arrested.‖ However, the bottom line turns these stereotypes into 
―successful behaviors‖ such as ―a healthy breakfast before I went to the gym‖ or 
―development on DVD.‖97 Certainly, this meme reinforces the success of black men as 
atypical and reinforces the top lines as normative. However, in making these assumptions 
explicit, the meme also demands that participants interrogate the stereotypes, asking why 
they may exist and if they are productive or problematic. 
   
Figure 1.9: Examples of the Successful Black Man meme. 
Mythic Memes 
 While all varieties of narratives are potentially politically significant, one of their 
most impactful forms is that of myth. As is cliché, albeit necessary when discussing 
myth, I refer not to the colloquial usage of myth as some sort of untrue narrative but 
rather to a particular type of narrative with a corresponding function. Although many 
myths may indeed be untrue by empirical standards, they contain some kernel of social 
truth that helps participants make sense of reality. Specifically, Burke notes that a 
narrative gains a mythic character when it purports to identify some sort of first principles 
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or essential characteristics of the culture that uses the narrative.
98
 Under Burke‘s 
conception, myths are tools for the production and organization of reality.
99
 
Consequently, in a political context, myths manifest as ―ideologically marked narratives‖ 
that are held to have some degree of truth within the public that accepts them.
100
 Most 
often, participants mobilize these myths in the service of dominant politics because their 
narrative cohesion and focus on essential causes serves to naturalize the complex and 
contingent realities of history.
101
 
Because of their strong narrative components, memes have potential to engage 
citizens on a mythic level. As a mode of hypersignification, they often draw attention to 
the unnatural underpinnings of dominant myths. For example, Condescending Wonka, a 
meme that mobilizes a condescending attitude to highlight the simplicity of other‘s 
opinions, often questions the stability of the American dream myth: ―Oh so you believe 
in the American dream // I‘m sure thousands of unemployed Americans do too‖ (Figure 
1.10).
102
 Here the meme suggests that the myth may not be an essential truth but rather 
serves a political function by placating those whom the rising tide of economic growth 
leaves behind.  
                                                          
98. Kenneth Burke, ―Ideology and Myth,‖ in On Symbols and Society (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1989), 308-09. 
99. Kenneth Burke, Permanence and Change. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1935), 
267. 
100. Christopher Flood, Political Myth (New York: Routledge, 2001), 44. 
 
101. Roland Barthes, Mythologies (London: Paladin, 1973), 11.  
 
102. The visual form of the meme, as well as other examples, can be found at: 
http://knowyourmeme.com/memes/condescending-wonka-creepy-wonka.  
 37 
 
Figure 1.10: Condescending Wonka comments on the American Dream. 
Memes are particularly suited to engaging with mythic narratives because of their 
fragmented and visual nature. Flood notes that while political myths may stem from 
particular texts participants‘ exposure to varied fragments that corroborate the myth 
facilitate their internalization into the social fabric.
103
 In this capacity, memes, with their 
wide and rapid circulation, have the potential to either reinforce or disrupt this 
internalization process. Further, Flood notes that because of their flexibility and 
polysemy, visual presentations of myth allow for particularly diverse and complex 
understandings of myths.
104
 Images may invoke a myth directly, or they might place a 
non-mythic character into a mythic context – disrupting social understandings of both. 
Similarly, because visuals condense narratives, a single image can draw from multiple 
myths, juxtaposing them against one another. Memes may not always be the source of 
myth itself, but they contain the ―capacity to evoke a political myth or even entire 
mythology.‖105 Moreover, because these evocations can both reify and remediate political 
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ideologies, they both address publics and create the conditions under which these publics 
must deliberate varied mythic narratives. 
Fragments of Publics:
 
Memes and Public Opinion 
If a central assertion of this dissertation is that memes are a form of public 
address, the question becomes what is a public and how might it be addressed? As 
fragmented, mass produced, and visual texts, memes seemingly have little in common 
with the political speeches that are central objects of analysis within traditional 
conceptions of public address. This difference is particularly pronounced in digital media 
ecologies, as communication through networked media is more fragmented, personal, and 
(often) ironically grounded than traditional political discourse. However, in an era where 
not only is the personal political, but traditional modes of public politics are viewed as 
under corporate control, these non-traditional features make networked native 
communication phenomena such as memes central to understanding the kinds of civic 
address that populate the networked public sphere.
106
 Simply put, in an era where 
mainstream politics are subject to the influence of unlimited campaign financing, those 
outside the orbit of conventional electoral politics seek—and need—new rhetorical 
avenues to exert political force.  
 As political communication outside traditional political contexts, memes are 
particularly suited to political expression because participants construct them within the 
vernacular experiences and communicative practices of networked communities.
107
 As 
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part of this vernacularization, memes become a sort of language onto themselves, with 
individual meme forms operating as topoi for participating in public deliberation.
108
 For 
example, the meme ―#ThanksObama‖ emerged as a powerful lens for explaining how 
those with different political leanings experience the Obama presidency.
109
 Right-leaning 
Americans often use the hashtag sarcastically, in an effort to blame the president for what 
they see as political failures. Conversely, left-leaning Americans use the hashtag either to 
genuinely praise the president or ironically apply it to non-political contexts to argue that 
right-leaning uses of the hashtag are absurd. Because of its reach, Obama even used the 
meme as part of an effort to promote the rollout of the Affordable Care Act.
110
 Since 
memes are clearly influencing politics (in both a macro and micro political sense), which 
is a traditional function of public address, I will now expand on this potential by 
exploring the ways in which memes are constitutive of new publics. To do so I will 
briefly explicate my positions on publics and publicity, next look at the ways these 
concepts change in a networked rhetorical ecology, and finally explore the ways in which 
memes function within this ecology to create and alter public opinion. 
Publics and Publicity 
Rooted in Habermas‘ theorizations of the bourgeois public sphere, the idea of 
―publics‖ is a useful heuristic for understanding the ways that collectivities form and how 
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their participants mobilize them for engagement in political action. Habermas focused on 
the dominant mode of bourgeois publicity, either as a normative or idealistic vision of 
politics. However, the problematic implications of this conception of the public sphere 
led most theorists to either turn away from or complicate this concept. Specifically, some 
scholars argue by focusing on this dominant modality of publicity, Habermas‘ conception 
reduces all political action outside this sphere to the private and in doing so affords non-
public rhetorical activity less legitimacy.
111
 This historically privileges the rhetoric of 
white wealthy men as political, relegating all other rhetorics as either counter to or 
outside of politics.
112
 Consequently, many scholars found the need to speak of neither a 
public sphere nor publics and counterpublics but, rather, to theorize a multiplicity of 
publics with permeable boundaries that encompass all ranges of political action from the 
private lives to state action (both excluded by Habermas‘ original conception of the 
public sphere).
113
 In this tradition, I turn to Michael Warner‘s understanding of publics as 
the entities built around particular instances of discourse.
114
 For Warner, the circulation 
of every text – even memes – creates a public, which in turn operates as a force to shape 
and direct rhetorical action.
115
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The Networked Public Sphere 
 When theorizing the bourgeois public sphere, Habermas was examining a culture 
largely defined by print media. Although many theories of publics and publicity sought to 
correct the varied oversights of Habermas, a focus on print-based politics remains central 
to many extensions and complications of his work. Warner‘s emphasis on the text as the 
center of a public evidences this continued focus on print. Consequently, most 
conceptions of publics rooted in modern technologies tend to remain invested in 
discourses related, or reacting, to large-scale economy and government, elite nations and 
individuals, and dominant ideologies.
116
 However, the emergence of a networked society 
destabilizes this historical tendency of publicity and public formation. A major part of 
this shift can be credited to new digital media technologies. These media are particularly 
influential because they do not necessarily compete with older media – as television 
might have competed with books and newspapers – but rather subsume them. 
Internetworked media incorporate older forms of media into their networked processes, 
remixing and redeploying their potential.
117
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Yet the networking of public life involves more than simply a shift in 
technologies. Castells notes that networked society is defined by a range of social factors 
including the expansion of globalization, the rise of immaterial labor, ideological 
pluralism, and constant archiving.
118
 These sensibilities create a rhetorical environment 
that is defined by increased participation and many-to-many communication. This is not a 
system that replaces the norms of modernity but rather one that remixes and hybridizes 
it.
119
 The ―networked public sphere‖ is not an appeal to a Habermasian deliberative ideal, 
nor does it encompass the entirety of networked rhetorical action. Rather, the term 
highlights the affordances and constraints of deliberation within a networked media 
ecology, particularly how they create social conditions that shape the ways that different 
publics form, operate, and interact. 
Major features of the networked public sphere include a decentralization of 
national politics, increased encounters with diversity, and the internetworking of 
media.
120
 The result of this is a vastly different experience of publicity. Writing in the 
early years of networked media, Thompson noted these shifts – which have only since 
intensified: 
The development of communication media has created a new kind of publicness 
which is very different from the traditional conception of public life. This new 
kind of mediated publicness does not involve individuals coming together in a 
shared locale to discuss issues of common concern. Rather, it is a publicness of 
openness and visibility, of making available and making visible, and this visibility 
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no longer involves the sharing of a common locale.
121
 
 
This destabilization is furthered because the texts that define publics are mutually 
constituted by participants through many-to-many communication.
122
 Under this process, 
a wide range of actors influences the formation and alteration of publics, as any 
participant can ―shift, re-form, circulate, or consolidate ties with any act of 
communication.‖ 123 Furthermore, much of life in the modern era could go undocumented 
by modern media – this is not to say that this life existed independent of the public, but 
rather that it was not explicitly publicized.
124
 Conversely, internetworked media, with 
their easy translation onto mobile applications, make all parts of life potentially public.
125
 
These changes increase the potential for participation in publics; however, it is important 
to note that emergence of the networked public sphere does not guarantee democracy, 
freedom, or dignity; instead, it intensifies and networks a plurality of spheres of 
existence.
126
 
This plurality of spheres of existence, while not inherently democratic, does open 
up the range of rhetorical actions available to publics. Most notably, the networked public 
sphere allows more publics to be accessible to a greater range of participants. This is not 
solely because these new public texts circulate on the internet but also because they drive 
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other media production. In many cases, conversations started in the networked public 
sphere migrate to traditional media, helping to set and drive the agenda of more 
traditional politics.
127
 Not only have blogs forced responses from traditional politicians 
and mainstream media, but, more recently, memes have shaped political debate. The 
meme ―Texts from Hillary‖ gained such cache in portraying Hillary Clinton as a cool and 
―bad ass‖ candidate that the Clinton campaign submitted their own iterations to the blog 
that popularized the meme (Figure 1.11).
128
 This move highlights the power of memes to 
drive other media. In this sense, memes are engaging other publics and shaping their 
relations to political events. In practice, they seem to be influencing public opinion.
129
 
   
Figure 1.11: The original “Text from Hillary Meme” (left), the campaign’s response 
(right). 
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Memes and Public Opinion 
As part of the vernacular expression of participants in the networked public 
sphere, memes provide an avenue for publics to form that directly comment on and direct 
public opinion. Specifically, the flexibility of memes allows for easy yet profound 
political commentary because they open incongruous readings of events and ideologies 
that allow political commentary and beg deliberation.
130
 The aforementioned meme 
referenced by Carson used a quotation, misattributed to Stalin, which sought to link the 
Democratic Party‘s rhetoric with cold-war anti-American rhetoric (Figure 1.4). In this 
case, the form of the meme allowed it to produce an exaggeration of a political party that 
seemed antagonistic to patriotic Americans. Carson‘s repetition of the meme‘s text 
highlights that as a meme‘s circulation expands it enfolds evermore participants into their 
constituted public. Further, circulation increases a meme‘s chances of intertextually 
linking to other public discourse. Carson‘s invoking of the meme allowed it to jump 
contexts, from a closed audience of conservative social media to the debate stage and 
mainstream news media. Once connected to larger political institutions, memes can serve 
to ―connect and critique.‖131 Specifically, because they often focus on micropolitical 
issues, memes are able to disrupt dominant narratives by turning attention to ways that 
identity, relationships, and consumptive practices exist outside these dominant logics.
132
 
For example, within the highly censored media atmosphere of China, memes are often 
able to sneak by censors. This ability to evade censorship allows these seemingly trivial 
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texts to voice perspectives with the potential to rupture the hegemonic voice of dominant 
media.
133
 While many western nations lack the overt censorship of China, the seeming 
banality of memes still allows them to offer alternative viewpoints that may not gain 
traction in more traditional media environments.  
 This constitution of political identities also extends beyond the commentary 
offered by a particular meme. While emerging within a particular election cycle as a 
commentary on the sexual politics of the Romney campaign and the Republican Party, 
the Binders Full of Women meme lives beyond the 2012 elections. The meme itself is no 
longer specifically germane to electoral politics, yet the public created around it remains 
politically active. Rentschler and Thrift note that as of 2015 the Facebook page built 
around this meme 
has become a place to post news stories and discuss current US politics, 
Hillary Clinton‘s candidacy for the US presidency, state passage of gay 
marriage laws, and gender issues on the Internet, among other topics. In 
the first day of posts, a contributor shared a link to an 11 April 2012 report 
from the National Women‘s Law Center on the racialization and 
regionalization of the wage gap between women and men.
134
  
 
Certainly, this public is larger than the meme that inspired it, and that is exactly the point. 
Memes encourage participants to form publics around particular shared interests 
following the form, content, and stance of the meme.
135
 Much as a traditional public 
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speech turns the crowd into an audience; the meme‘s constituted public unifies 
participants who otherwise may never connect in networked spaces, creating a public that 
is capable of engaging in larger political action. Moreover, memes such as Binders Full 
of Women have the potential to sustain political interest because they are never complete. 
Rather, their very nature as proairetic texts demands further dialogue and participation in 
the political conversations enacted through the meme.
136
 The political potential arising 
from seemingly trivial texts leads Shifman to conclude, ―Bad texts make good memes in 
contemporary participatory culture.‖137 
Finding Bad Texts: On Method and the Scope of This Project 
 If bad texts do indeed make good memes, the following questions emerge: How 
does one analyze memes, and, what makes a meme particularly ―good‖ for academic 
analysis? Consequently, the remainder of this chapter is dedicated to an elucidation of the 
methods of my analysis, principles of selection for determining case studies, and a 
preview of those case studies.  
 Following the observations of Barry Brummett, I eschew the application of a 
methodology independent of my theoretical framework.
138
 Brummett argues that this 
divide, indicative of social scientific research, is neither possible nor practical in the 
realm of rhetorical studies. Instead, Brummett posits that theory contains method; for 
example, when using the artistic proofs or Burkean dramatism, the theoretical concepts 
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that drive the inquiry also provide concepts (ethos, scapegoating, etc.) to unpack the 
forces that drive the rhetorical artifact.
139
 Thus, I turn to the theoretical insights of 
Bernard Stiegler to evaluate memes. Stiegler‘s focus on the ways that communicative 
technologies – such as memes – are central to the creation of subjects and publics makes 
it a useful framework for evaluating the ways that memes reposition participants in 
relation to political issues. Specifically, Stiegler‘s concept of transindividuation explains 
the co-constitutive relationship between individuals, collectives, and technologies. This 
theory can thus explain both how and why memes circulate, as well as the force that 
circulation exerts. However, since Stiegler does not have a fully rhetorical sensibility, I 
will supplement this theory with rhetorical concepts such as perspective by incongruity, 
narrative, and myth, which can help explain how rhetorical forces drive 
transindividuation. The second chapter of this dissertation is therefore dedicated to 
outlining these theoretical concepts and their relationship to memes. 
 However, just because the focus on rhetorical theory does not explicitly 
foreground methodology does not mean it is without method or rigor. Brummett notes 
that rhetorical ―method uses ordinary skills of research such as reading, library 
techniques, etc., as guided by the extraordinary sensibilities given to one by the 
theory.‖140 Similarly, Burke argues good criticism always begins with a close read of a 
text, focusing on prominent themes and the relationships and antagonisms between these 
themes.
 141
 Once these relationships are established, I use theoretical concepts to establish 
the force and nature of these relationships. Therefore, I begin my analysis with close 
                                                          
139. Ibid., 100. 
 
140. Ibid., 99. 
 
141. Burke, Philosophy, 19-35.  
 49 
reads of the generic form and various iterations of particular memes, as well as their 
circulation within particular controversies. I turn to internet archives, such as Know Your 
Meme, to establish the history of particular memes, and use Google Analytics and press 
coverage to determine their circulation in relation to particular times and controversies. 
These initial readings then provide the foundations to utilize a rhetorically-inflected 
reading of Stiegler to explain these phenomena.  
The concept of individuation – explicated in the following chapter – has 
implications for the analysis of memes. Because memes are iterations emerging out of a 
preindividual formal state, the criticism of memes cannot simply focus on their particular 
iterations. To do so would ignore both their individuating potential as well as their larger 
social force. Paolo Virno notes that when dealing with processes of individuation, the 
individual should never be the center of the investigation, both because they emerge from 
the preindividual and because they never exhaust the preindividual.
142
 In this context, no 
single iteration of a meme can illustrate the full capacity of a meme. Instead, the critic 
must turn to the meme itself as the beginning of the analysis, before then using the 
individuating iterations to understand contextually based changes and manifestations. 
 In a practical sense, this focus on pre-individual modes means a foregrounding of 
form.
143
 However, a critic must be careful to not suggest that form is rigid, nor that it 
fully determines the force of a particular iteration. First of all, transindividuation assures 
that the form changes in each individuation as much as the form dictates the individual 
iteration. Second, a single formal appetite may not be the only force driving a particular 
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process of individuation. Any given meme may exist at the intersection of multiple 
forms. Therefore, an awareness of an iteration existing at the interplay of multiple modes 
enables a fuller understanding of the individuating potential of any meme and its 
iterations. This does not mean that any one study must focus exclusively on a singular 
meme but rather that a critic should not explore iterations of memes without prior 
consideration of how their form enabled their particular individuation. 
In the process of trying to explore the capacity of memes to demonstrate the 
potential of networked media as a democratic counter to technocratic control, I plan to 
turn to three case studies. I chose these case studies because they highlight the 
individuating capacities of memes in political contexts. Specifically, I identified three 
instances where memetic publics were explicitly responding to technocratic rhetorics and 
their drive towards what Stiegler calls ―proletarianization,‖ the transformation of 
individuals from political actors to passive consuming subjects.
144
 The first case study 
focuses on the genesis and evolution of Old Economy Steve. This affords an analysis of 
the changing individuations of a particular meme while responding to the ways that the 
rhetorics of economic used by technocrats frame consumption as the only relation 
between consumers and the economic. Conversely, in the other case studies, participants 
redeploy popular memes to respond to political controversies – the NSA leak scandal and 
the Russian ban on memes. Not only do these cases help to demonstrate how the forms of 
memes may be reindividuated to comment on new political forces – creating new publics 
– but in doing so they demonstrate how memes exist as repositories of common 
knowledge, ready to be deployed in new rhetorical contexts.  
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The first case study focuses on the ways that the meme ―Old Economy Steve‖ 
responds to the bureaucratization of economic messages during the aftermath of the 
―Great Recession.‖145 In an effort to manage the economy, technocrats, such as the 
officials of the Federal Reserve, promoted a rhetoric that dehumanizes individuals by 
rhetorically repositioning them as tools in the service of the economy. The ―Old 
Economy Steve‖ meme challenges this orientation. By enthymemematically creating a 
narrative that challenges the myth of the American dream, the iterations of the meme 
combine to offer a narrative that the economy failed younger generations. This 
conclusion is created by juxtaposing conditions of life under a late industrial economy 
with those under the control economy that prompted the recession. This juxtaposition is a 
potent illustration of Stiegler‘s politics of care because it searches for a more caring 
industrial economy by relating of individual stories of economic woe to a larger social 
struggle. In this sense, it demonstrates the capability of memes to re-politicize 
proletarianized subjectivities. Beyond this potential, this particular case study is useful 
for elaborating on the rhetorical importance of form in the process of individuation. 
Because this study focuses on the evolution of a single meme, not only does it focus on 
the individuation of the particular iteration studied, but it also focuses on 
transindividuation that occurs across iterations of the memes. This case study shows both 
how form acts and is acted upon. 
 The second case focuses on memes circulating in reaction to Edward Snowden‘s 
leak regarding NSA domestic spying programs. Here, the technocratic rhetoric of the 
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NSA provides a narrative of security and accusations of Snowden‘s treason designed to 
foreclose alternative rhetorical individuations. However, networked rhetorics responded 
with a variety of memes that included parodies of the Verizon ―can you hear me now‖ 
slogan, as well as memes reframing the alleged treason of Snowden. Further, a range of 
popular memes like Overly Attached Girlfriend and Annoyed Picard were used to 
comment on the controversy. As each of these memes provides a different affective 
casting of the controversy, this case provides an opportunity to expand explorations of the 
role the ironic plays in individuation, especially irony‘s potential to create a range of 
potentialities that subjectivities must then negotiate. Such a case expands understandings 
of the democratic potential of memes as they create the space for multiple perspectives by 
incongruities. This not only allows for the democratic transindividuation of a particular 
preindividual state, but the creation of multiple individuations related to a particular 
controversy that then must be democratically reconciled.  
 The final case study focuses on Russian efforts to limit the political use of memes. 
Specifically, after a range of negative memetic reactions to Russian foreign and domestic 
policy, memes were denied the status of protected speech through a Roskomnadzor social 
media post clarifying existing defamation laws. Not surprisingly, digitally networked 
participants responded to this effort at curtailing communication with even more memes. 
Aside from being a demonstration of the inability of technocrats to control the production 
and force of memes, these memes highlight the particular power of the amateur creation 
of narratives. While each of these cases feature amateur meme production, these Russian 
memes are the re-articulation of a specific and focused control-based narrative regarding 
the authority of Vladimir Putin. In this context, they are not simply memes that emerge 
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from collective (rather than technical) expertise, but rather the direct transformation of 
what Stiegler calls a grammatizing hypomnemata into a participatory amateur form. 
Moreover, despite the Russian political context, many of the memes around this 
controversy were in English. This chapter then has the potential to answer questions such 
as: what does memeing about control one does not experience, and may not be replicable 
in one‘s own culture, do to the individuating process in each context? And how does 
American memeing about Russian politics change the movements of individuation within 
that culture? 
 From these case studies, this dissertation concludes by considering what unique 
affordances memetic technics provide for contemporary rhetorical culture. Specifically, 
their reliance on rhetorical forms grounded in irony uniquely empowers modes of 
individuation that are particularly suited to resisting the proletarianizing forces that drive 
contemporary control. Moreover, this accelerated individuation enabled by digital 
technics suggests that digital politics are driven by a multitudinous subjectivity. As every 
participant in a meme can democratically alter the form, these memes become the 
common manifestation of these participants. They are the argumentative and affective 
product of the collective negotiated structures of feelings of networked publics. 
Combined, these features enable memes to function as critics who offer a new vision of 
politics. A politics where digital participants can reshape politics and participate in 
technics, revitalizing the potential of democracy that is stifled by control.   
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Chapter 2 
 Individuation, Identification, and Imitation: Toward a Theory of Memes 
 As is common to the life of the doctoral student, one of the most frequent 
questions I am asked is ―what is your dissertation about?‖ Not wanting to bog down my 
interlocutors in complex orations about the changing nature of rhetoric in networked 
media ecologies and the potential of politics in an era of control, I often simply reply 
―memes.‖146 In such conversations, two responses are the most common: ―that sounds 
fun‖ and ―they will let you study that?‖ While both are (usually) well-meaning jabs built 
around stereotypes about esoteric research subjects, they also hint at a cultural skepticism 
about the seriousness of memes. Rather than forms of consequential political discourse, 
many view memes as a trivial and juvenile fad of online banter.  
 This view of memes as a fad of digital culture led to arguments that their 
popularity is waning. Specifically, Nick Douglas proclaimed the specific genre of the 
Advice Animal dead.
147
 Douglas argues that these memes originated as part of a ―cool‖ 
web native culture but that they have been supplanted by a ―post-meme‖ that is 
reminiscent of pre-networked cartoon merchandize. These memes, which appeal to 
participants that are not embedded in native network discourses, have taken over 
Facebook and large social media venues. These memes lack the adaptability and required 
social knowledge of traditional image macros. Instead they rely on popular figures such as 
Garfield (Figure 2.1), Calvin (from Calvin and Hobbes), and Minions. For Douglas, post-
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memes are the consumer friendly and content light version of the meme, reminiscent of 
pre-digital window decals and bumper stickers sold as kitsch. They facilitate participation 
by older, more conservative, and religious, participants in networked media ecologies. In 
this way, they serve as a foil to the traditional Advice Animal, which is rooted in the 
irreverence of places like 4chan and Reddit where they originated.  
 
Figure 2.1.: Example of a post-meme. 
 Although Douglas does identify a rising trend within meme usage, his concerns 
regarding the future creativity and impact of memes are not warranted. Initially, while 
Douglas‘ theory of ―post-memes‖ gained traction across social media, these variants are 
neither banal nor without impact. The meme that inspired Ben Carson to wrongly quote 
Joseph Stalin in a presidential debate is one kind of rhetorically impactful post-meme. 
Moreover, the Advice Animal is certainly not dead. Instead, they have become a sort of 
lingua franca of networked rhetorical production. Never immensely popular on the highly 
corporatized platform of Facebook, this family of memes continues to circulate on venues 
like 4Chan, Reddit, and Tumblr – sites populated by younger participants. The social 
influence of these memes is such that the form based logic of communicating with text 
over pictures of bodies in some kind of affective state dominates many emerging media 
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forms. For example, Snapchat, currently one of the most popular modes of networked 
communication, allows participants to quickly transform their daily experiences into 
images akin to Advice Animals.
148
  
However, this tension between the Advice Animal and the post-meme is more than 
simply a generational difference; it is representative of a larger political struggle facing 
contemporary rhetorical ecologies. While networked media have the ability to evoke the 
political potential within the creative individuation of networked publics, the program 
industry – Bernard Stiegler‘s updating of the culture industry for hyper-industrial times – 
constantly works to re-territorialize these technologies into mass consumable texts that 
reify individuals into ―herd-like‖ consumers.149 Viewed in this light, memes are far more 
than an outdated or trivial web discourse – although as this chapter seeks to prove, their 
comic nature is part of their political potential. Moreover, if memes seem juvenile, it is 
because they do not fit within more so-called mature genres of political discourse 
dominated by political elites and corporate interests. Consequently, memes work to 
oppose more traditional rhetorical genres, which many dissatisfied participants criticize as 
out of touch or even anathema to the political values of participants in the networked 
public sphere.  
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By no means are memes the only technology, symbolic or otherwise, contributing 
to this realignment of political discourses. However, they are a representative anecdote for 
how amateurs generate participatory, vernacular symbolic activities to create a subversive 
political subjectivity under the conditions of control society. Recognizing the significance 
of this struggle, this chapter is dedicated to articulating the social and political significance 
of memes under contemporary political conditions. This chapter proceeds in four parts. 
First, rather than viewing memes as a historical idiosyncrasy, I position memes as a 
networked manifestation in a longer tradition of participatory vernacular politics. Next, I 
examine how the emergence of control society has moved political struggle from 
questions of candidates and speeches to a struggle between bureaucrats and networked 
publics. Third, I explore how Bernard Stiegler's commentaries on control, particularly 
their focus on technics, individuation, and care, open a space for memes as politically 
productive. Finally, as Stiegler lacks a fully rhetorical sensibility, I turn to the conceptual 
vocabulary of rhetoric – particularly that of Kenneth Burke – as a complement to these 
more contemporary critical theories.  
The Tradition of Visual Participatory Politics 
The residue of the bourgeois public sphere is apparent in the long valorization of 
traditional oratorical public address and mass news media as the avenues for 
consequential political discourse. However, the rational argumentation of these forms has 
never been the sole contribution to political rhetoric. Rather, visual participatory rhetoric 
serves as an alternative to traditional political discourse. For example, through an analysis 
of the political nature of art, Murray Edelman posits that while aesthetic compositions 
may contain less specific political warrants than traditional political discourse. This 
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vagueness has the potential to help deliberation move beyond disputes of policy. Instead, 
the aesthetic shifts focus towards more fundamental questions of social politics. 
Specifically, for Edelman, art ―excites minds and provokes attention. It creates new 
realities and this promotes reflection.‖150 Aesthetically focused rhetoric prompts 
participants to reflect on larger social issues. Specifically, the aesthetic can frame 
participants‘ evaluations of the worth and morality of particular political projects by 
commenting on the underlying perceptions and beliefs that motivate political action.
151
 
Beyond engaging in meta-politics, art attunes participants to the consequences of 
politics as a socially, rather than individually, driven phenomenon. Edelman notes: 
That art is always a social product, never an individual fabrication, also 
means that it can both buttress democratic institutions and serve as a 
potent weapon for elites. The ideas that issue from works of art reflect 
group interests, as do the particular channels through which art becomes 
available to a susceptible public.
152
  
 
Although aesthetic politics are a product of social negotiation, much like memes, it is 
important to recall that they are easily coopted because this sociality is comprised of 
fragmented texts. Aesthetic political struggles often focus on the legitimacy of and 
control over participants‘ expression, rather than simple contestation of particular 
argumentative premises. As a form of communication firmly rooted in aesthetic 
production, memes‘ political functions tend towards meta-commentary and social 
evaluation. 
 
The Varied Forms and Forces of Proto-Memes  
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 While memes may be one of the newest and most intense forms of visual 
participatory rhetoric, they are not an entirely new phenomenon. Instead, they emerged as 
an extension of varied participatory visual rhetorics. This history reaches all the way back 
to cave paintings and pictograms; however, I focus on a few of their prominent 20
th
 
century precursors, as these offer the most direct link to the contemporary form and force 
of memes.  
Although aesthetic rhetorics are traditionally juxtaposed against more rational 
forms, political cartoons represent a long memetic tradition. Within the newspapers that 
Habermas argues fueled the public sphere, political cartoons rely more on intertextual 
understanding, aesthetic and formal qualities, and affective force than the expected 
rationality of the public sphere.
153
 In this capacity, these cartoons function as a sort of 
proto-meme. For example, despite the term ―Fat Cat‖ originating in an editorial, its 
translation into visual form allowed it to serve as a memetic distillation of the populist 
distrust of the wealthy.
154
 In this case, the ability to visualize the concept increased its 
capability to function as a site of social negotiation of values. Although memes circulate 
more easily because of their digital form, popular iterations of cartoons were (and still 
are) clipped out of newspapers, shared with friends and colleagues, and posted on cubicle 
walls and office doors. This ability to circulate outside of the context of their initial 
iteration suggests a longer prehistory of memetic forms with distinct social uses. 
The ability to recirculate reproductions of these images demonstrates the 
participatory element of pictorial political art, yet other historical analogues highlight the 
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power of increased aesthetic participation within politics. For example, beyond 
functioning as topoi within the context of traditional electoral politics, the previously 
referenced pinback button functions as a proto-meme. These buttons, which distill broad 
campaigns to fragmented visual and textual slogans, provide political participants a way 
to externalize their identifications with individual policies and political affiliations.
155
 
Moreover, pins often feature pictures of candidates, expanding their discursive force 
beyond words. Thus, they more explicitly open electoral politics to the force of 
representation of bodies and their affects. Further, the variety of available pins allows 
participants to express a range of identifications, moving between political communities. 
Consequently, the success of particular buttons may best be explained memetically. The 
strength of an identification directly relates to the willingness of a larger community to 
circulate and identify with the distilled message.
156
 The pins served as memes, albeit ones 
created by political elites to foster political identification with participants who posted 
them on their bodies.  
 Bumper stickers provide another example of political fragments circulating 
memetically. Usually a combination of images and slogans, bumper stickers often distill 
politics into slogans that are easy to understand via their vernacular roots and use of 
intertextual references.
157
 Like internet memes, these messages are easy for participants 
to circulate because of the low cost of replication. They make political rhetoric mobile, 
transforming cars, laptops, dorm room doors, and other objects by rendering these 
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ostensibly non-political locations political.
158
 While their memetic potential can define 
their success, much like pinbacks, they are still products of political parties and 
companies. Although participants can reinterpret and redirect this force, this institutional 
grounding denies them the full participatory potential of contemporary internet memes.  
Traditional visual art such as political cartoons and mass produced texts such as 
stickers and buttons represent more established (read: bourgeois) manifestations of 
participatory visual political rhetoric. These forms highlight the power of circulating 
simple fragments; however, more anti-establishment forms of aesthetic political rhetoric 
demonstrate the tradition of participation and irreverence that manifests in contemporary 
internet memes. Forums like Reddit and Tumblr provide locations where participants can 
directly compare and discuss memes; however, much of the mobilization of memes is as 
posts in comment threads across the internet. One of the defining rhetorical 
characteristics of memes is their ability to impose themselves onto established rhetorical 
texts. This imposing nature of memes also stems from a pre-digital rhetorical tradition. 
As mobile sources of communally negotiated meaning posted onto other 
rhetorics, graffiti may be one of the most natural predecessors to the logic of 
contemporary internet memes. Although similarly denigrated as juvenile, graffiti has an 
undeniable history as a politically important mode of communication. Graffiti tags not 
only function to negotiate social and spatial identity throughout urban areas but also 
played important roles in negotiating political struggles in such locations including 
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Bosnia, the West Bank Wall, and Northern Ireland.
159
 Adrienne de Ruiter argues that the 
appeal of street art lies  
in its ability to function simultaneously as a medium of communication 
and a contentious performance, combined with the particular power of the 
aesthetic to change conceptions of social reality of the audience through 
what Rancière has called the ‗(re)distribution of the sensible.‘ Graffiti and 
street art thus present artists with singular possibilities to express their 
political ideas and appeal to the public because street art combines the 
power of framing, the power of performance and the power of 
imagination.
160
  
 
As both resistive performance (defacing public space) and articulation of particular 
ideological views, graffiti allows for a wide range of political expressions. Much like 
memes, this range of expressions led to a wide range of graffiti genres, including art 
graffiti, slogans, gang, and private graffiti.
161
 The implementation and integration of 
varied generic norms changes the ways that participants attend to particular iterations of 
graffiti. The same piece of street art will have vastly different understandings based on 
community relations. Moreover, as the process of graffiti often obfuscates the identity of 
authors, much like memes, the publics built around graffiti exist as an ―affiliation 
between strangers with temporary bonds.‖162 By mobilizing these community 
connections to express social values and unexpressed political concerns, graffiti provides 
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an avenue for a ―vernacular creativity‖ that directly translates into the social logic of 
memes.
163
  
As technological improvements allowed the internet to surface as the site for the 
rapid circulation of varied textual, visual, and video materials, it has served to unify the 
methods of proto-memetic technologies. Specifically, as technological developments 
made it easier for participants to not only post images and video but also edit and remix 
them, networked rhetorics have centered on ―replication, repetition, and reiteration.‖164 
With this focus, varied digital memes have become platforms for aesthetic production 
rooted in an ethos of participation and play. For example, the Downfall videos – a series 
of parodic videos all based on a single scene in the Nazi era war drama Downfall
165
 – 
offered participants the capacity to parody not only specific controversies but also a 
larger culture of seriousness.
166
 Participants placed their own subtitles over the video of 
an outraged Hitler to express their frustration with FIFA, gamer culture, politics, and 
even the Downfall parodies themselves. One of the first YouTube videos to receive the 
full memetic treatment, the circulation of these videos is emblematic of the larger 
rhetorical shift enabled by networked technologies. Like pins and bumper stickers, these 
videos allow participants to proclaim ideological affiliations and to impose outside 
messages on official rhetorics through graffiti-esque posts on message boards and 
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comment threads. While internet memes are certainly a new genre, they are the product 
of a range of previous rhetorical traditions and technologies. 
A Note on Triviality and Play 
Beyond being precursors to the digital meme, these proto-memes share another 
common characteristic: the ease of their dismissal within discussions of ―serious‖ 
politics. For many, buttons, cartoons, stickers, graffiti, and memes are simple, irreverent, 
and lacking in deeper meaning. Combined, these traits make it easy to frame them as a 
poor substitute for formal public debate: popular frames position play, graffiti, guerrilla 
theatre, and online performance as native to youth, criminals, or artistic weirdos, not 
respectable public citizens. In short, the popular imagination dismisses this entire 
tradition as childish and idle curiosities.  
However, in an exploration of the nature of politics in a post-Fordist era, Paolo 
Virno claims that neither of these are liabilities. Virno argues that childishness has 
important political utility in struggling against the political exploitation and stagnation 
inherent to state driven representational politics. Virno questions the deprecatory tone 
used with the dismissal of childish rhetorical genres, noting, ―it might be worth it to ask 
ourselves if there is something of consistency (in short, a kernel of truth) in the 
connection between metropolitan life and childhood.‖167 Specifically, Virno argues that 
for children, ―Repetition is understood as a protective strategy in the face of the shock 
caused by new and unexpected experiences.‖168 However, Virno notes this repetition can 
be equally useful for adults. Furthermore, playing childish (rhetorical) games creates 
common symbolic spaces within which participants form larger social connections. In 
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this way, to play with communication might just be key to Deleuze‘s call to ―hijack 
speech‖ as these games break the universializing drive of communication, instead 
individuating participants within locialized, less controlling collectivities.
169
 Just as the 
childish repetition of a word helps a baby understand itself within a particular linguistic 
milieu, the childish recirculation of buttons or graffiti enables participants to understand 
themselves as part of a community. Thus to paraphrase Virno, memes may have 
―something childish in [them]: but this something is as serious as can be.‖170 
 Virno similarly argues for the valorization of the idleness of communication. 
When the classical and modern rhetorical traditions valorize ―meaningful‖ speeches and 
so called substantive discourse, they reduce idle fragments to mere chatter. Martin 
Heidegger, in theorizing the problems of ―idle talk,‖ admonishes such speech, claiming 
its fleeting and potentially vacuous nature detaches itself from deeper investigation.
171
 
However it is precisely in this divorce from substantive speech that idle talk has profound 
power. Virno notes, 
Communication, instead of reflecting and transmitting that which exists, 
itself produces the states of things, unedited experiences, new facts. I am 
tempted to say that idle talk resembles background noise: insufficient in 
and of itself (as opposed to noises linked to particular phenomena, such as 
running a motorbike or a drill), yet it offers a sketch from which the 
significant variances, unusual modulations, sudden articulations can be 
derived.
172
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The seeming banality of memes, graffiti, etc. is precisely what makes them of political 
consequence. As Kenneth Burke notes, the power of community negotiation is unlikely to 
come from ―one particular address;‖ rather, it resides in ―trivial repetition and dull daily 
reinforcement.‖173 Consequently, the ubiquity of memes not only establishes the 
normative conditions of symbolic behavior but in doing so also creates a backdrop 
against which changes in the symbolic landscape become apparent. Such idleness may 
seem oppositional to modes of ―intellectual learning,‖ yet Virno argues that this 
distracted idleness empowers ―sensory learning.‖174 It creates spaces where participants 
may both feel and experience politics, rather than only thinking them through. Memes, in 
being both childish and idle, are demonstrative of alternative modes of politics enabled 
by participatory vernacular aesthetic production. Thus as products of the tradition of 
participatory visual rhetorics, the political force of memes is emblematic of a 
fundamental shift in the nature of politics where elections and deliberation are no longer 
central.
175
 Instead the alternative politics of subjectification through performance and 
symbolic renegotiation have emerged as central in contemporary life. To fully understand 
this shift, I now turn to an explanation of the shift in modes of power that predicated this 
change – the emergence of control society and the resultant politics of individuation. 
 
 
Technocrats and the Emergence of Control Society 
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 Drawing on Foucault‘s genealogy of the shifts from sovereign, to disciplinary, to 
biopolitical regimes of power, Gilles Deleuze famously posited the rise of control society 
in 1990. While Deleuze‘s comments on control are seen to be enigmatic and sometimes 
conflicting with the theorist‘s prior writings, the central claim is that contemporary 
modes of capitalistic production have intensified the biopolitical regime of power to the 
point that its very nature has changed. Under control society power is increasingly diffuse 
and mobile, no longer bearing down on populations but rather on modulating each 
subjectivity through their relation to consumption.
176
 Control society emerges as a 
consequence of the real subsumption of labor: capitalism has found ways to valorize 
almost every waking and even many sleeping moments.
177
 Under the logic of control, 
where capitalism works to manage subjectivities across interactions, the very nature of 
subjectivity then becomes the location of political struggle.
178
 
My interest in control society stems from the fact that memes in general, and 
stock character macros specifically, are both native to, and operate under, the logics of 
control society. However, this does not mean that they are without subversive potential. 
Specifically, memes often operate in opposition to the technocratic rhetorics that are 
central to biopower. Therefore, before further detailing the regime of power that is 
control, I first turn to the conditions of biopower from which it emerged. 
Biopolitical Technocrats 
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Understanding biopower is not only useful because it created the conditions for 
control but also because discourses and institutions of the biopolitical regime of power – 
such as bureaucratic agencies – continue to exert considerable rhetorical sway.179 As a 
regime of power, biopower is not interested in placing boundaries on particular lives, but 
rather regulating the production of life itself. Focused on the conditions of the continued 
production of life, biopower is no longer interested in containing the individual, but 
rather maintaining the life of the population as a whole.
180
 Biopower extends power 
beyond particular spatial conditions, as discursive regimes manipulate populations across 
localities. These discourses are ―discontinuous segments whose tactical function is 
neither uniform nor stable.‖181 Instead, they function through a series of collective 
relations that can be mobilized to define the conditions under which life may exist, may 
be reproduced, and who deserves access to life itself. 
As biopower is primarily concerned with the regulation of life, bureaucracies 
managing that life emerge as dominant rhetorical agents in the production of biopolitical 
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discourses. More specifically, technocrats – the political figureheads of the bureaucracies 
that regulate human behavior via their deployment of expertise – are central to the 
construction and circulation of restrictive rhetorics.
182
 Murray Edelman notes that while 
the entirety of the state apparatus is vested in the exercise of power, executive agencies 
and the bureaucrats who run them make the decisions that directly influence 
individuals.
183
 Consequently, their leaders – appointed technocrats, rather than elected 
officials – have an influential political voice. They not only marshal their expertise to 
influence policy making but also engage larger publics to justify their vision for the 
maintenance of the economy, environment, security apparatus, etc. In their position as the 
creators and curators of the knowledges that define political life, these technocrats wield 
expansive force in outlining the average political subject, bureaucratizing them as agents 
in motion to support the administered apparatus.
184
 Further, because biopower focuses on 
the regulation of populations, it is also reliant on the politics of publics to organize 
subjectivities into collective populations.  
While contemporary biopower empowers technocrats as the rhetorical managers 
of many dominant publics, contemporary questions about the efficacy of collective civic 
action enhance the power of technocrats. Across the postindustrial world, critics assert 
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that civil society has begun to wither under the influence of finance democracy.
185
 For 
example, Karlyn Kohrs Campbell argues that in the United States, ―public discourse 
about issues and candidates financed chiefly by major corporations and fostered by the 
norms and conventions of commercialized, corporate owned outlets drives other kinds of 
public discourse out of circulation.‖ 186 Lamenting this increased role of money in 
American politics, Ronald Green argues that the political economy of political rhetoric 
provides a barrier to the efficacy of the citizen as a traditional political actor.
187
 Electoral 
politics are increasingly under control of financial elites, all the while government has 
become increasingly polarized and stagnant. Combined, these factors have emboldened 
many publics to question traditional politics. For example, citizens looking for politicians 
outside of this government structure dominated the 2016 political primaries in the United 
States.
188
 In the face of dissatisfaction and polarization, technocrats – with their 
seemingly non-partisan credentials and technical expertise – are able to exert rhetorical 
influence above that of traditional politicians.
189
 These technocratic actors, although part 
of a residual regime of power, are some of the only subjectivities that exist at the 
intersection of social expectations of legitimate and visible power. Thus, even as control 
moves power to diffuse, non-state, capitalistic forces, many technocrats retain influence 
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not only through their support of this neoliberal power but also as the only seemingly 
functional vestige of governance.
190
  
The Emergence of Control Society 
As capital faced the limits of expansion under biopolitical regimes, power shifted 
away from the state to more elusive and all-encompassing forms – which Deleuze termed 
control.
191
 Foucault‘s comments on neoliberalism suggested that the dominant regime of 
power was already moving beyond biopower in 1979.
192
 In 1990, as neoliberalism began 
to settle into the normative mode of power, Deleuze argued that as the primary agents of 
neoliberalism, ―marketing is now the instrument of social control and produces the 
arrogant breed who are our masters. Control is short-term and rapidly shifting, but at the 
same time continuous and unbounded.‖193 Because they are continuous and market 
driven, control societies are not interested in regulating life at the level of population but 
rather in reconstructing each subject through their personal consumptive practices. While 
biopower used technologies such as the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental 
Disorders to define norms capable of regulating mental states of populations, in control 
society, capital now creates books, programs, and products that turn this difference into 
pure consumption – masking the larger systematic, social, and capitalistic forces that 
exploit this difference. 
 While the celebration of such diversity seems (and to a certain degree is) 
empowering, one of the great capabilities of control society is precisely that it has 
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managed to mask its operation as a regime of power. Bernard Stiegler argues that control 
has seemingly de-politicized life despite its intensification of power. Stiegler asserts that,  
A fable has dominated the last decades, and to a large extent deluded 
political and philosophical thought. Told after 1968, it wanted to make us 
believe that we have entered the age of ―free time,‖ ―permissiveness‖ and 
the ―flexibility‖ of social structures, in short, the society of leisure and 
individualism. Theorized under the name of the post-industrial society, 
this tale notably influenced and weakened ―postmodern‖ philosophy. It 
inspired the social democrats, claiming that we have passed from an epoch 
of laborious, consumptive masses, which was the industrial age, to the 
time of the middle classes, while the proletariat was supposedly 
disappearing.
194
 
 
This fable is particularly problematic because although the western world embraces this 
―free time‖ – which is often converted into unpaid labor for corporate interests – for 
many around the world Deleuze notes, ―one thing, it's true, hasn't changed – capitalism 
still keeps three quarters of humanity in extreme poverty, too poor to have debts and too 
numerous to be confined.‖195 
  As part of the explanation of the changing nature of power under control society, 
Deleuze turns to the language of molds and modulation. Deleuze argues, ―confinements 
are molds, different moldings, while controls are a modulation, like a self-transmuting 
molding continually changing from one moment to the next, or like a sieve whose mesh 
varies from one point to another.‖196 The logics of disciplinary society, and even the 
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discourses of biopower, seek to confine individuals into molds, subjectivities that set the 
boundaries on normative behavior. Conversely, control society instead refigures 
subjectivity within modes. A concept borrowed from Spinoza, Deleuze notes that modes 
are ―bodies in relational assemblages, in engagement with one another.‖197 As 
assemblages, modes create the conditions of potential for the directions of particular 
affect – the ways that bodies relate to one another, which establishes the ways that they 
may affect and be affected.
198
 While molds rigidly limit bodies at the level of discursive 
population, modes function as the very pre-subjective potentiality that enable a particular 
body – as an assemblage of relations – to engage in action. 
 Eric Jenkins‘ conception of memes as modal texts is grounded in an assumption 
that memes can participate in the logics of control society. Drawing from Deleuze, 
Jenkins notes, 
Modes circulate across media platforms, producing a recognizable 
structure that enables the emergence of an open set of images subject to 
continual remaking. The set remains open to further adaptation and 
addition because the virtual mode constitutes a manner of engagement or 
interfacing with images shared by rhetor and audience, a seeing as that 
circulates and thereby shapes both image production and reception. In 
brief, modes will be defined as manners or ways of engaging (image-) 
texts or, alternatively, as relational assemblages, such as the assemblage of 
image, medium, and viewer constituted in the processes of constructing 
and perceiving.
199
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Under this modal logic, individual iterations of memes exist as parts of a larger modal 
assemblage of texts, contexts, and participants. These varied forces work in tandem to 
negotiate the form of the meme. 
The form created by these larger assemblages centers around modal poles, which 
Jenkins describes as essential to the functioning of the memetic assemblage. Poles are the 
socially invented formal elements of an assemblage ―that limit what is and is not 
selected.‖200 For example, the meme PTSD Clarinet Kid forms around the pole of the 
intense juxtaposition of affective expressions of his two faces as well as the pole of a top 
line that sets up an innocent action and the bottom line that takes a dark turn (Figure 2.2). 
However, these poles, while reliant on a logic of form, do not refer to rigid boundaries; 
rather, they draw on a modified sense of Burkean form. If form for Burke, as I mentioned 
before, is ―the creation of an appetite in the mind of the auditor, and the adequate 
satisfying of that appetite,‖ then memetic forms provide the appetite that the individual 
iteration of the meme fulfill.
201
 Those iterations of memes, the modal poles of which 
actualize a particular affection, meets a particular appetite and will ―circulate more 
widely thanks to an affected viewer-become-rhetor.‖202 Iterations of PTSD Kid whose 
text satisfies the affective appetite of participants are the ones that get circulated as 
exemplars of the meme.  
                                                          
200. Ibid., 450.  
201. Burke, Counter-Statement, 143. 
202. Jenkins, ―The Modes of Visual Rhetoric,‖ 452. Jenkins argues the focus on modal poles 
outweighs attention to particular iterations of the meme: Ibid., 445. However, this assertion suggests that 
the modal poles overdetermine the individual iterations, turning the poles into molds, which denies the 
broader relationally of the memetic modal assemblage. Instead, working within Deleuze‘s ontology of 
becoming, an assemblage exerts force based on the interactions of all of its parts. With each new relation 
added the assemblage is always already becoming anew. Deleuze, ―Control and Becoming,‖ 171-172. 
Modal poles are but the summation of the relations between individual iterations of a meme and the 
contexts in which they circulate.  
75 
 
 
 
Figure 2.2: The first iteration of PTSD Clarinet Kit (left), a later iteration (right). 
Further, both the circulation of existing memes and development of new iterations 
of a meme alter the assemblage. When participants recirculate the same form of a meme, 
the repetition of the iteration intensifies its force, driving the particular affective stance of 
the assemblage.
203
 Similarly, the deployment of new iterations, and the subsequent debate 
over their validity, alters a mode and its poles in their entirety, redefining the force of the 
meme. Early iterations of PTSD Kid focused almost exclusively on commenting on the 
horrors of the Vietnam war – suggesting its most profound outcome was PTSD. 
However, as the meme iterated, bullying, neglect, and general ennui all became topics. In 
this way, subsequent iterations move the modal pole, suggesting that the affect of the 
photo relates to conditions beyond war.  
 Although Deleuze theorized control before the so-called internet revolution, the 
relations afforded by these technologies have only accelerated the rise of control as the 
dominant regime of power. Specifically, networked technologies increase the reach and 
speed of the subsumption of human relations into informational capitalism.
204
 Put simply: 
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it is easier to capitalize a conversation over Facebook messenger than a conversation had 
while walking down the street. Deleuze notes that new technologies influence the 
functioning of control; however this theorization avoids technological determinism, 
arguing, ―the machines don't explain anything, you have to analyze the collective 
apparatuses of which the machines are just one component.‖205 Consequently, it is in the 
face of
 
such technically-enhanced control that the project of resistance becomes the 
paramount concern of the critic.
206
 
Bernard Stiegler and the Evolution of Control 
Although influential, Deleuze‘s theorization of control is remarkably brief and 
lacks a clear articulation of the forces that empower control as well as the specific 
techniques of resistance. While colorful, concepts such as hijacking speech
207
 or 
uncoiling the snake of control
208
 offer little in the way of a comprehensive political 
program. Moreover, Deleuze theorized control prior to the emergence of internetworked 
technologies, which have certainly intensified and altered the functioning of control. In 
this capacity, I recognize that certainly memes operate within the logics of control; 
however, Deleuze‘s theorization fails to provide the theoretical tools needed to explain 
the rhetorical force of memes. Moreover, while a modal orientation attunes critics to the 
formal forces that define memes, it does not provide a clear explanation for the 
relationship between individuated iterations and form and how this interplay shapes 
memes, drives their circulation, and defines their cultural force. 
                                                          
205. Deleuze, ―Control and Becoming,‖ 175. 
 
206. Pfister, Networked Media, 194 
 
207. Deleuze, ―Control and Becoming,‖ 175. 
 
208. Deleuze, ―Postscript on Control Societies,‖ 182. 
77 
 
 
 Therefore, to better understand not only the way memes function in control 
society but also how they react to technocratic biopower, I turn to Bernard Stiegler. This 
turn is apt because Stiegler positions the Symbolic Misery series as an explicit 
commentary on Deleuze‘s control thesis. While Deleuze was suspicious of 
communication, Stiegler‘s focus on the role that technics play in the establishment and 
maintenance of control is especially suited to opening theoretical space for the rhetorical 
force of networked communication technologies – such as memes.209 Further, Stiegler‘s 
focus on individuation as an explanation of the interrelation between the individual, 
social, and technical provides not only a more robust theoretical apparatus for explaining 
how memes gain their rhetorical force but also greater insight into their capability to 
impact and drive social evolution. Finally, although Stiegler‘s concept of the program 
industry shades towards deterministic readings of media, the interplay between this 
controlling media environment and the subversive potential of amateur participatory 
forms serves to illustrate the political struggle between programming technocrats and 
memetic individuated politics. 
 In extending Deleuze‘s control thesis, Stiegler is interested in the ways that the 
marketing logic of control changes the political capacity of subjectivities. Specifically, 
Stiegler contends that control created new aesthetics, which ―functionalized the affective 
and aesthetic dimension of the individual so as to produce a consumer.‖210 Stiegler warns 
that control is predicated around the ―program industry‖ – the technologies of mass 
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media that work to synchronize consumption to fuel contemporary capitalism.
211 
The 
drive for synchronicity is particularly problematic for Stiegler because it threatens the 
very nature of the political subject. In constructing participants as consumers, they are no 
longer an individuating ‗I‘ in relation to a ‗we‘ but rather a ―one‖ dissociated from the 
political.
212
 
Borrowing from Deleuze‘s observation that the primary products of capitalism are 
―wealth and misery,‖213 Stiegler posits that a sense of ―symbolic misery‖ defines 
subjectivities produced by control. Symbolic misery refers to the singularity‘s inability to 
participate in the development of the technics that define contemporary life.
214
 Without 
collective participation in the individuation of technics, it is easier for dominant 
institutions to control bodies and affects, directing them towards consumption.
215
 
Consequently, Stiegler not only replicates Deleuze's call to find new weapons but also 
expands it to include a range of new technics to challenge control.
216
 For Stiegler, the 
critical project is the development of concepts that empower the creation of political 
subjectivities that are capable of a politics of care, undermining the hyper-individualism 
that feeds neoliberalism and control.
217
 
While critical of the mass mediated environments of television and popular music 
because their bureaucratizing force fuels biopolitical power, Stiegler argues the 
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participatory nature of digital technologies breaks the distance between producer and 
consumer present in older media.
218
 This mobile and ever present mediation certainly has 
the potential to intensify control; however, writing about the disruptive nature of new 
technologies, Stiegler insists, 
This rupture is not a rejection of new technical possibilities. On the 
contrary: it aims to socialize these possibilities, that is, to put them in the 
service of society, rather than in the service of a destructive ‗innovation‘ 
founded on disposability, and on the social regression that is its inevitable 
result; in the services of a social innovation that cultivates that which, in 
the evolution of the technologies and society that it socializes and 
concretizes, allows it to take care of the world of its future.
219
 
  
Central to this call for new modes of participation, Stiegler argues that there is potential 
to restore the individuation that is key to contemporary liberatory politics.
220
 Recognizing 
this potential, Stiegler argues that as contemporary control disrupts individuation, it 
destabilizes the very potential of a productive political future landscape.
221
 However, 
because they are central to the process of individuation and its political ramifications, I 
first explore Stiegler's focus on technics.
222
 
The Forgotten Importance of Technics 
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Central to Stiegler's theoretical project is an emphasis on the importance of 
technics. Stiegler uses the term technology to refer to any externalization of human 
physical, cognitive, or mnemonic function into an ―organized inorganic material 
form.‖223 These technologies are not limited to a vulgar sense of material. While an axe 
or a computer is a technic – as they externalize physical and mental capacities – so too 
are language and culture, which are the materials through which memory is externalized, 
collectivized, and passed on.
224
 This concept of technics is particularly suited to memes, 
as they represent not only digital technology but also an influential form of contemporary 
communicative and cultural technics. 
Stiegler asserts that western thought from Plato to Heidegger largely ignores the 
role technics play in understanding and creating the world. Stiegler argues these 
philosophies instead sought to understand the world by focusing primarily on the 
consciousness of the being.
225
 However, Stiegler asserts that a focus on being is short 
sighted because technics are ―ontogenetic.‖ That is, ―the identity of an individual emerges 
from his or her relationship with technics, it does not precede this relationship.‖226 In 
positioning technics as prior to identity and being, every technic is both a connection to 
―a past that we have never lived‖ as well as an orientation towards the future. 227 
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Technics‘ connection to the past creates the very possibility of social memory, which 
Stiegler argues are tools that we use to adapt to a future as part of an effort to ―anticipate 
and stave off death.‖228 In short, technics situate humans in time. 
Through this ability to connect participants to their pasts and futures, technics 
give rise to the concept of the human.
229
 They serve as an externalized mnemonic organ, 
providing the enhanced command of memory that Stiegler argues constitutes what we 
take to be human.
230
 To explain the role of technics in creating humanity, Stiegler turns to 
fire as an example of the first technic. Not only did Prometheus‘ gift separate humans 
from other animals, but in the process, it externalized the functionalities of survival 
outside the human body.
231
 Prior to fire, each human survived only through instinct and 
embodied action. However, once given this technic, participants instilled social memories 
in the tool – memories of how to make and use fire. Because technics are part of the 
nature of humanity, understandings of the human animal are always ―constituted in 
historical, contingent combinations.‖232 If the tools that we use produce our identities, the 
historical epoch capable of creating those technics define our very humanness.  
 Because technics are inherently related to the processes that generate 
subjectivities, Stiegler contends that technics are inherently political and aesthetic (which 
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Stiegler sees as intimately related).
233
 By aesthetics, Stiegler is not referring simply to 
―the regional science of ‗works of art‘,‖ but rather to the range of processes engaged in 
the production of the ―modalities of sensation.‖234 It is at this level of sensation that 
aesthetics become political. By attuning participants to particular rhythms of existence, 
technics create the capacity to experience the aesthetic.
235
 Moreover, the ways that these 
rhythms of sensation repeat through difference defines particular modalities of time.
236
 
Consequently, aesthetic attunement is political because identifications with this 
attunement are the foundation of community: ―The extent of our adoption of technics, 
namely our access to the technologies through which society operates, is what determines 
our ability to participate in the constitution of the institutions and values on which our 
artificial environment consists.‖237 In short, technics are how participants ―make sense‖ 
of the world.  
 As they fashion the possibility of human action (without placing concrete 
boundaries upon it), technics function modally. As modes, technics serve as connecting 
nodes that combine individuals into the assemblages that we call communities.
238
 This 
technical constitution of communities is political because it sets the conditions of 
constituting social identity. Beyond this, because particular technics afford certain actions 
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while discouraging others, they shape the ways that individuals affect judgment.
239
 
However, under control the politicization of the sensible has intensified, turning these 
modes towards the service of capitalism. As capitalism subsumes all forms of technology, 
including communication itself, the drives and flow of capital increasingly define the 
sensible – both in terms of our capability to sense things and to judge what makes sense. 
Consequently, Stiegler‘s conception of technics enables an understanding of memes that 
focuses not on what they mean but rather on what memories are invested in them, what 
these memories make sensible, and the communities produced by this sensibility. 
Recognizing the social force of technical memory, Stiegler is most interested in 
the capacity of technics to function as ―mnemotechnics.‖ A focus on mnemotechnics 
draws attention to the ―objects and techniques able to preserve and make accessible 
experiences that I have not myself lived.‖240 Traditional communicative media are the 
most obvious examples of mnemotechnics; however, this potential exists in any technic, 
e.g. memes allow participants to experience the narrative and affects of diverse 
networked participants. Distinguishing the inherent memory within all technics with 
those that are explicitly engaged in mnemotechnic practices, Stiegler turns to the term 
hypomnemata. Hypomnemata are the mechanically created modes of symbolic 
production that enter most aspects of social interaction.
241
 Because of this, Stiegler argues 
hypomnemata are central to the contemporary functioning of control society. For 
example, Facebook encourages participants to commit their free time to generating 
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marketing information and viewing advertisements. Hypomnemata are not necessarily 
tools of control, but that is the dominant mode of their contemporary usage. However, it 
is only in recognizing this linkage between technics and political control that, Stiegler 
concludes, ―the struggle can begin.‖242 
The Process of Individuation 
For hypomnemata such as memes to engage in this struggle, it is not enough to 
recognize the relation between technics and control. Rather, we must understand the ways 
that technics function to reproduce control through their constitution of the contemporary 
political subject. To explain this phenomenon, Stiegler draws on Simondon‘s concept of 
individuation. Since technics individuate in much the same manner as subjects, 
understanding this process is key to understanding the emergence, circulation, and force 
of memes. 
While not subscribing to enlightenment notions of the unitary individual, 
Simondon notes that the individual is part of humans‘ experienced reality and thus has 
force. However, if the individual is not a prima facie being but a relational effect, then 
the question becomes where does this individual come from?
243
 To answer this question, 
Simondon argues that if individuals are an effect, they must emerge (individuate) out of 
some preexisting condition: 
In order to think individuation, it is necessary to consider being neither as 
substance, nor as matter, nor as form, but as a tight, supersaturated system, 
above the level of unity, inconsistent solely in itself and not adequately 
thinkable by means of the excluded middle; the concrete and complete 
being – that is, the preindividual being – is a being that is more than a 
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unity. Unity, characteristic of the individuated being, and identity, which 
authorizes the use of the principle of the excluded middle, do not apply to 
preindividual being […]; unity and identity apply only to one of the phases 
of the being, posterior to the operation of individuation.
244
 
 
For Simondon, the individual is not a static state but is, rather, always engaged in the 
process of individuation. Similarly, the preindividual does not overdetermine the process 
of individuation, but is the condition of possibility from which the orthogenesis of 
individuation can emerge.
245
 Because neither the individual nor preindividual takes 
primacy; this preindividual state does not initiate individuation. Rather, some entity 
embraces those conditions of possibility to begin the process of individuation.
246
  
However, as the preindividual is the condition from which individuation can 
begin, it is also necessarily the starting point of understanding individuation as a process 
– to begin analysis with the individual is to enter far too late in the game.247 Stiegler 
argues, ―if you want to understand the individual, you need to inscribe the individual in a 
process of which he (sic) is only a phase. As such, the individual has no interests. The 
individual is only an aspect, or phase of a process, but the process is what is 
important.‖248 The individual is neither completed nor exhausted in the process of 
individuation. Each act by an individual, as it draws upon the preindividual, begins the 
process anew. This cyclical nature leads Virno to conclude that individuation ―makes a 
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human animal an unrepeatable singularity, [it] is always circumscribed and partial – 
indeed, unfinishable by definition.‖249  
 Noting that it is a process whereby individual utterances uniquely emerge from 
the conditions of a larger sense of language, the process of individuation both explains – 
and is a concrete example of – the human use of language. Virno expands the relationship 
between individuation and language, noting, 
The capacity for articulating signifying sounds – biological prerequisite of 
the species Homo sapiens – cannot manifest itself other than by being 
individuated in a plurality of speakers; inversely, such a plurality of 
speakers would be inconceivable without the preliminary participation of 
each and every one of them in that preindividual reality which is, 
precisely, the capacity for articulating signifying sounds.
250
 
 
For an individual to make an utterance, they must already exist within the preindividual 
state of language. This is not language in an actualized form; the toddler does not 
command any specific language before they first speak. Rather, they exist within the 
capacity for language. The process of individuation occurs when the toddler engages in 
the act of uttering a specific word or phrase. In this moment, language ceases to be a 
preindividual possibility. Instead, that utterance is entirely singular to the toddler and the 
situation in which it is uttered. The toddler has begun to individuate in language. 
However, that toddler‘s individual command of language does not stop with that first 
utterance, rather each successive utterance draws once again from the potentiality of 
language. Each time it speaks, the child makes anew itself and its relationship to the 
language.  
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However, our understanding of individuation would be vastly incomplete if we 
only attuned ourselves to the ways in which the preindividual acts on the individual. 
Wary of this focus, Simondon warns, 
It is therefore incorrect to speak of the group‘s influence over the 
individual; in fact, the group is not composed of individuals joined 
together by certain ties, but of grouped individuals: group individuals. 
Individuals are group individuals, just as the group is a group of 
individuals. […] the group is no longer an inter-individual reality, but a 
complement of individuation on a vast scale joining together a plurality of 
individuals.
251
 
 
In uttering the word for the first time, the toddler not only draws from the potentiality of 
language, connecting itself to the community of individuating individuals that engages in 
that language, but also changes both the community and the language itself. The unique 
features of the utterance open new possibilities for future utterances, functionally 
changing the potential force of the words and the community that forms around them. 
This interrelation between user, tool, and community leads Stiegler to argue that 
individuation is always triple in nature: psychic, collective, and technical.
252
 As I write 
these words for you to read, I am redefining myself (psychic), changing the community 
of English speakers and academics (collective), and redefining the potential of the 
English language and printed text as tools (technical). Each of these individuations acts 
upon the others in a ―three pronged transductive relationship.‖253 Stiegler unifies this 
interrelation of coinciding processes of individuation under the term ―transindividuation.‖ 
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In doing so, Stiegler argues that one can never individuate an ―I‖ without also 
individuating a ―we‖ through the mediation of individuating technics.254 
  Not only do memes function as a technic that enables the individuation of 
participants within the communities of networked publics, but memes themselves (as is 
true of all other technics) also individuate as humans deploy them. Individuated iterations 
of memes emerge from the preindividual form of the meme. Any one iteration of PTSD 
Kid only makes sense as an iteration because it emerges from the preindividual form of 
the meme. However, that iteration also redefines the form of the meme, changing the 
conditions by which each future iteration of the meme can individuate. Thus, as PTSD 
Kid is deployed, the poster of the meme positions themselves within the community of all 
participants of the meme, while simultaneously redefining the conditions by which both 
participants in the meme and future iterations of the meme might individuate.  
 Because technics both enable individuation and function as the externalization of 
memory, there is a significant link between mnemotechnics and individuation. Stiegler 
clarifies this relationship through the concept of retentions.
255
 Stiegler offers three 
retentions, with each referring to different potential temporal states of memory. A 
primary retention is that which consciousness holds in the now. It is this very word you 
are reading, related to but independent of the rest of the context. A secondary retention is 
a primary retention held as the memory of experience. It is the memory of reading, the 
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memory of the word you just read. Finally, a tertiary retention is a technical apparatus 
that stores memories external to the individual. It is the word processor, computer, 
database, or digital archive that allows these words to exist beyond my utterances or our 
personal memories.
256
  
 These tertiary retentions, with the ability to exist outside of the individual, enable 
transindividuation as collectivization of secondary retentions.
257
 However, it is also the 
centrality of these tertiary retentions that undergirds the power of control. Stiegler argues, 
Tertiary retentions such as the alphabet are those things that undergird 
every collective and psychic individuation‘s access to pre-individual 
funds. They exist in all human societies. They condition individuation as 
symbolic sharing, which is made possible by the externalization of the 
individual experience in traces. When they become industrial, tertiary 
retentions constitute the technologies of control that alter symbolic 
exchange fundamentally. Resting on the opposing of producers to 
consumers, they allow for the hyper-synchronization of the time of 
consciousness.
258 
 
Tertiary retentions establish the potential for collective social coordination. However, it is 
important to note that each of these retentions are selections, with no single one retaining 
everything they engage.
259
 Therefore, what is included within the retention establishes the 
possibilities of individuation. The memories retained in memes are the conditions of their 
participants‘ individuation. Conversely, the technocratic control of retentions by capital 
not only allows for the reconstitution of the self in the service of capital but also gives 
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capital the ability to manage the very possibility of collective action.
260
 Memes in service 
of capital frame memories only in service of capital, not individuation. 
 In functioning through the redeployment of tertiary retentions, individuation 
works through a logic of repetition and difference. As Stiegler notes, ―in order to see, you 
have to see again.‖261 Not only is the individuational process carried out through 
repetition – the toddler says the word as a repetition of a previously heard iteration – but 
comparison of the similarities and differences of its past uses are necessary for 
understanding the word. In operating through a logic of repetition, individuation 
functions as a sort of apprenticeship: we learn to do by repeating the externalized 
retentions of others.
262
 Conversely, if we are always encountering the new and the novel, 
there is little capacity to form consequential retentions.
 263
 There is no collective 
individuation that the novel can be tied to; a single iteration of a photo with top and 
bottom lines cannot function as a meme. It is only through the repetition of different 
iterations of a meme that the larger condition of possibility that is a meme emerges. As 
long as individuation happens, transformation is inevitable. If a word is always 
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individuating, can it have stable or binding force?
264
 However, as this transformation is a 
threat to forces of domination, particularly as the fluidity of subjectivities, words, and 
technics wield ever more potential power, efforts to bind or stop individuation lie at the 
heart of control. 
Grammatization, Proletarianization, and the Loss of Spirit 
 In the Phaedrus, Plato famously warns of the dangers of the externalization of 
memory. Stiegler re-interprets this warning, arguing that as hypomnemata emerge, the 
individuating potential of internalized organs is lost to external ones.
265
 While this does 
not preclude the productive force of individuation, it does create a tension between the 
potential rigidity of the technic and the subjectivity‘s need for flexibility in 
individuation.
266
 This technical rigidity is characterized by a process Stiegler calls 
grammatization, which speaks to the process whereby the continuous flux of 
individuation ―becomes broken down into a system of discrete elements.‖267 Any process 
of individuation can grammatize; however, Stiegler is most interested in the codification 
of symbolic exchange.
268
 Although this process begins with the alphabet itself (codifying 
the very sound of language), the communicative revolution engendered by control has 
intensified this practice.
269
 Through the force of technocratic rhetorics, globalizing 
economies have worked to level symbolic idioms across the globe – the iPhone is 
                                                          
264. Ibid., 165. 
 
265. Ibid., 136. 
 
266. Ibid., 116. 
 
267. John Tinnell, ―Grammatization: Bernard Stiegler‘s Theory of Writing and Technology,‖ 
Computers and Composition 37 (2015), 136. 
 
268. Stiegler, Symbolic Misery vol. 1, 57. 
 
269. Ibid., 54. 
 
92 
 
 
internationally recognizable, and English is increasingly the language of international 
business, tourism, and the internet. Because of this symbolic homogenization, Stiegler 
contends that grammatization has emerged as the ―technical infrastructure of control 
society.‖270 
As grammatization intensifies, Stiegler warns of the loss of individuation—a 
process Stiegler calls proletarianization. Within proletarianization, grammatization 
repositions the participant – not as a worker but as a consumer, ―now accessible and 
mobilized twenty-four hours a day, and whose memory, habits and preferences are 
entirely retained and stored forever in the digital traces he (sic) leaves at every stage of 
the consumption process.‖271 Although ubiquitous under control, Stiegler notes that the 
loss of individuation is not new:  
The concept of the loss of individuation introduced by Gilbert Simondon 
describes what happened in the nineteenth century to the worker subjected 
to the service of the machine tool: he lost his (sic) know-how and thus his 
very individuality, eventually finding himself reduced to the condition of a 
proletarian. These days it is the consumer whose behavior is standardized 
through the formatting and artificial manufacturing of his desires. Here he 
loses his life knowledge (savoir-vivre), that is, his possibilities of living. 
Norms are substituted by the latest fashionable brands as considered by 
Mallarmé in La Dernière Mode (―The Latest Fashion‖). ―Rationally‖ 
promoted through marketing, these brands are like those ―bibles‖ that 
govern the functioning of fast-food franchises, which the franchisee must 
follow to the letter under the threat of contract breach or even a lawsuit.
272
 
 
Proletarianization occurs because the ―worker‖ is divorced from any technical 
participation in production. Under control, participants are not simply divorced from the 
product of their labor, their very existence is both the labor and the product.  
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 Consequently, proletarianization divorces participants from participation in 
symbolic construction and instead asks them only to passively consume symbols. Stiegler 
turns to the example of music to explain this process. Prior to technologies of mass 
musical circulation, the gramophone, record, MP3 etc., to enjoy music more than once an 
individual had to be able to reproduce it themselves. Participating in this personal 
reproduction enabled individuation for the music, as well as participants and the listening 
collective.
273
 Conversely, when music can be purchased and consumed, each user has the 
capacity to consume the melody without reproduction or individuation. Although there is 
a lesser possibility for individuation by redeploying the music in new times and spaces, 
the symbolic content is now only industrially, rather than socially produced, limiting the 
space for the invention of new communicative possibilities.
274
 This is not to say that 
individuation cannot happen within particular media forms, but when technocratic 
bureaucratization promotes consumption over participation, these media lose their 
individuating function – denying the creation of active subjects and politically affective 
publics. 
The Politics of Spirit 
Theorizing control, Deleuze implies there is a potential of political agency in the 
human actor, asserting ―Men‘s (sic) only hope lies in a revolutionary becoming: the only 
way of casting off their shame or responding to what is intolerable.‖275 In recognizing the 
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conditions of proletarianization enabled by control as the root of this intolerability, 
Stiegler turns to questions of spirit and care as the model of future politics. 
For Stiegler, resistance to control must align with questions of spirit, as this is the 
capacity denied by proletarianization. Stiegler defines spirit as the capability of the mind 
to freely individuate. Specifically, Stiegler argues that  
the ‗life of spirit (the mind),‘ to speak in the words of Hannah Arendt, has 
become entirely subjected to the imperatives of the market economy and 
to the imperatives of returns upon the investments of enterprises that 
promote the technologies of what is called the culture industry, the 
program industry, media, telecommunications, and finally technologies of 
knowledge, or cognitive technologies.
276
  
 
Recognizing that there is not an outside to capitalism, Stiegler does not call for a 
wholesale abandonment or destruction of current modes of production. Instead, Stiegler 
argues for the adoption of an economic system that does not focus on profit but rather for 
the care of the collective and its spirit.
277
 Stiegler argues,  
These systems must be grounded in the representation of differing 
perspectives, polemics and controversies, as well as convergences of 
interest or perspective enabling re-groupings, that is, ultimately, 
transindividuations that recognize themselves in meanings, thereby 
constituting collective individuations, and establishing, at the heart of 
digitalized public life, argued and analyzable critique that counters the 
murmurings that abound in a falsely consensual digital world lacking 
instruments for enhancing collective singularities.
278
 
 
Through participation in digital technologies that allow a variety of individuations – such 
as memes – ―we are [able] to love things together‖ and in the process both love ourselves 
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and engage in collective action.
279
 In this call to love things together, the very relations 
denied by technocratic synchronization create this new spirit. Specifically, Stiegler calls 
for a capitalism that creates a space for individuation and spirit under the auspices of 
care, a byproduct of individuation. Specifically, care is a process ―whereby knowledge 
and skills are imparted from an older to a younger generation‖ in a way that allows 
individuation.
280
 In order to engage in care, participants must mobilize the third degree 
retentions created by past individuations in the present and in a way that they may be 
used for the future. If the economy places care at its heart, Stiegler argues, education, 
science, and industry will all gain a more productive capacity.
281
 
Because the loss of spirit is directly tied to the industrialization of the symbolic, 
the ethos of a society of care is built around amateurism. For Stiegler, an amateur is more 
than a person without professional credentials, although that is central. Amateurs must 
also engage in production not out of a monetary motive, but for the love of the art.
282
 The 
amateur sings the song to learn its nuance, enjoy it, and share with friends, not to record 
the perfect track and sell it. However, Stiegler argues that the focus on synchronization of 
mass production discourages the amateur.
283
 Stiegler therefore argues for a revitalization 
of amateurism because it encourages the repetition through difference that allows 
individuation. Networked media ecologies are particularly suited to this amateurism, 
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because while they certainly have the ability to function as tools of the programming 
industry (Netflix lets us synchronize binge watching at a level beyond that of network 
TV), the contributive logic of networked ecologies invites participation, creation, and 
recirculation, on the amateur scale.
284
 In this capacity, memes have the potential to 
function as technics of amateur production par excellence. Not only do their aesthetics 
derive from amateur modes of production, but their creation of participatory narratives 
and publics enables them to function as modes of amateur cultural and rhetorical critics.  
Despite the potential of networked media to simply drive consumption, Stiegler‘s 
veneration of digital technologies emerges from the capability of these technics to enable 
a return of spirit. Recognizing a return of spirit as key to productive human action, 
Stiegler views contemporary hypomnemata as pharmakon – both a poison and a cure.285 
The curative functions of networked technologies begin with their capacities as parts of 
an economy of contribution. In inviting all participants within networked ecologies to 
participate, networked technologies invite each participant to contribute to the 
construction of the modes that define these digital environments.
286
 This curative 
potential has manifested in technologies like freeware and open source software, both of 
which drive the production of memes and break the cycle of synchronization.  
However, participants should not embrace the potential of networked ecologies 
without caution. Stiegler notes that all too often control turns this contributive nature 
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back towards synchronizing consumptive practices. Crowdsourcing, while potentially 
mobilizing the common for the creation of the social good, is also frequently used by 
corporations to make products more desirable for popular consumption.
287
 Similarly, 
control can re-mobilize many memes to reify dominant ideologies and promote 
consumptive drives in networked publics. Because of this dual nature, Stiegler warns that 
pharmaka are indifferent towards participants; it is up to us to ensure they work in the 
service of care.
288
 Consequently, resisting control centers on turning technologies towards 
the manufacture of spirit. Participants must utilize networked technologies in ways that 
help them struggle against proletarianization, which means embracing the individuating 
processes built around the symbolic capacities of the new, networked media ecology.  
Because control functions primarily through the synchronization of individuals, 
political struggle exists at the intersection of technics, subjectivities, and collectivities. 
However, as collectives are preindividual, and technics are exteriorizations of the 
collective, the political space of the struggle becomes subjectivity itself. In quashing 
individuation, control prevents the process of subjectification.
289
 Following this concern 
with the politics of subjectification, Stiegler asserts that ―to trans-form oneself, or to 
make of oneself, is just as much the theatre as the forge of the struggle.‖290 This is not a 
battle over the nature of some sort of unified subject – this notion is something Deleuze 
                                                          
287. Stiegler, Symbolic Misery Vol. 2, 49. 
 
288. Stephen Barker, ―Techno-pharmaco-genealogy,‖ in Stiegler and Technics, ed. Christina 
Howells and Gerald Moore (Edinburgh, UK: Edinburgh University Press, 2013), 271. 
 
289. Stiegler, Symbolic Misery Vol. 1, 50. 
 
290. Stiegler, Symbolic Misery Vol. 2, 4. 
 
98 
 
 
and Stiegler explicitly reject. Rather a struggle over subjectification seeks to establish the 
conditions under which the human animal may act.
291
  
Rhetoric in the Regime of Control 
As hypomnemata have the potential to both foster the most intense modes of 
control as well as enable resistance, any contemporary political project is undoubtedly 
tied to communication. However, it is not enough to simply attend to generic 
communication-oriented technics. Rather, I contend a rhetorical orientation can best 
foster the return of spirit via restored individuation. Therefore, I dedicate the remainder 
of this chapter towards explicating how the rhetorical tradition can offer illuminating 
insights into resisting proletarianization. 
 Considering Deleuze‘s admonishment of an abundance of communication as the 
foundation of control – he claims that ―speech and communication have been corrupted‖ 
and calls for ―vacuoles of noncommunication‖ – it would be easy to dismiss the rhetorical 
in the efforts to resist the dominant forces of control.
292
 This dismissal would seem 
particularly appropriate for networked rhetorical technics as they expand the 
opportunities for communication. Critics like Jodi Dean argue that these technologies 
encourage participation in control at the cost of the more consequential politics that 
operate on the level of money and collective ―real world‖ action.293 However, if, as 
Damien Smith Pfister notes, control society is communicatively ―justified, extended, and 
maintained‖ – particularly through networked rhetorical processes – then ―networked 
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rhetorical theory must focus its critical edge on [control society].‖294 This rhetorical focus 
is particularly useful because, as Stiegler notes, symbolic resources – as the grounds for 
individuation – ―are both theatre and weapon‖ in the current struggle over power.295 
Moreover, a rhetorical focus is the necessary antidote to philosophy‘s poisonous 
dismissal of technics. Stiegler asserts that in ignoring technics, Platonism and its resultant 
philosophies are the grounds from which the oppressions of contemporary control stem. 
Consequently, according to Stiegler, the resurgence of technics must be the project of 
contemporary philosophy.
296
 If that is the case, the meta-technic that is rhetoric may be 
the future of philosophical thought. Specifically, as an architectonic art, rhetoric is a 
technic through which all other techne may be understood.
297
 A participant cannot simply 
build an axe, it must be rhetorically framed as having utility to operate as a retentional 
apparatus. Similarly, the alphabet is nothing more than a series of sounds without 
rhetorical formation. In this sense, the rhetorical is the very condition of possibility from 
which other technics individuate.  
In the context of Stiegler, as soon as rhetoric is more than a simple tool for 
creating action, it is already on the road to being a technic of individuation. In this sense 
it demands a rethinking of the dominant tradition of rhetoric. Blumenberg famously notes 
that rather than being a tool only for mono-directional persuasion, rhetoric centers around 
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fostering agreement.
298
 However, in the milieu of Stiegler, this is not traditional 
agreement. Instead, agreement is found in using tertiary retentions to recreate the 
collective secondary retentions that constitute the ―we.‖ Further, Blumenberg argues that 
because it is interested in agreement, rhetoric must delay other forms of action to make 
time for this process.
299
 In the language of individuation, this delay is the renegotiation of 
the preindividual. In seeking agreement through unifying individuations, the rhetorical 
seeks to reshape the very individualities that constitute the we, taking the time to 
constitute a different field of potential from which individuals may act (individuate). 
If rhetoric is the negotiation of the conditions for individuation, it does so 
particularly through its focus on form.
300
 While individual rhetorical iterations have 
force, the form behind these iterations organizes ―our beings, our perceptions, and our 
social realities.‖301 The individuating capacity of form relates to long-standing concepts 
within the rhetorical tradition. Indeed, the Sophists argued that a flexible notion of form 
creates the conditions of rhetorical possibility in a manner akin to what Simondon 
envisions as the preindividual state. Nathan Crick praises this Sophistic legacy because, 
Despite the attention paid to the Sophists‘ epistemology, their greatest 
legacy is really their artistic commitment to form, or what Kenneth Burke 
calls the ‗‗creation of an appetite in the mind of the auditor, and the 
adequate satisfying of that appetite.‘‘ The Sophists understood that logos 
is a means of giving form to collective human experience by bringing 
                                                          
298. Hans Blumenberg, ―An Anthropological Approach to the Contemporary Significance of 
Rhetoric,‖ in After Philosophy: End or Transformation?, ed. Kenneth Baynes, James Bohman, and Thomas 
McCarthy (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1987), 442.  
 
299. Ibid., 447. 
 
300. While Simondon has spoken against the linking of form and individuation, this reluctance 
stems from the rigidity of the Platonic concept of form. Simondon, ―Genesis,‖ 371. Once form is removed 
from questions of ―True Form‖ and being and is instead conceived of as rhetorically, I believe it is a useful 
tool for explaining the rhetorical processes that drive individuation.  
 
301. Brummet, ―Form,‖ 378. 
 
101 
 
 
forth outstanding qualities in their common situation and narrating 
possibilities by which emotional tensions can be brought to 
consummation.
302
 
 
Crick‘s description of logos bringing forth human qualities through rhetorical form reads 
as a paraphrase of Simondon explaining individuation. Rhetorical form shapes the 
potential of symbolic action, and symbolic action shapes reality. Yet the analogs to 
individuation in rhetorical studies extend beyond the centrality of form. 
The same year that Deleuze wrote on control societies (1990), Michael Calvin 
McGee wrote ―Text, Context, and the Fragmentation of Contemporary Culture,‖ an essay 
that serves as a rhetorical parallel to Deleuze‘s theorization of control by opening 
rhetorical studies to the question of individuation through three moves. First, in 
theorizing interpretation as the task of the audience, rather than the critic, McGee 
conceives of rhetoric not as a simple conveyer of static meaning but as a technic that 
individuates in each context.
303
 If every act of rhetoric must be consumed in new contexts 
that draw attention to different fragmented components and flows, these acts necessarily 
transindividuate through their circulation and analysis. It individuates a new force of the 
words, the interpreter is re-individuated, and it constitutes new social relations between 
those who interpreted it. McGee‘s second tie to individuation is recognizing that ―rhetoric 
is what rhetoricians do,‖ suggesting that ―focus is more on the performance of discourse 
than the archeology of discourse.‖304 If rhetoric is a process of performance, it is never 
complete. Rather, it is a moving force that re-individuates as it moves across contexts and 
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through individuals. Finally, reconceiving texts as formations of fragments, McGee 
disconnects the rhetorical performance from a particular rhetor.
305
 Instead, fragments, 
both mobilized and excluded from the assembled performance, must preexist the text in 
potentiality (form) but not in iteration. It is the combining of the fragments into an 
assembled force that actualizes and individuates the rhetorical performance and its related 
components. Consequently, both McGee and Deleuze recognize a fundamental shift in 
the very nature of communication. They both argue that the conditions of contemporary 
communication and politics demand a move away from understanding texts and forms 
exclusively as boundaries/bounded. For Deleuze, this is the move away from molds, for 
McGee it is the rejection of the discrete text. Instead, these concepts must be replaced 
with more fluid understandings of communicative force/individuation – Deleuze‘s 
modulation and McGee‘s fragments.306 It is only in embracing these shifts that critics can 
understand the ways that rhetoric – as a technic of power – functions in the conditions of 
control.  
Memes as the Entelechial Individuating Text 
Because McGee‘s fragmentation thesis is an effort to understand rhetoric at the 
birth of control, it is not surprising that digital technologies have intensified the features 
of McGee‘s arguments in the same way that they have Deleuze‘s. Memes operate almost 
exclusively through a logic of form, as they are exceedingly fragmented and are symbolic 
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technics in a state of constant individuation.
307
 Because of this fragmented and 
participatory nature, memes are not simply another hypomnemata, but rather they are 
representative of the potential of the capacities of rhetoric as pharmakon of control in a 
networked rhetorical era.  
Virno, while explaining the individuation of the multitude and the resultant 
political capacities, also articulates the relation of rhetoric and control. Specifically, 
Virno argues that the preindividual state known as the ―the general intellect‖ can also be 
called ―common places.‖ Virno notes, 
in today‘s world, the ―special places‖ of discourse and of argumentation 
are perishing and dissolving, while immediate visibility is being gained by 
the ―common places,‖ or by generic logical-linguistic forms which 
establish the pattern for all forms of discourse. This means that in order to 
get a sense of orientation in the world and to protect ourselves from its 
dangers, we cannot rely on those forms of thought, of reasoning, or of 
discourse which have their niche in one particular context or another.
308
 
 
This use of commonplaces is a pun referring to both the classical concept of culturally 
specific stories and the common as the place where publics are both produced and reside. 
A wide range of human relations may share a variety of technics, and the common forms 
of the symbolic are both the engine of capitalism and individuation of publics.  
 However, beyond saying that both usages of the pun are literal, this dual 
movement also speaks to the fact that a language of commonplaces is the discourse of 
post-Fordism. As the networked logic of control places ever more diverse subjectivities 
into relation, symbols, such as memes, that distil the commonality between subjectivities 
into a manner that is easy to deploy are the rhetorical resources that connect the widest 
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range of participants. Virno argues that this shift is a result of the loss of home afforded 
by control, noting, 
the cognitive-linguistic habits of the species do not come to the forefront 
because someone decides to make them come to the forefront; they do so 
out of necessity, or because they constitute a form of protection in a 
society devoid of substantial communities (or of ―special places‖).309 
 
As control erodes spatial community, the form based logic of commonplaces and topoi, 
which resonate across contexts, become the crux of rhetoric and the production of 
collectivities. This loss of home and general language is the very basis of networked 
media ecologies. As networked participants turn to the de-spatialized web for rhetorical 
production and consumption, they must speak in the generalized language of the internet 
– notably memes and emojis – to be intelligible. Joshua Gunn earlier recognized a similar 
phenomenon, observing that the logics of late capitalism frequently reduce books and 
movies to stock footage and other fragments, transforming their specialized knowledge 
into generalized topoi/commonplaces.
310
 Under the logic of control, as well as that of 
networked spaces, it is those rhetorical technics that are most open to the common that 
have the greatest potential for use. 
While a loss of specialized language does create a more shallow conception of 
language, that shallowness may be a political resource. Specifically, shallow language 
may also function under the logic of pharmakon. Certainly, if symbols are shallow they 
are more easily synchronized and consumed. Hours spent reading memes, all the while 
also being subjected to advertisements and producing metadata, certainly plays into the 
hands of capitalistic control. However, this shallowness also affords a certain realistic 
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power. Drawing from Foucault, theorists such as Deleuze, Negri, and Virno all argue that 
surface is all that there is. Technics are not impactful because of some deep or innate 
nature but rather because of what they do and how they relate to individuation. In 
attuning all participants to this surface nature, commonplaces function as tools of social 
criticism. Virno notes,  
Those who do not feel at home, in order to get a sense of orientation and 
to protect themselves, must turn to the ―common places,‖ or to the most 
general categories of the linguistic intellect; in this sense, strangers are 
always thinkers. As you see, I am inverting the direction of the analogy: it 
is not the thinkers who become strangers in the eyes of the community to 
which the thinkers belong, but the strangers, the multitude of those ―with 
no home,‖ who are absolutely obliged to attain the status of thinkers. 
Those ―without a home‖ have no choice but to behave like thinkers: not in 
order for them to learn something about biology or advanced mathematics, 
but because they turn to the most essential categories of the abstract 
intellect in order to protect themselves from the blows of random chance, 
in order to take refuge from contingency and from the unforeseen.
311
 
 
While memes and other fragmented digital texts may seem inane, their very lack of 
deeper or specialized meaning allows them to become a reflection of contemporary 
humanity. Memes are created and individuate out of the shared social context of internet 
participants; they are the languages by which this collective knowledge individuates. It is 
in this capacity, as the product of collective networked individuation, that memes emerge 
as key to understanding the potential of contemporary rhetorical production. 
 Furthermore, as technics that are eminently individuational, memes demonstrate 
the democratic potential of networked hypomnemata. Although this democratization may 
have impacts on representative democracies, memes‘ central impact is in the enabling of 
a more radical form of democracy – the constitution of the potential of humanity through 
multitude itself. The ability to engage in this more radical democracy is key to resistance. 
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Under control, representative democracy more often than not functions as an institution 
of bureaucratized biopower.
312
 However, just because traditional politics increasingly 
operates in the interests of control does not imply that organized politics are not possible. 
We must simply rethink what and how organizations are used.
313
  
 Because participants create and renegotiate memes through processes of social 
invention, they are representative of this organized possibility of radical democracy. 
Their participatory nature gives them the potential to work against proletarianization. 
Davi Johnson notes  
If, as Nietzsche famously suggests, so much of our thought is the product 
of grammatical habit, then memetics offers a way to disrupt these 
traditions of thought by providing a defamiliarizing theoretical vocabulary 
capable of offering at least temporary reprieve from the causal 
assumptions borne of grammatical necessity.
314
 
 
The commonness of memes allows every participant the potential to break the symbolic 
logic of a particular meme, as well as the other grammatical structures in relation to 
which the memes individuate. When iterations of PTSD Kid moved the poles from 
focusing on the horrors of Vietnam to the horrors of childhood, it is the grammatical 
resistance of this new interpretation that allowed for a refiguring of the grammar of the 
meme. 
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Moreover, as the memes operate on a common level, they allow the amateur 
production that Stiegler sees as the key to re-individuation. Because memes are simple 
and universal in content, any participant can deploy them. In the process, they also 
participate in the active renegotiation of modes that drive the meme. Each deployment of 
Scumbag Steve changes the form of the mode of ―scumbag,‖ redefining the potential of a 
range of social individuations. Such memes, and other forms of cognitive labor, function 
as non-representative democracy. The changes of the scumbag mode set the potentialities 
of decorum because each new iteration helps to democratically renegotiate the boundaries 
of decorum. Memes are democratically created symbol systems, and their relations to 
other social modes allow for those modes to be democratically negotiated as well. 
Technics like memes radicalize the process of individuation, challenging 
proletarianization.
315
 
 In providing the rhetorical resources to challenge proletarianization, memes and 
similar rhetorical technics also have the potential to help reshape traditional politics 
towards care. Theorists of control are suspicious of representational democracy, not only 
for its ties to capital but also because the very nature of representation is to reduce 
individuating singularities to grammaticized representational classes.
316
 However, Zizi 
Papacharissi, in studying participatory digital technics, notes that while expressive 
technologies may not motivate individuals towards traditional political action, the 
creation of particular structures of feelings reorient these individuals towards the civic by 
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providing connections that allow people to ―feel‖ their way into politics.317 Tweets about 
the Arab spring may have had little impact on global policy, but they disrupted the 
synchronic isolated media consumption of web participants, prompting them to exist in 
relation to politically engaged others around the world. It is these modes of relations that 
Stiegler argues is the essence of care. The rhetorical creation of affective publics – that is, 
modes of affectivity that connect people to one another – creates the potentiality for an 
industrial political economy predicated on care rather than control. 
Using Burke to Combat Symbolic Misery 
The politics of control and individuation, particularly in a networked era, are 
central to rhetorical processes. However, even as the rhetorical link to individuation has 
been explicated, the specific rhetorical technics and processes entangled within these 
politics remain unclear. To provide a rhetorical vocabulary for exploring the 
individuating potential of networked technics against technocratic modes of control, I 
turn to Kenneth Burke. This relationship has the potential to be fruitful because Burke 
provides a more robust vocabulary to explore the role of the symbolic in individuation 
but also because Stiegler provides the opportunity to update Burke both in terms of 
technics and current technology. 
At first, this pairing would seem unusual. Burke is often characterized as a total 
Luddite, whereas Stiegler cautiously praises technology. Certainly, Burke was suspicious 
of new technologies; however, this suspicion focused on technology‘s association with a 
psychology of information.
318
 Burke‘s psychology of information parallels Stiegler‘s 
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account of contemporary symbolic misery. Each focuses on the ways that the capitalistic 
production of rigid symbolic systems limits the capacity for human action. In this way, 
Stiegler and Burke share similar suspicions of technology. When unchecked, technology 
stifles the capability of action and the spirit by reducing individuals to creatures of 
motion/consumption. Yet, both also saw the potential cure in technology. The late 
writings of Burke observe that the interplay between the principle of personality (akin to 
psychic individuation) and the principle of technology (akin to technical individuation) 
create subjectivity.
319
 Finally, to avoid the perils of technology, both Burke and Stiegler 
turn to poetics. Stiegler argues that it is the nature of the poetic to be sensible, creating 
spaces to play and manipulate with language.
320
 Burke again parallels Stiegler, framing 
the poetic orientation – an orientation towards incongruity and play – as the solution to 
the informationism that is driven by capitalist production.  
The final ideational parallel between Burke and Stiegler is a commitment to a 
return of the pre-Platonic. These corresponding sophistic returns are symptomatic of the 
parallels between contemporary rhetorical conditions and those of pre-literate society. 
Stiegler‘s theory is explicitly tied to the pre-Platonic Greeks, arguing that they were the 
most recent prior philosophical movement interested in technics.
321
 Crick similarly 
argues that Burke‘s focus on form, attitudes, and play all place Burkean rhetorical 
theorization within the same sophistic tradition.
322
 As they share similar philosophical 
                                                                                                                                                                             
 
319. Kenneth Burke, ―In Haste,‖ Pre/Text 3-4 (1985): 340. 
 
320. Stiegler, Symbolic Misery vol. 2, 31. 
 
321. Stiegler, Technics vol. 1, 205. 
 
322. Crick, ―The Sophistical Attitude,‖ 41. 
 
110 
 
 
roots, their philosophies unsurprisingly mirror one another. This overlapping of a 
sophistic orientation is particularly useful for unpacking the rhetorical affectivity of 
memes. Indeed, their reliance on imitatio provides a rhetorical explanation for the 
creation and function of repetition and difference central to Stiegler‘s concept of 
individuation.
323
  
 However, if Burke and Stiegler demonstrate so many philosophical parallels, what 
does Burke provide to understandings of the questions of technics and individuation? 
Foremost, as iterated multiple times already, the Burkean notion of form is central to 
unpacking modes and transindividuation. The negotiation of form is how these fields of 
potentiality emerge and are recreated. Similarly, identification helps explain the potential 
of collective secondary retentions; it is those rhetorics that create identification that allow 
the sharing of experience across subjectivities. Moreover, if according to Stiegler 
―retentions are selections,‖324 Burke asks us to also consider how they are reflections and 
deflections, broadening our understanding of the force of these retentions. Therefore, I 
now turn to examining memes situated in contemporary political controversies to 
demonstrate the utility of this Burke-Stiegler hybridization. Ultimately, understanding the 
rhetorical dimensions of technics provides the potential for restoring their individuating 
capacities, and in the process the prospects of productive democratic politics.  
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Chapter 3  
Old Economies and New Memes:  
Enthymeme and Enchantment in Old Economy Steve 
Signs of economic slowdown had begun to emerge across the United States as 
early as 2006. However, two years later when Lehman Brothers, the then fourth largest 
investment bank in the United States, collapsed many Americans were shocked.
325
 For 
these Americans, the ―Great Recession‖ that followed Lehman‘s collapse seemed to 
come out of nowhere.
326
 Although the bank‘s failure was the result of systematic lapses 
in regulation and accountability that could be traced back as far as the seventies, 
dominant economic rhetorics had largely convinced Americans that continued prosperity 
and growth were the inevitable outcome of the neoliberal economy that had brought the 
affluence of the 1990s. So great was the public shock at this seemingly unpredicted 
disaster that both academics and the popular press proclaimed that the entire system of 
global capitalism was under threat.
327
 However, this threat was never realized, and four 
years later economists and politicians proclaimed that the US economy was well on the 
path to recovery. Despite these messages of recovery, many Americans – particularly 
Millennials – were not feeling any more economically secure.328  
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In opposition to this angst, the Federal Reserve Bank (The Fed), led by Ben 
Bernanke, promoted a rhetoric of market recovery that proletarianized individuals as 
consumers in service of these markets. Drawing on rhetorical tropes traditional to the 
Fed, namely protecting agentic markets and distrusting the irrational urges of consumers, 
this rhetoric framed consumption as not only the key to recovery, but as the only rational 
action for American consumers. Such a rhetoric demonstrates the profound 
proletarianizing force of technocratic rhetorics, because it dissuades the amateur 
participation key to productive individuations. Although larger populations are the most 
impacted by economic shifts, and therefore could offer meaningful insight into the 
diagnosis of economic concerns, individuating economic rhetorics would allow economic 
policy to be built around common understandings of the issues and goals of economics. 
However, in this case the proletarianizing force is all the more pronounced, as it literally 
valorizes the politics of personal consumption that Stiegler sees as dis-enchanting 
individuals and empowering contemporary politics of control. 
In 2012, an unlikely symbol emerged to provide an individuating voice seeking to 
challenge the official rhetorics of market recovery and prosperity: Old Economy Steve. A 
stock image macro built around a seventies-era yearbook photo, this meme articulates the 
emotional and ideological frustrations of a generation beset by economic anxiety. By 
enthymematically creating a narrative that challenges the myth of the American dream, 
the iterations of the meme combine to offer a narrative that the economy simply failed 
younger generations. This narrative is less invested in conventional political divides 
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between conservatives and liberals, instead focusing on diagnosing problems with the 
contemporary economy and building a coalition of the disaffected. Such a coalition has 
the potential to resist proletarianizing rhetorics that seek to prioritize consumption over 
collectivity. 
 Therefore, in this chapter I outline how technocratic rhetorics such as Bernanke‘s 
work to proletarianize individuals in relation to economics. I then explore the ways that 
Old Economy Steve generates breakages in these communicative structures of control. 
Specifically, this meme provides unique insight into the ways that stock image macros 
intersect with both dominant ideological discourses (neoliberal economics) as well as 
particular social identities (Millennials).
329
 In this capacity, the Old Economy Steve 
meme is demonstrative of Stiegler‘s vision of a positive political future. As I will argue, 
the meme‘s networked practices show how the rhetorical forms of narrative, myth and 
identification provide resources for individuational rhetorics which serve to unwind 
control and promote a politic of care.  
The Fed and the Infantilization of America 
Political economy and economics have long had a turbulent relationship with 
rhetoric. Adam Smith‘s academic career began with a focus on rhetoric; therefore, it 
should not be surprising that Smith‘s framing of capitalism – which is largely responsible 
for contemporary economic understandings – has both rhetorical and moralistic elements 
within it.
330
 Additionally, as Deirdre McCloskey reminds us, the technical language and 
                                                          
329.
 Hunter Schwarz, ―Old Economy Steve is a New Meme That Will Enrage All Millennials 
Everywhere,‖ BuzzFeed (May 25, 2013), http://www.buzzfeed.com/hunterschwarz/old-economy-steve-is-
a-new-meme-that-will-enrage-all-millenn. 
330.
 Lisa Herzog, ―The Community of Commerce: Smith‘s Rhetoric of Sympathy in the Opening of 
the Wealth of Nations,‖ Philosophy &Rhetoric 46 no. 1 (2013): 66. 
114 
 
 
mathematics of economics have a persuasive purpose and function, largely rooted in 
metaphor.
331
 However, contemporary economic theory and politics have largely denied 
this rhetorical element. Instead they frame economics as a hard science, with predictable 
and rational results. James Aune argues this is but one way the realist style manifests 
itself in economics; these discourses – particularly free market economics – simplify 
human nature and define efficiency as a norm.
332
 By adopting a realist style, economic 
discourses shut down opposing viewpoints by dismissing them as lacking substance, 
which maintains the privilege of economic elites through the prevention of alternative 
individuations.  
 Existing at the nexus of objective and rhetorical understandings of economic 
policy, the  Chair of the US Federal Reserve Bank is one of the most influential actors in 
shaping both the direction of the economy and public understandings of economics and 
their impact. Although unelected, bureaucrats such as the Fed Chair have immense power 
to influence national politics through their ability to enact their broad mission of 
preventing economic and banking instability. Lowi argues such ―broad discretion makes 
a politician out of a bureaucrat.‖333 Even as chairs of the Fed argue that they base their 
decisions on numbers and models, they also recognize that their words are carefully 
                                                          
331.
 Deirdre McCloskey, The Rhetoric of Economics, 2nd ed. (Madison: University of Wisconsin 
Press, 1998), xiii.  
332.
 James Arnt Aune, Selling the Free Market: The Rhetoric of Economic Correctness (New York: 
The Guilford Press, 2001), 40.  
333.
 Theodore J. Lowi, The End of Liberalism: The Second Republic of the United States (New 
York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1979), 304.  
115 
 
 
dissected and interpreted – creating conditions where they carefully craft their messages 
to try to promote the stability and growth of markets.
334
 
 The Fed‘s focus on markets and trade highlights their commitment to the 
neoliberal ideologies that underpin control society. Specifically, the Fed‘s commitment to 
market objectivity and market freedom aligns its political influence with the broader 
marketization frequently identified with neoliberalism.
335
 These rhetorical moves further 
politics of control and proletarianization because they transform the individual from a 
citizen to a consumer. Nicholas Gane draws the link between consumer society and 
control by arguing that consumer society ―passes ‗freedoms‘ down to individuals but at 
the same time depoliticizes and disempowers them by closing down the agora as an 
active space for political engagement, and by leaving consumers (who are not citizens) to 
their own devices.‖336 When consumption becomes the primary action of publics, politics 
is left to technocratic elites. To better understand the specific ways that the rhetoric of the 
Fed enacts such political control, I examine their justifications of their response to the 
2008 housing collapse and subsequent ―Great Recession.‖ Many saw the tumult of the 
Great Recession as a moment where neoliberal capitalism was on the brink of failure.
337
 
When a series of Fed-led interventions assisted in a recovery that was framed as 
preventing this collapse, chair Ben Bernanke was able to use the crisis to justify the 
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validity and importance of the Fed‘s vision of economics – reifying the consumerist 
model of economics that prevents individuation.  
 To evaluate the proletarianizing rhetoric of the Fed, I examine a series of four 
lectures delivered by Ben Bernanke at George Washington University in the spring of 
2012. While these lectures were delivered to a class of graduate students, they were 
viewed live by an online audience of over 40,000 and were watched an equal number of 
times in the following week alone.
338
 In part, a response to the increasingly virulent anti-
Fed rhetoric circulating across the 2012 election cycle, these lectures sought to justify the 
Fed‘s response to the great recession. They established them as an actor key in preventing 
economic collapse and thus legitimating the Fed as a necessary and visionary force in 
American politics.
339
 My analysis primarily focuses on the third and fourth of Bernanke‘s 
lectures because they specifically detailed the Fed‘s response to the crisis and outline 
their vision for American economics.
340
 The rhetorical features of Bernanke‘s lectures 
exemplify American political rhetorics that promote proletarianization as it relates to 
economic discourses by creating an ordered hierarchy which valorizes the action of 
markets, the rationality of banks, and the irrationality of the masses. Combined, these 
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factors reduce the masses to consumers, negating amateur participation in politics and 
promoting rhetorical and market action around consumption.  
Before I delve into the specifics of Bernanke‘s framing of the Fed response to the 
great recession, I will briefly outline the popular narratives explaining this economic 
slowdown. Officially referring to the economic recession lasting from December 2007 to 
June 2009, the Great Recession colloquially refers to the collapse of the US housing 
market in 2007 and the economic slowdown that lasted well into the second decade of the 
twenty first century.
341
 The most popular narrative explaining the causes of this recession 
was that irresponsible mortgage practices created a bubble in housing prices and the 
subsequent popping of that bubble triggered the recession.
342
 Specifically, in an effort to 
expand the availability of mortgage backed securities, which had become a profitable 
alternative to government bonds as a premier safe investment, American financiers 
offered increasingly risky mortgages to US consumers. However, as consumers of 
particularly risky mortgages were unable to make their payments, a series of banks – 
including large firms such as AIG, Lehman Brothers, Bear Sterns, all of whom were 
heavily invested in mortgage markets – lost a major revenue stream. The collapse of 
Lehman under these pressures led to a rapid and profound reticence for future lending 
across the financial industry. This quickly expanding liquidity crisis sent ripples across 
the economy, expanding the impact of the housing collapse across economic sectors. 
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While the recession officially ended in 2009, it would be over five years before 
unemployment, wages, markets, and other economic indicators would begin to approach 
pre-2008 levels. Undoubtedly this narrative of the collapse is overly simplistic. Ryan 
Avent notes that the growing gap between the rich and other Americans, deregulation, 
governmental commitment to boom and bust cycles, and other structural factors all 
contributed to the collapse.
343
 However, as the following section will make apparent, the 
exclusion of these systematic factors in favor of blaming individual failings is part of the 
larger proletarianizing force offered by Bernanke‘s rhetoric.  
Agentic Markets and Proletarianized Masses 
While Bernanke‘s lecture series focuses on the Fed‘s response to the great 
recession, it emerges out of a larger framework of financial rhetoric built around 
neoliberal discourses predicated on the centrality of market logics and growth. 
Specifically, Christian Angelich argues that ―The prime directive of financial speak is to 
protect the status quo image of capitalism as an economic system with infinite growth 
potential.‖344 This focus on growth means that the movements of markets, rather than the 
actions of individuals, is the driving force of economics. This stance is replicated in 
Bernanke‘s lectures. Across the lectures, Bernanke explains the economy in terms that 
focus on it as a system of liquidity and economic flows that is measured by total output, 
rather than a system that is the product of amalgamated actions of individuals.
345
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Bernanke‘s focus on markets all but erases the human cost of economic crisis. For 
example, although much of the content of the lectures are dedicated to the impacts of the 
recession on markets and industry, the third lecture only has a single paragraph on 
unemployment and the topic is discussed only in two brief sections of the fourth. In these 
rare cases where the economy might be measured in human cost, Bernanke pivots this 
discussion back to the impact these factors have on markets. This focus is apparent in the 
fourth lecture when Bernanke explicitly lays out the goals that motivate Fed action, 
noting: 
Now of course, always, we have a dual mandate. We always have two 
objectives. One of them is maximum employment, which we interpret to 
mean is trying to keep the economy growing and using its full capacity, 
and low interest rates are a way of stimulating growth and trying to get 
people back to work. But the other part of our mandate is price stability, 
low inflation…And as a result, markets have been confident that the Fed 
will keep inflation low.
346
  
 
Although unemployment and prices both have profound impacts on all Americans, 
Bernanke pivots each issue back to their effect on markets, employment only matters in 
that it facilitates market growth and inflation is key to market – rather than consumer – 
confidence. Because even the most human costs of the economy are reframed to focus on 
their impact on markets, Bernanke‘s rhetoric clearly frames the strength and growth of 
markets as the central concern of the Fed.  
 Markets can be understood as one of the most concise ways to reflect the 
combined human action that drives economic movement.
347
 However, Bernanke‘s 
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rhetoric instead frames markets as independent agents. Benjamin Lee and Edward 
LiPuma argue that popular frames tend to think of the public sphere and the state as 
containing both first and third person elements, however the market is usually understood 
as a third-person collective agent to which first-person agents respond. They note ―‗the 
market‘ can act, indicate, warn, hesitate, climb, and fall,‖ and human regulators and 
consumers can only react to these moves.
348
 Across Bernanke‘s lectures, markets are 
attributed with this agency as they not only grow (healthily), but are frequently 
―uncertain,‖ ―vulnerable, ―and ―stressed.‖ In the face of these basic actions the Fed is 
positioned as a responsive actor. 
So given how we currently see the economy, we tell the market something 
about where we think the rates are going to go. To the extent that they--
market is--better understands our plans, that's going to help reduce 
uncertainty in financial markets. And to the extent that our plans are, in 
some sense, more aggressive than the market anticipated, we'll also tend to 
ease policy conditions. OK, so again, monetary policy has been used to try 
to help get the economy back on its feet.
349
  
 
For Bernanke, Fed policy can only function effectively insofar as it is understandable to 
markets. Consequently, both the lectures – and Federal reserve rhetoric more largely – 
rely heavily on economic jargon.
350
 This jargon laden explanation of economics suggest 
that the actions of agentic markets can only be understood through technical expertise. 
Because of this, Bernanke frames Fed rhetoric and policy as needing to respond to the 
technical needs and demands of markets rather than be intelligible to larger publics. 
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 In framing human action as a response to markets as agentic actors, Bernanke‘s 
rhetoric prevents most individuals from participating in the individuation of economic 
rhetorics. Lee and LiPuma argue that by constructing markets as independent agents to 
which investors and other individuals respond, non-experts are prevented from 
identifying with markets.
351
 Furthermore, while banks and regulators respond to markets, 
larger publics are simply consumed by them. When explaining how mortgages are turned 
into investments, Bernanke mentions individual borrowers only insofar as they are 
transformed into securities which may flow across markets.
352
 In the realm of Fed 
rhetoric, most individuals are only related to markets through their consumptive 
practices. Bernanke‘s rhetoric follows Aristotle‘s delineation between economics and 
politics: ―For Aristotle, the administration of the oikos aimed toward the preservation of 
natural life, while the activity of the polis aimed for the promotion of the good life.‖353 
For Bernanke, people matter as those natural lives whose consumption fuels markets – it 
is a non-political space. However in focusing only on markets, Bernanke‘s rhetoric is 
proletarianizing as it prevents most individuals from participating in the identifications 
that create politics and publics; the market is an agent that is fundamentally different than 
―we the people‖ and thus people cannot individuate with it.354 Without this individuation, 
markets are framed as outside of rhetorical space, and thus not subject to the democratic 
will of the people.  
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Even though the Fed‘s rhetoric frames markets as independent agents, for 
Bernanke these agents are not responsible for the housing collapse and subsequent 
recession. Instead, human actors are framed as a mass whose irrational panics created the 
crash. This massification of the larger public begins with reducing individuals to faceless 
aggregates. Outside of banking and financial elites, individuals are only referenced as 
part of statistics or referencing a panic. Such rhetoric frames larger collectivities as 
masses, which Hardt and Negri note is a frame that removes collective agency because 
these irrational mobs are instead led by others.
355
 This view of non-agentic masses is 
replicated in Bernanke‘s implication that consumers function through a Pavlovian-style 
response to Fed policies and rhetoric. Commenting on the influence of Fed policies, 
Bernanke argues:  
By raising and lowering the short-term interest rate, the Fed can influence 
a broader range of interest rates. That in turn affects consumer spending, 
purchases of homes, capital investment by firms and the like, and that 
provides demand for the output of the economy and can help stimulate a 
return to growth.
356
 
 
By suggesting the consuming masses uncritically respond to Fed policy, Bernanke‘s 
rhetoric positions them as participating in what Goodnight and Green call ―mimetic 
isomorphism.‖ 357 Goodnight and Green argue that economic rhetorics frequently ask 
participants to simply imitate past successful behaviors. As a mass, the collective ―we‖ is 
asked to consume a Bureaucrat‘s definitions of economic success, rather than politically 
negotiate (individuate with) these rhetorical technics. In making mass economic action an 
imitation without difference, this rhetoric forecloses individuations. 
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 Beyond limiting individuation, the massification of larger publics also functions 
to create a scapegoat for the financial collapses that spurred the recession. The belief that 
markets are objective and rational is central to the neoliberal rhetorics that justify control 
– if markets are rational they are politically neutral and ethical.358 Yet if markets always 
operate ethically, how could such a disastrous crash occur? The answer offered by 
Bernanke is that the panic of the masses forced the market down a harmful path. 
Although Bernanke argues that subprime mortgage lending was a catalyst of the collapse, 
the lectures focus on mass panic as the mechanism that transformed a localized bubble 
into a system wide failure. In addressing public responses to the earliest bank failures, 
Bernanke explains,  
A depositor would pull their money out of a bank that was thought to be 
having trouble. So there was a whole series of runs which generated huge 
pressures on key financial firms as they lost their funding and were forced 
to sell their assets quickly and many important financial markets were 
badly disrupted.
359
 
 
In using the phrase ―thought to be,‖ Bernanke suggests that the troubles facing banks 
existed in the irrational mind of the masses rather than in financial realities. This 
irrationality then created a cascade that ―disrupted‖ the otherwise orderly and rational 
operation of markets. Even after the crisis, Bernanke asserts that mass irrationality 
continued to hamper markets. In the fourth lecture, Bernanke addresses the slow recovery 
of the economy. Despite the fact that banks had been stabilized and liquidity restored, 
Bernanke argues that the irrational perceptions held by consumers are preventing a full 
recovery. 
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And more broadly, existing home owners, when they see their house 
prices down, it may mean they can't get a home equity line of credit. It 
may mean that they just feel poorer. And so that affects not just their 
housing behavior, but also their willingness and ability to buy other 
business services. So that's one of the reasons, the declines in housing 
prices, and to some extent also stock prices, are part of the reason why 
consumers have been cautious and less willing to spend.
360
  
 
In attributing the inability of stocks, housing prices, and consumer spending to recover to 
masses ―just feeling poorer,‖ Bernanke pegs responsibility for the entirety of the 
continued economic hardship on mass irrationality. It is ―just‖ a feeling, and thus not in 
line with the factual rationality of economic conditions which Bernake would argue 
create growth if freed from these fetters of human irrationality. By framing the masses as 
irrationally harming markets, Bernanke argues that in those cases where larger publics 
are allowed to participate in shaping economic rhetorical technics, the result is disaster. 
This rhetorical frame implies that the exclusion of the masses from participation in these 
economic technics is both necessary and desirable. 
Across Bernanke‘s rhetoric, the masses are a threat to the rational operation of 
markets. This irrationality justifies the imposition of increased control. Specifically, 
Bernanke rationalizes this control by positioning the Fed as a benevolent parent who 
must constrain the masses when they threaten the operation of markets. Megan Foley 
argues that such family metaphors are central to the way that contemporary society 
understands economics. Foley notes this metaphor places larger publics as children in the 
familial relationship.  
Although nowadays the word ‗economics‘ only rarely connotes parent-
child relationships, a family metaphor nevertheless underwrites the history 
of political economy. The term ‗economy,‘ once oeconomy, derives from 
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the Greek roots oikos (household, home, or family) and nomos (law, 
convention, or ordinance). While classical Greek thought maintained a 
division between the economic management of the family and the political 
government of citizens, the modern emergence of ‗‗political economy‘‘ 
appropriated the domestic administration of the oikos as a set of 
techniques for governing civic life. Discourses of political economy 
mapped the art of governing children onto the art of governing citizens, 
ultimately resulting in the rhetorical infantilization of citizenship today.
361
 
 
Bernanke‘s rhetoric follows this familial pattern. Bernake establishes the paternal 
wisdom of the Fed by noting that they had warned the irrational public that their actions 
would lead to a crisis. Demonstrating this passing on of paternal wisdom, Bernanke 
argues  
going back for at least a decade before the crisis, the Fed and many other 
people, you know, said that the--Fannie and Freddie just didn't have 
enough capital and that they were in fact a danger to the stability of the 
financial system.
362
  
 
By arguing that the Fed warned politicians that government programs like Fannie May 
and Freddie Mac were putting markets at risk, Bernanke suggests that if the masses had 
been rational (adult) – or at least listened to rational advice – they could have avoided 
triggering the crisis. Despite this caution, the public acted as juveniles and ignored the 
warnings of more mature minds, succumbing to panic that created the crisis.  
 Once the public failed to listen to the wisdom of the Fed, Bernanke argues that the 
Central Bank was forced to step in and save the public from itself. Speaking about the 
first meeting of heads of central banks after Lehman failed, Bernanke explains, 
We essentially tore up the agenda and we sat down and we talked about 
what are we going to do? How are we going to work together to stop this 
crisis which was threatening the global financial system? And in the end, 
we came up with a statement that was written from scratch based actually 
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on some Fed proposals and was circulated, and there were a number of 
principles and statements involved in that. But among those were first, that 
we were going to work together to prevent the failure of anymore 
systemically important financial institutions.
363
  
 
Framed against the usual banality of such meetings, Bernanke‘s words position the 
response of the Fed as a creative intervention in the face of a failing system. In the 
familial metaphor, they are the parent who has to step in to save an unruly child. That is 
not to say the Fed is without fault in the crisis. On repeated occasions Bernanke notes that 
in allowing unregulated mortgages, the Fed ―did not do as good a job as it should have in 
protecting consumers.‖ 364 However, the failure of the Fed is not one of ignorance about 
markets or economics, but rather that it did not treat the masses as the juveniles that they 
were within this proletarianizing frame. Had the Fed protected people from their 
irrational impulses, the crisis could have been adverted.  
 Bernanke‘s framing of the masses as unruly children justifies both the expansion 
of state power as well as a symbolic politics of proletarianizing control.
365
 Concluding the 
lecture series, Bernanke contends that, ―financial crises will always be with us. That is 
probably unavoidable.‖366 Implicitly, Bernanke‘s rhetoric argues this cycle of crisis exists 
because the panics of irrational masses will continue to disrupt markets. Consequently, 
Bernanke asserts that the Fed and other similar regulators must have the authority to 
regulate (control) the masses as completely as possible. Bernanke posits, ―The only 
solution in the end is for us regulators and our successors to continue to monitor the 
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entire financial system and to try to identify problems and to respond to them using the 
tools that we have.‖367 If the masses cannot be expected to listen to reason, the Fed must 
have the full resources of control to impose that reason onto them. It is only under these 
conditions that the Fed can ―put out the fire‖ that is the childish irrationality of the 
masses.
368
 
Combined, these rhetorical moves by Bernanke create a clear hierarchy of 
economic actors, justifying the proletarianization of the masses. On the top of this 
hierarchy is markets, who are positioned as necessary for creating the growth that leads to 
prosperity. However, in equating markets with rationality, Bernanke‘s rhetoric negatively 
implies that the irrationality of the masses must be symbolically excluded from markets. 
In this order, Fed interventions (through the mediation of banks and other financial 
institutions) are necessary for the market to reach its entelechial form. Specifically, the 
Fed‘s role is to insulate markets from the inefficiencies of people and their 
unpredictability. Moreover, because markets can function as a metonym for the 
economically elite, the interest of the public – the majority of global citizens – are the last 
concern of market capitalism.
369
 The technical language of these economic addresses 
further relegates amateurs as hierarchically bellow these discourses.
370
 Because any 
public action besides consumption is a potential threat to the continued growth of 
markets, neoliberal economics must be conducted through technics that make alternative 
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economic individuations as difficult as possible. If the public cannot understand the 
discourse of experts, they may as well accept it.  
Ultimately, this entire discourse works to foreclose mass participation, preventing 
individuation. This lack of individuation precludes the economic sphere from being 
regulated by collective politics. This lack of accountability to politics is clear in the 
lectures. Only once does Bernanke suggest that the Fed is answerable to more than just 
the stability of markets. Addressing the money spent on bailing out AIG, Bernanke notes 
―we weren‘t taking chances with tax payer money.‖ 371 Although this does suggest some 
public accountability, this responsibility exist only so far as the Fed is an ethical steward 
of the interests of the public, which is defined as ―getting credit flows moving again.‖ 
Even when the Fed is accountable to the public, it is as a parent whose greatest interest is 
the freedom of markets – the tax payer is never the Fed‘s primary concern. Moreover, 
because the tax payer is only useful in terms of their input of money into the system; the 
Fed not only validates itself as justified in ignoring the 45 percent of Americans who 
functionally pay zero income tax
372
 – completely removing them from economic 
rhetorics, but it also justifies the act of taxation as an investment in markets, rather than 
collective interests. Each tax payer has an individual relation with their investment, rather 
than a collective interest in the outcome of tax policy. By foreclosing a collective relation 
to these economic rhetorics, Bernanke forecloses upon the possibility of collective 
individuations, preventing non-consumptive economic practices from being valid 
amateur action within this rhetorical grammar.  
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Old Economy Steve as a Mode of Individuation 
The rhetorical environment created by rhetorics like that of the Fed worked to 
proletarianize any subjectivity that was not part of the financial elite. However, as a 
collective that felt particularly excluded from economic discourses, Millennials were 
particularly alienated from narratives of returning economic prosperity. Economic data 
both suggests that Millennials were disproportionally left behind in the recovery,
373
 and 
that the prospects for economic prosperity for the middle and working classes of America 
have been declining for the better part of four decades.
374
 Beyond the harsh economic 
reality facing this generation, rhetorical frames further excluded them from participation. 
For example, when Bernanke established that the Fed was nominally accountable to 
taxpayers, this accountability largely excluded Millennials because most lack the income 
required to pay into the federal income tax system.
375
 Combined, these economic and 
rhetorical factors led many Millennials to feel excluded from the possibility of 
participation in the politics of political economy. In the face of this alienation and 
frustration, the meme Old Economy Steve emerged as a technic that afforded increased 
opportunities for individuation in relation to issues of contemporary political economy 
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Characterized as a meme for frustrated Millennials, Old Economy Steve (also 
called Steven) emerged as a web phenomenon in 2012.
376
 Although the picture circulated 
around the internet as early as 2010 as a stock photo in anti-acne articles, it developed 
into the Old Economy Steve image macro in a Reddit thread in May of 2012.
377
 The 
image is a high school yearbook photo of Kenneth Kiser, which was available on the web 
because Kiser uploaded it to a free use photo repository.
378
 The popularity of the meme 
spiked when BuzzFeed posted an article in May 2013 proclaiming it ―a new meme that 
will enrage Millennials.‖379 A Google trends search of the phrase ―Old Economy Steve‖ 
reveals that after this initial burst of activity, a steady stream of web attention has 
continued in the years since, with spikes appearing when new web outlets report on the 
meme.
380
 The ability to generate thousands of views and sustain a consistent web 
presence suggests that Steve offers a unique opportunity for participants to 
transindividuate with the meme.
381
 Through an analysis of the corpus of the meme 
available on the Quick Meme and Know Your Meme websites, I explore the defining 
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features and forces of the Old Economy Steve meme. Aside from outlining the ways that 
participants mobilize the meme for political purposes, in focusing on this one meme, this 
chapter also seeks to illustrate how the process of transindividuation shapes and redirects 
the form of memes.  
 
Figure 3.1: Original iteration of the meme 
 
The Individuating Form of Steve 
 As the most consistent element of Old Economy Steve, the visual form of the 
meme is an ideal location to begin evaluation.
382
 Since the Reddit post that introduced the 
meme included the phrase of ―old economy‖ in the title, one clear function of the visual 
is to create a sense of opposition between Steve as a representative of the ―old economy‖ 
and Millennials as members of the ―new economy.‖ Aesthetically, the picture distances 
itself from contemporary America (Figure 3.1). Both Steve‘s shirt and the background are 
a shade of blue reminiscent of the ―powder blue‖ tuxedo stereotypically associated with 
the sixties and seventies. Moreover, the faded contrast of the photo suggests that the 
image is genuinely old, rather than a contemporary reiteration of a past aesthetic. The 
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embodied presentation of Steve himself further dates the photo. The feathered haircut and 
wide-collared shirt place the image firmly within the fashion of the 1970s. These 
aesthetic features position Steve as a member of the Baby Boomer generation, as even the 
oldest members of Generation X would not have been old enough to be in high school 
when these fashions were popular. Combined, these elements create an affect akin to that 
of a yearbook or similar window into the past, setting the conditions where any 
individuation of the meme will already be connected to this frame of temporal opposition. 
As Colin Brooke argues, participants in digital rhetorics not only develop the 
visual form of technics to look a particular way, but also to be looked at from a particular 
vantage point.
383
 When mediated through a screen, with its bright contrast and 
contemporary aesthetics, the image of Steve – with its soft focus and faded elements – is 
positioned as an old and out of touch other. This faded past must be contrasted with the 
vivid, lived experience of participants in digital culture. Additionally, Steve is looking 
directly into the camera, maintaining a direct gaze with viewers. This perspective further 
situates Steve and memetic participants oppositionally. Participants cannot assume the 
perspective of Steve because they are directly engaging his visage.
384
 By positioning the 
Boomers as oppositional to memetic participants, the components of the meme situate 
members of Gen X and Y as ideal participants. They are the members of American 
culture who stand apart and therefore across, from Steve‘s generation. 
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 While the aesthetics and perspective of the meme create temporal distance and 
opposition, the image of Steve himself bolsters the force of the photo. Close-up shots on 
the face cut out mediating factors such as body and context, allowing the disembodied 
face to become a focal point for affect.
385
 This focus is particularly salient in the case of 
Steve, where the photo-session background obfuscates context beyond powder blue – 
making temporal distance the only scenic context. This encourages participants to focus 
on Steve‘s face. With his youth, light tan, and easy-going smirk, Steve embodies an 
attitude suggesting the ease and happiness of youth in the seventies. Intertextually, he 
reads analogously to Matthew McConaughey‘s character in the film Dazed and 
Confused, replete with a ―dazed‖ facial expression.386 Steve‘s life is not only easy, he 
enjoys the excess and leisure – unavailable to contemporary youth – often nostalgically 
romanticized onto reminiscences of the seventies. Moreover, because the photo features 
what is likely interpreted by participants as a white male body, it evokes this nostalgia in 
regards to the subject position that most enjoyed the prosperity of the old economy. Akin 
to a visual ideograph, these images serve to concretize and anchor text.
387
 Therefore, by 
positioning this image at the center of the meme, Old Economy Steve invites participants 
to read the meme through a frame of generational difference that romanticizes the past.  
 These visual associations dictate the formal functions of the topline and 
bottomline. While the tone of textual elements varies across stock character macros, 
participants that create Old Economy Steve memes create ironic affect through the 
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juxtaposition of the two lines of text with the visual form. Once juxtaposed, these two 
lines create a perspective by incongruity whereby the bottomline calls on participants to 
reevaluate the assumptions written on the topline.
388
 In the earliest iterations of the 
meme, the topline continues the gesture of the visual, reifying the easy life embodied by 
Steve. These toplines imbue him with traits that would be unacceptable for contemporary 
economic success – e.g. ―fails out of high school.‖ The bottomlines then provide 
information that complicates efforts to read these failings through contemporary 
standards, instead telling of his success, e.g.―gets job, buys house, retires happy.‖ This 
contrast draws upon the nostalgia evoked by the visual style of the image, suggesting that 
Steve‘s life under conditions of the ―old economy‖ was easier than that faced by younger 
generations in the new.  
 However, as technics individuate along with the individuals who participate in 
their circulation, an alternative modality of Steve emerged through transindividuation. 
Later iterations of the meme flip the form of relation between the toplines and 
bottomlines, drawing force from the class division created by the photo‘s perspective. In 
this second individuated strain of the meme, the topline displays a viewpoint – usually 
conservative – that demonstrates participants‘ interpretations of Baby Boomer‘s current 
economic views or their criticism of contemporary youth: e.g. ―I didn‘t have a computer 
at my desk like you kids.‖ The bottom line then repositions Steve‘s generation as socially 
antiquated, ―had scotch and an ashtray instead.‖ This bifurcation of the poles 
demonstrates how the individuation of textual elements constantly repositions modal 
poles of a meme. While this inversion stays within the larger form of generational 
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contrast, it expands the scope of the meme beyond nostalgia for the past, allowing more 
explicit criticism of contemporary economics.  
Finding Ourselves in Steve‘s Past 
 Bernanke‘s rhetoric framed the entelechial goal of economic action as the growth 
of markets. As this rhetoric positioned agentic markets as hierarchically superior to 
human actors, it foreclosed identification between individuals and the economy. At best, 
people – particularly Millennials – could only respond to the actions of markets, ideally 
by consuming as homogenous singularities (Stiegler‘s very definition of 
proletarianization). Although blaming generational difference for this difficulties could 
be dismissed as simple youthful discontent, Stiegler points out that reconsidering the 
nature of economics is fundamentally the task of these younger generations. Speaking on 
the loss of care in contemporary economics, Stiegler argues: 
The great question of the twenty-first century will be finding the way to 
abandon [contemporary economics] and to invent new modalities of non-
inhuman existence within societies that have become thoroughly 
technological-modalities that are less toxic, more useful to a non-
inhumanity that has become a global community in which isolation is 
impossible…, and more desirable for the world‘s population as a whole 
(particularly younger generations who will themselves have to invent and 
solidify these new ways of life: this will be their work since we, having 
left them such a heavy heritage, will have to discover both how to have 
confidence in them and give way to them).
389
 
If it is up to younger generations to invent the conditions that create care, a frame of 
generational opposition creates the conditions that allow this innovation. Millennials need 
rhetorical distance from the Baby Boomers and their proletarianizing rhetorics if they 
wish to develop alternative economic orders predicated on care. 
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As a technic grounded in such opposition, Steve provides the conditions for 
collective individuation that set the foundations for Millennials to promote care. 
Specifically, the formal expectations of Old Economy Steve afford increased 
opportunities for individuals to identify with the stance of the meme – creating a focal 
point for the establishment of collective unity. Each iteration of an image macro is the 
enactment of a particular individual‘s identification with the meme – often taking the 
form of a textual reference to particular struggles.
390
 However, beyond their connection to 
the frustrations constructed by the meme‘s formal elements, little unifies the participants 
that individuate via particular iterations. In this way, the meme allows for collectivization 
through the constitution of an identifiable ―we‖, without the eradication of the ―I‖ into a 
mass subjectivity. Consequently, the way that participants identify with the narratives and 
structures of feeling that organize a text helps to determine the way they use the text to 
engage in a process of individuation. In the case of Steve, this individuation translates the 
proletarianizing discourses of markets into a participatory space for the discussion of the 
human side of contemporary economics.  
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Figure 3.2: Steve on the job market. 
While the form of Old Economy Steve suggests a crisis in contemporary 
American capitalism, individual iterations convey varied experiences of the crisis. For 
many participants, the meme allows the ability to express the that fact that younger 
Americans are experiencing unemployment in ways unknown to Steve‘s generation. 
Multiple iterations suggest that finding employment in Steve‘s era was easy – ―Loses job 
// finds another one on the way home‖ and ―finds ‗entry level‘ job // requires zero years 
experience‖ (Figure 3.2). These iterations highlight the difficulty of Millennials in 
finding employment after the great recession. Other iterations of the meme tackle issues 
ranging from outsourcing and the decline of industrial labor, to political issues like the 
minimum wage, unions, and social security (Figure 3.3). 
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Figure 3.3: Steve comments on political issues 
However, the ability of users to place their personal narrative within the larger 
form of the meme is most apparent in the plethora of iterations criticizing the current 
state of higher education, thus aligning the meme with Millennials for whom this is a 
particularly salient concern. Some instances highlight the problems of employment that 
face particular fields of study in the new economy, such as ―got journalism degree // 
works at daily newspaper‖ or ―liberal arts degree // gets job.‖ Others indict the 
contemporary failure of college to live up to its past promise more generally, ―when I was 
in college my summer job paid the tuition // Tuition was $400,‖ ―graduated college // saw 
difference in his paycheck,‖ and ―graduates college // doesn‘t move back in with his 
parents.‖ Each of these iterations allows Millennials to express and identify their 
individual struggles within a larger sense of generational unity. The ability to express a 
feeling of collective identification in the face of economic uncertainty encourages 
participation in, and reproduction of, the meme. 
 Yet it is not only the ability to write oneself into the meme that encourages 
identification. Old Economy Steve also allows participants to evoke nostalgic memories 
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that situate them within the economic crisis. Greg Dickenson posits that the construction 
of memory is a performative act used to constitute a particular sense of identity.
391
 This 
identity work is particularly prominent in times of crisis, where nostalgic recreations of 
the past are used to judge contemporary events in light of a reconstructed historical view 
of community identity.
392
 Steve‘s evocation of a nostalgic frame is empowered by the 
juxtaposition of generations created between the visual and the textual. Many iterations 
of the meme use Steve‘s construction as a slacker to further nostalgize the past. One 
popular iteration starts with the topline ―2.0 GPA, abuses alcohol and cocaine, can‘t hold 
a job,‖ all believable life outcomes for Steve within the form of the meme. This litany of 
poor life choices is then contrasted with the bottomline, ―elected president of the United 
States.‖ Aside from serving as an unflattering commentary on the complicity of George 
W. Bush in the failures of the new economy as well as the president‘s personal character 
flaws, this text suggests that the old economy offered more opportunities, as well as a 
greater capacity for second chances, for all types of individuals, not just the exceptional. 
The Old Economy Steve meme, with its romantic reimagining of the seventies, 
allows users to pass judgment on the failings of the contemporary economy. Yet, this is 
not a simple disparagement of the status quo; rather the meme uses a narrative built 
through transindividuation to use the past as proof that a preferable alternative to the ills 
of the present is possible. On face, the construction of a nostalgic memory is a 
conservative act, implicitly calling for a return to the late industrial economics of the 
1970s that allowed Old Economy Steve to flourish. However, when juxtaposed with the 
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undesirability of the present, the meme opens up alternative narrative spaces. While this 
narrative may come in the form of a return to the past, it is not limited to this logic of 
return. Stiegler notes that such juxtaposition of current ills with a better future is the only 
mode of individuation that can combat those who in the face of proletarianization do not 
―give a damn‖: the possibility of an alternative preferable to the present creates an 
impetus to challenge the structures creating contemporary dissatisfaction.
393
 Moreover, 
because the lines of text speak as a contemporary voice commenting on past events, they 
create a juxtapositional logic that reorients memory. This reorientation allows users to 
embrace a nostalgia that functions as a roadmap to the future, suggesting the possibility 
of a political alternative that is both materially and affectively preferable to the present.
394
 
Such a focus on alternative temporalities imbues the Steve meme with resistive potential. 
Deleuze notes that while disruptive surprises are a primary mode of unsettling power in 
control society, the creation of new ―space-times,‖ such as a hyperbolically idealized 
1970s, creates opportunities to resist inclusion into the narratives that justify control.
395
  
Ultimately, these varied narratives which allow identification between 
participants and with economic politics allows these memes to afford participants 
opportunities for individuation. This individuation is enabled not simply through the form 
of this meme, but also through the larger proairetic logics of networked media. Because 
of their social construction, memes encourage the revitalization of invention built around 
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imitatio, furthering the proliferation of their underlying communicative force.
396
 
Participants use the intersections of their unique experiences to create common force 
across the network. Under this interpretation, a meme that allows identification will better 
induce proairesis, creating an evolving democratic narrative that can provide spaces 
where memetic expressions articulate a collective individuation in opposition to dominant 
structures of power. Stock character macros are particularly suited to enabling 
participants to identify with the formal constraints of the meme. The narrative and 
affective content of visual elements allow participants to share common experiences or 
social positions, although the textual overlays enable the participants to articulate their 
particular subject position within this common community.
397
  
Modular Construction of an Enthymematic Meta-narrative 
 While each instance of the meme functions as its own enthymeme, they are 
textual fragments that invite participants to critically construct a broader message when 
combined.
398
 Such reconstructions, with as many permutations as fragments, foster 
rhetorical technics particularly suited to individuation. As evidenced in discussions of the 
ways that participants can articulate their personal struggles within the meme, each 
iteration of Old Economy Steve enthymematically tells a singular story about the 
economy and the political/economic differences and divisions between generations. 
However, as the meme proaireticly expanded, a larger enthymematic meta-narrative 
emerged across iterations of the meme. As repetitions of the meme with unique content, 
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these iterations coalesce into a larger enthymeme built around the form of the meme. This 
enthymeme gestures towards a meta-narrative that participants may adopt. Stiegler argues 
that the provision of such narratives is politically potent, as individuals do not decide 
their identity, but rather adopt it through the technics they transindividuate with.
399
 
Consequently, the construction of alternative identities within the technics of Steve 
allows alternative individuations through which individuals may enter into political life.  
Across the two primary threads of the meme, particular iterations highlight 
specific ideological inconsistencies of Steve‘s generation, or specific ways that capitalism 
has failed the millennial generation. More broadly, the collective construction of the Old 
Economy Steve enthymematically argues that contemporary articulations and practices of 
capitalism preclude the American Dream – challenging the virtue of Bernanke‘s 
hierarchical valorization of markets. As Aaron Duncan argues, the myth of the American 
Dream is central to Americans‘ understandings of their social and economic character.400 
Duncan posits that the most basic form of the myth centers on the trope of the ―self-made 
man.‖401 The narrative of this man is as follows: work hard, follow basic social 
expectations, and be rewarded with moderate success in the form of a suburban home, 2.4 
kids, and financial security. In the language of Bernanke, be a good consumer who does 
not panic in a way that will disturb markets. The myth further posits that anyone with 
enough grit and good fortune has the potential to realize the dream. The myth frames 
individuals as having total economic agency and self-determination but not to question 
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capitalism; if the system allows prosperity, what incentive is there to question it – let 
alone push for change? This myth has played a central role in the justification of 
American capitalism,
402
 making Steve appealing to those that capitalism has failed. This 
latter part of the myth disrupts the hierarchy of Bernanke, by suggesting that individuals 
need to be more than passive consumers regulated by parental technocrats. 
 Although this myth is central to American cultural character, the meta-narrative 
constructed across Old Economy Steve offers a counter-narrative by arguing the current 
impossibility of the myth – and by extension Bernanke‘s hierarchy. To begin, the 
embodied presence of Steve uses modes of hypersignification to draw attention to the fact 
that non-white, non-male bodies have been traditionally – and continue to be – excluded 
from the dream. Beyond this, iterations indict the myth in a general sense. The iteration 
―receives entry level position after high school // works up the ladder to CEO‖ – uses the 
expected comic form of the meme to suggest that while Boomers lived the dream to 
achieve high paying white color positions, that type of advancement is now impossible 
for Millennials. Other iterations deconstruct specific elements of the dream‘s vision of 
the idyllic American life – ―didn‘t graduate high school // still made enough money to 
support a family of four.‖ Across the meme, participants suggest that for Millennials 
home ownership is unlikely, pay is lower, benefits are disappearing, possibilities for 
advancement are dim, and generally, they will be less well off than their parents.  
Combined, these enthymematically argue that while banks may have recovered 
from the Great Recession, for everyone unable to fit the mold of Steve, the Fed‘s claims 
of economic recovery are far from true. A form of the meme featuring no topline and the 
                                                          
402.
 Richard Weiss, The American Myth of Success: From Horatio Alger to Normal Vincent Peale 
(New York: Basic Books, 1988), 1. 
144 
 
 
bottomline ―retires‖ summarizes the meme‘s vision of the prospects for Millennials. By 
breaking the form of the meme, this iteration suggests that regardless of the content of the 
topline, for non-Boomers the hope of retirement – and by extension the American Dream 
– is a punchline. By suggesting the incongruity between any expression of contemporary 
life and the American dream, this iteration argues the two are incommensurate. 
Moreover, by expressly linking the prospects of the American dream to the faded image 
of Steve, the meme enthymematically asserts that the idea of achieving the dream is as 
outdated as the picture of Steve, long lasting consumer products, and other bottomlines of 
the meme. The American dream is living through reminiscences of the past in the same 
way that a Baby Boomer may use a high school photo to relive their glory days. In this 
way, the meme uses identifications with the American dream to disrupt the order of the 
hierarchy presented by Bernanke, disrupting its proletarianizing force. If the rationality of 
markets supported by citizens as consumers cannot provide the dream, then the control 
advocated by Bernanke‘s rhetoric may not be as productive as individuations which 
foreground the human cost of the economy. 
 This rejection of contemporary capitalism also serves to indict the neoliberal 
economics that underlie much of Bernanke‘s rhetoric. Neoliberal ideology frames 
contemporary economics as part of the natural development of capitalism;
403
 however, 
Old Economy Steve rejects this evolutionary model. The combined force of the iterations 
of the meme argue that the current economy is the direct result of the choices of Steve‘s 
generation. This charge reframes Bernanke‘s wise paternalism as parental neglect. While 
many iterations allude to these changes by blaming Boomers for economic trends such as 
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outsourcing or the decline of industrial labor, the attitude is best summarized in one 
iteration – ―grows up in one of the world's best economies // creates the worst global 
economy the world has ever seen.‖ Subsequent iterations frame this wholesale 
destruction of the economy as the result of the ignorance of the Boomers, ―‗at my first 
job I only made $15k a year‘ // in 1979 that was the equivalent of $47k,‖ as well as active 
generational conflict: ―says get a job // refuses to hire recent graduates.‖ These iterations 
of the meme construct Steve‘s generation as initiating the economic shifts that deny 
Millennials the American Dream and assert that they are actively maintaining an 
economic status quo that is detrimental to Millennials.  
Through this, the meta-narrative of the entire meme shifts the target for victimage 
related to the economic crisis.
404
 The meme transfers blame for the great recession away 
from concerns of mass panic, instead constructing Steve‘s generation as a scapegoat who 
has undermined the economy that gave them prosperity. Across iterations, the meme 
suggests that if the Baby Boomers –the generation of which most Fed officials are 
members – were removed from economic power, an act of symbolic and material 
sacrifice, the Millennial generation could use their alternative values to restore the virtues 
of the old economy and by extension American prosperity. In this capacity, the meme 
allows younger generations to reaffirm the myths of the American Dream and American 
Exceptionalism despite their death in contemporary America.  
The meme also frames Millennials as the upholders of these mythic virtues, as 
their identification with the ideal (nostalgic) vision of the past allows them to 
―understand‖ the potential for a humane vision of capitalism. Because the meme allows 
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users to expunge personal culpability for the current state of capitalism, and offers a more 
positive vision of the future, the meta-narrative uses identifiable narratives and myths to 
further enhance the individuating force of the meme, further increasing its appeal with 
Millennials and increasing its political potential. Moreover, through its ability to unify 
participants without the traditional articulations of ―left‖ or ―right,‖ but rather through 
their alienation from contemporary modes of political economy, the meme helps to foster 
a political subjectivity with the possibility to consider care, rather than argue over 
policies that – while defining of contemporary political debates – often are secondary to 
the questions that are most defining of current political and economic struggle.
405
 
Memes as Pharmakon for Control  
Through its enthymematic meta-narrative, the modal assemblage constructed 
around Old Economy Steve advances a stern criticism of contemporary capitalism by 
romanticizing a particular memory of late-industrial capitalism. Although steeped in this 
romantic nostalgia, by enabling a transindividuation with economic rhetorics, the meme 
opens the potential for alternative economic rhetorics. Anglich argues for the importance 
of such new rhetorics, positing:  
An informed citizenry, empowered with a new understanding of language, 
has the ability to shape political will toward sustainable reforms. Our 
collective consciousness can find a path of wisdom where all economies 
can grow freely and sustainably— beyond the shadows.406 
 
By offering ways for individuals to move out of the proletarianizing rhetoric of 
paternalism and markets, Old Economy Steve becomes a conduit through which an 
alternative vocabulary – focused on the human cost of economics – can begin to emerge. 
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This new vocabulary, developing from the participatory individuations of the meme is 
demonstrative of Stiegler‘s observations that digital hypomnemata have the potential to 
function as pharmakon. Specifically, as Steve draws attention to an economy that is no 
longer predicated simply on ―stimulating consumption‖ but instead is built upon 
economic growth that assumes that ―‗to economize‘ means ‗to take care,‘‖ it can work 
towards the revitalization of human spirit and interrelatedness that creates a capitalism 
focused on human development rather than market growth.
407
 
 Certainly, capitalist institutions have subsumed the physical content of memes, 
the bits and bytes. However, these structures cannot fully contain their affective 
dimensions. Stiegler notes that the pharmacological force of hypomnemata does not come 
from the opposition of poison and cure, but rather in the composition of the two in such a 
way that allows the technic to individuate. Such technical individuation is necessary for 
alternative politics because ―individuation at the pharmacological level (technical 
individuation) transductively intensifies the individuation of the other two levels (psychic 
individuation and collective individuation).‖408 Across the textual variations of the meme, 
participants in Old Economy Steve provide a comprehensive indictment of contemporary 
neoliberal economics. The sustained attention of this criticism across the life of the meme 
is particularly impressive, as neoliberal ideologies have embedded themselves within 
American discourses of morality, individuation in the Old Economy Steve meme fulfills 
pharmakon‘s potential as remedy and not just poison. Participants of the meme rupture 
                                                          
407.
 Stiegler, New Critique, 108. 
408.
 Ibid., 43-44. 
148 
 
 
forces of control through three primary tactics: uncoiling the logics of neoliberalism, 
fighting disenchantment, and overtly promoting a politics of care. 
Uncoiling Neoliberalism 
Demystifying the workings of capitalism is often dismissed as a holdover of 
vulgar Marxism. However, under the ubiquitous and multilayered forces that define 
control, unraveling the machinations of dominant processes is imperative. Exploring 
youth politics in France, Deleuze notes, 
Many young people have a strange craving to be ‗motivated,‘ they‘re 
always asking for special courses and continuing education; it's their job to 
discover whose ends these serve, just as older people discovered, with 
considerable difficulty, who was benefiting from discipline. A snake's 
coils are even more intricate than a mole's burrow.
409
 
 
The power in Steve is not to reveal that we are all cogs in the service of capitalism – 
Bernanke‘s rhetoric proudly asserts as much while reifying individuals as consumers. 
Instead, the modal assemblage surrounding Steve allows the articulation of multiple 
narratives and structures of feeling that create a nostalgia that entreats a rolling back neo-
liberal globalized capital. Yet, the political potential afforded by exploring the depths of 
control does not solely reside in fostering personal awareness of the maneuverings of 
control. Stiegler argues control can only be challenged ―in a public space in the service of 
a social organization always more and better equipped to discern, critique, improve, 
create, transmit, and receive forms of knowledge and consciousness.‖410 The uncoiling of 
the snake must unify personal experiences of control into a publicized discourse focused 
on an alternative. Steve‘s existence as an image macro allows for this type of publicity, 
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because these memes circulate across the internet, creating publics attuned to their 
particular perspective. 
Despite being the product of the fragmented experiences of partially anonymous 
members of a diverse collective, the criticism offered through Old Economy Steve works 
to deconstruct the naturalness neoliberalism attributes itself. The assumption that the 
Fed‘s market centered economy is the result of the natural progression of human political 
economy is central to the authority of neoliberalism.
411
 This not only implies that there 
are no alternatives to neoliberalism, because this system is ―natural‖, but also that the 
system is moral. In theorizing that the ―new‖ economy is an active choice of the Boomers 
– rather than an inevitability of the evolution of markets – participants within the Old 
Economy Steve meme suggest that neoliberal capitalism is a human creation, rather than 
a certainty. By suggesting that a return to an economy prior to neoliberalism is possible, 
Old Economy Steve creates rhetorical space outside the rigid confines of neoliberalism – 
questioning its naturalism and telos of progress. It is only in creating an outside space that 
alternatives to contemporary capitalism can be imagined, opening possibilities for 
change.
412
 In this capacity, the meta-narrative created through the iterations of Steve 
creates a common space that cannot be entirely subsumed by capitalism, and thus 
provides a resource for future resistance. 
The power of this meta-narrative is emboldened by the ironic/comedic orientation 
engendered by the form of the meme. Burke has long attuned critics to the power of 
ironic reinterpretation of events to offer perspective by incongruity. However, extending 
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Baruch Spinoza‘s comments on the potential of the comic, Lars Tønder argues that each 
comic interpretation of an event remediates it, transforming a dominant affect into plural 
affective orientations.
413
 The collective meta-narrative offered by Old Economy Steve 
highlights Millennial dissatisfaction with contemporary economics built around 
capitalism‘s denaturalization. However, the humor generated across individual iterations 
of the memes derives from differing emotions including despair, rage, and befuddlement. 
 This range of affective frames challenges the dominance of the neoliberal 
narrative and the complicity through consumption that it demands. Such a move opens 
democratic space. The proliferation of affective interpretations enabled by Steve invites 
deliberation over the exact nature of contemporary dissatisfaction with capitalism. 
Through their ability to allow multiple remediations, each participant can offer multiple 
iterations of an event, memes such as Steve invite democratic individuations in 
opposition to control, as the meta-narrative generated by the meme is a democratically 
created sum of remediations. Because of their commitment to mass participation in the 
collective construction of the comic, memes invite not just perspective by incongruity, 
but perspectives by incongruities. 
 
Re-enchanting Millennials  
Beyond the ubiquity and opacity of power under control, Stiegler notes that, 
―control runs through a dissociative logic.‖414 Specifically, by positioning individuals‘ 
primary task as consumption, Bernanke‘s rhetoric, which is emblematic of control, denies 
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any sense of a productive individual. Instead, by presenting economic narratives as 
information to be consumed, rather than knowledge to individuate with, Bernanke‘s 
rhetoric leaves individual subjects proletarianized.
415
 Consequently, a central project of 
resisting control is the re-enchantment of the political subject through the process of 
individuation. It is not simply enough to highlight those forces that proletarianize the 
subject, rather a resistive communication fosters individuation by enabling participants to 
fashion a productive individuality attached to a collective identity.
 416
 
 The memetic form of Old Economy Steve assists the process of individuation. 
Stiegler asserts that because structures of networked communication center on logics of 
contribution, they are best suited to break the ―generalized proletarianization‖ of 
control.
417
 Each individual who circulates Steve is contributing to the meme‘s larger 
social force. It would be easy to dismiss this circulation as mere imitation. However, as 
the words and images move into new contexts, they function through the logic of 
imitatio, the revitalization of the ―spirit of the original‖ into new contexts.418 Through this 
imitative recontextualization, even those who simply share the meme are productive 
participants, using their identification with a preexisting iteration of the meme to generate 
a new individuated force. Because the circulatory force of image macros is driven by 
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efforts for each new iteration to foster a more potent affective force, they invite 
participants to produce new remediations of narrative. This remediation turns participants 
into active commentators on politics, rather than passive proletarianized subjects.
419
  
 Beyond the productive elements common to the form of the image macro, the 
Steve meme further individuates participants through its reliance on enthymematic 
narrative and myth. In each of these cases, the form overrides the specific substance 
promoting identification. Bernanke‘s rhetoric, built around static narratives of the ―laws‖ 
of economics, leaves little room to participate or identify. Conversely, as participants 
read across the iterations of the meme, the openness of the form invites them to produce a 
unifying meta-narrative through their connection to the affective and propositional 
content. No single iteration offers a complete call to political action, yet the collectivity 
of the iterations strongly implies one. In this way, each participant produces for 
themselves the knowledge individuated within the iterations. Even for those users who do 
not produce or circulate the meme, there is a potential for the meme to connect them to a 
productive, rather than passive, political existence.
420
 
 In the process of constituting participants as productive individuals, Old Economy 
Steve also orients them as a ―collective individual.‖ Bernanke reduces each individual to 
a faceless consumer, precluding the posibility for large collective identifications. 
However, by tapping into a larger sense of millennial angst, the meme functions as a 
collective public statement.
421
 The power of this statement comes from the meme‘s 
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ability to be demonstrative of the lived experience of participants. However, because 
participants create the meme through individual biographical iterations, they are also able 
to express their unique dissatisfaction, allowing them to ―feel‖ their own way into the 
political based on personal experience.
422
 This balance of individual and collective 
affective attunement creates a diverse and adaptable assemblage that invites mass 
participation and eludes easy coopting of the narrative.
423
 The constitution of a collective 
individual, the product of vernacular lived experience, lends an ethos of independence 
from control. Steve‘s ability to balance the desires of individuals with an affiliation with 
Millennial collectivity allows for the creation of a political subjectivity willing to struggle 
against control. 
Millennials‘ Politics of Care 
 Aside from motivating alternative political individuations through uncoiling 
neoliberalism and creating an individuated collectivity, Steve also offers an articulation 
of an alternative politics – one of care. Recognizing that the complete overthrow of 
capitalism is unlikely under contemporary conditions, Stiegler suggests a politics of care 
may be the best response to the current limitations of control. 
The question of care must return to the heart of political economy, and 
with it, clearly, a new cultural, educational, scientific, and industrial 
politics capable of taking care of the world. This is why we propose as an 
axiom of our reflections and our actions that – as the primary meaning of 
the verb ―economize‖ tells us, and as each of us know deep down – to 
economize means that first and before all else to take care.
424
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Broadly, Stiegler theorizes care as the capacity of individuals to engage productive 
knowledge to meet the needs of all life. Moreover, guaranteeing short-term needs of the 
people and the planet, needs often ignored under neoliberalism, can set the stage for the 
reversing of the proletarianization central to contemporary control.
425
 Specifically, 
Stiegler argues that networked communication is central to this process of reorienting 
political economy towards care. 
The internet is the technical milieu, par excellence, which allows for the 
implementation of an industrial model that no longer rest upon opposition 
between dissociated producers and consumers, but upon association of 
addressees and addressors, productive of a new form of sociality and a 
new spirit of capitalism.
426
  
 
It is through the creation of a public committed to cooperative industrial politics that 
places care, rather than corporate profit, as the final goal of the system, that the re-
enchantment of spirit becomes possible. 
 Although the meta-narrative offered by the Steve meme primarily functions 
through the rejection of contemporary capitalism, the specific ways that it nostalgizes the 
past implicitly advocates for the Stieglerian ethic of care. Stiegler notes that while care is 
driven by cultivating the values of the past, it is more than a simple nostalgia, instead it 
must transmit the values of the past into a usable public vision for the future.
427
 Through 
its glorification of goals including retirement, affordable tuition, and available entry-level 
jobs, Steve‘s capitalism is implicitly one of unions, fair wages, and protectionism – the 
forces which created the conditions Steve nostalgizes. Yet the meme does not reject 
capitalism; participants still glorify home ownership, corporate hierarchies, and wage 
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labor. Instead, Steve demands, just as Stiegler does, that the wealth generated from these 
practices should engage care first, and profit second.  
However, this care is not simply gained by a nostalgic return. Instead, by allowing 
participants to write their contemporary struggles into the meme, many of which (such as 
the decline of print journalism) were not concerns for Steve‘s generation, they are able to 
use these values to cultivate a more desirable present. In this sense, the meme advocates 
for the specific short-term guaranteed prosperity that prevents the long-term trend of 
proletarianization. The individuated subject envisioned by Steve has the free time and 
access to desirable jobs to engage in productive labor that prevents proletarianization. 
None of the iterations of the meme challenge the goals of American industrial capitalism. 
Nor does this advocacy remove the structures of control, if such a thing is even possible. 
Rather the meme demonstrates the potential for politics where the collective uses the 
freedoms afforded within control society to push for a more humane and equitable 
distribution of care. In this sense, the narration offered by Steve does far more than just 
allow new political individuations, it suggests that Stiegler‘s spirit of care may already be 
alive within Millennials. 
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Chapter 4  
Can You Meme Me Now? Technics and Terministic Democracy 
A year after Old Economy Steve gave networked publics a mode to compose a 
narrative built around millennials‘ dissatisfaction with the American economy, memetic 
technics tapped into another political controversy particularly salient with networked 
publics: surveillance and privacy. These public‘s interest only increased as the use and 
scope of networked and mobile technology expands, creating conditions where the 
opportunity for privacy breaches and surveillance increasingly loom over all facets of 
communication.
428
 The reality of these fears became particularly salient when in June of 
2013 a series of reports by British newspaper The Guardian revealed that the National 
Security Agency (NSA) was collecting a wide range of US data across mobile networks 
and online communication. On June 5
th
 The Guardian revealed that under the jurisdiction 
of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) the NSA had been collecting 
metadata on all Verizon customers – the largest US cellphone provider.429 The next day 
the newspaper revealed the existence of the PRISM program, software which gave the 
NSA access to the servers of major online data holders including Apple, Google, and 
Facebook.
430
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News of these leaks quickly went viral. The Guardian story was shared more than 
ten thousand times in the first 12 hours and accrued over two hundred and fifty thousand 
Twitter mentions in 24 hours.
431
 In response to the spread of these revelations, both the 
Obama Administration and the NSA issued press releases and gave interviews about the 
surveillance program. Despite the continued efforts of government officials to control the 
story, networked publics, particularly those in meme-centric communities, offered 
reinterpretations of the official story. Within hours of the leak, parodies of Verizon‘s 
slogans circulated around networked ecologies. Similarly, when The Guardian revealed 
their source two days later, a range of popular memes were used to debate the heroism or 
villainy of Edward Snowden.
432
 Across the controversy, memes served as a mode for 
networked participants to share opinions, reactions, and feelings surrounding the 
uncovering of the largest domestic intelligence operation in US history.  
This chapter explores the interplay between NSA rhetorics that sought to limit the 
symbolic responses to the controversy and memes which sought to proliferate them. I 
begin with an analysis of the rhetoric of Deputy Director of the NSA Richard Ledgett in 
defense of the NSA. Following Murray Edelman‘s observation that ―the largely 
unpublicized decisions of hundreds of thousands of people working in administrative 
organizations determine who gets what,‖ I focus on Ledgett because the figures at the 
head of these bureaucracies function to constitute the ideal political subject as the human 
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in service of these bureaucratically regulated structures.
433
 In opposition to the banal, 
rational, expert style of these singular technocrats, networked memes emerged as 
collectively constructed expressions of social narratives and affect. Therefore, I turn to an 
analysis of the most popular memetic responses to the controversy. The constant addition 
of new iterations to these memes created a variety of fractured narratives and affective 
frames, preventing the official rhetoric‘s efforts at static informational and affective 
force. Instead, by creating perspectives by incongruities, the memetic responses create 
rhetorics with the potential to restore individuation through the collective renegotiation of 
terms. Through their recirculation of memes, participants collectively redefine these 
terms through a terministic democracy built around the individuations of the terms central 
to the rhetoric of security. 
The NSA and the Anti-Rhetoric of Security 
Working as a contractor for the NSA, Edward Snowden grew increasingly 
concerned about illegal and dangerous surveillance practices.
434
 After collecting 
thousands of documents, Snowden arranged to meet with The Guardian reporter Glenn 
Greenwald. Snowden disclosed to Greenwald evidence of surveillance by the US and UK 
on allies, the collection of domestic surveillance and metadata, and other unsanctioned 
intelligence gathering.
435
 These revelations quickly spurred international controversy 
about the morality and legality of both US surveillance and Snowden‘s leaks. The US 
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government was quick to label Snowden a traitor and charged the whistleblower with 
espionage, arguing that there were ways to protect privacy without undermining US 
security efforts.
436
 Conversely, networked publics and international governments praised 
Snowden as a patriot and a hero. Snowden even received a range of awards for 
contribution to international freedom, peace, and democracy.
437
 The debate about 
Snowden‘s revelations revolved around the question of whether peace, freedom, and 
democracy would be better protect by privileging security or privacy. 
 A year into this controversy, Edward Snowden made a surprise video appearance 
at the TED 2014 conference (Snowden was a fugitive from US law enforcement). 
Speaking on a platform that gave access to a wide range of networked publics, Snowden 
was interviewed by Chris Anderson – the curator of the original TED series. Snowden 
used this appearance not only to defend the leaks, but also to make a case for individual 
and corporate resistance to surveillance.
438
 Specifically, after Anderson provided the 
history of the leaks, Snowden outlined the nature and scope of PRISM program, framed 
the program as a breach of privacy, and answered common arguments about the banality 
of the surveillance by arguing it was a matter of rights and national culture. Snowden also 
posited that the leaks were not a threat to security, as courts had found no proof of plots 
thwarted. Instead, Snowden positions terrorism as a ―cover for action‖ used to hide the 
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invasive policies of the NSA. At the end of Snowden‘s interview, Anderson invited a 
response stating, ―if the NSA wants to respond, please do.‖  
In response to this call, Deputy Director of the NSA Richard Ledgett took the 
TED stage via video conference call. Ledgett, the top civilian authority at the NSA, 
played an active role in the shaping of NSA polies and procedure as the Chief Operating 
Officer.
439
 In the interview Ledgett systematically responds to Snowden‘s claims about 
the surveillance program. First, Ledgett emphasizes the possibility of legal protest by 
Snowden, as opposed to the leaks. Ledgett then pivots to a series of arguments about the 
lives put at risk by the leak, including an argument for the very real threat of terrorism. 
Finally, Ledgett argues that the NSA takes careful steps to limit invasions of privacy to 
only those necessary for maintaining security. These responses to Snowden‘s TED Talk 
are representative of the larger NSA effort to justify their policies after they were made 
public, offering an ideal case to study the rhetorical force of NSA rhetorics.  
Although this interview took place nearly a year after Snowden‘s leak, I chose 
this address for two reasons. First, this interview is one of the few public addresses made 
by any senior official at the NSA. Further, the choice to address the TED audience is 
particularly salient given my focus on networked publics. TED videos invite thousands of 
viewers and are circulated across varied networked platforms. Consequently, TED 
emerged as one of the premier avenues for elites to proliferate political and academic 
ideas to networked publics.
440
 Even in Ledgett‘s interview, Anderson acknowledges the 
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relation of TED to networked publics. At the end of the interview Anderson exclaims, 
―Rick, it took a certain amount of courage, I think, actually, to come and speak openly to 
this group.‖441 Aside from drawing attention to the NSA‘s reticence to publicly respond 
to its policies, Anderson‘s comment implicitly notes that participants in TED, as typical 
netizens, are particularly attuned to pro-privacy political stances. Nonetheless, in 
addressing networked publics, the Ledgett‘s rhetoric functioned as to deny individuation 
through two rhetorical strategies which bolster a rhetoric of national (in)security: evoking 
the NSA as an anti-rhetoric and establishing security as a god term/ideograph above all 
other ideals.  
The NSA as Anti-Rhetoric 
While the bulk of Ledgett‘s statements deal with the NSA‘s role in maintaining 
security, the interview begins with a move to establish these statements as ―anti-
rhetorical.‖ In examining scientific rhetorics, Michael Calvin McGee and John Lyne note 
that:  
anti-rhetoric's appeal to objective knowledge and its accompanying 
denunciation of rhetoric is one of the most effective rhetorical strategies 
available. No one was a greater master of the strategy than Plato. In our 
time, masters of the rhetoric of science command the most formidable 
rhetorical ethos. Theirs is the chaste rhetoric that pretends not to be 
rhetorical. Expert testimony in a legislative hearing, in interviews with the 
press, and in trial proceedings typically parades the rhetoric of objectivity. 
… The intense conviction of testifying experts that they are not acting 
rhetorically casts an aura of authenticity over their performance.
442
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While McGee and Lyne argue that the natural sciences are particularly adept at evoking 
an anti-rhetorical frame, the sciences are by no means the only disciplines to do so. Anti-
rhetorics exist across academic and public life. Edward M. Panetta and Marouf Hasian, 
Jr., note that,  
An anti-rhetorical stance is any foundational quest for truth that privileges 
itself as the only or primary ‗rational,‘ ‗objective,‘ and ‗neutral‘ means of 
acquiring epistemic knowledge. This posturing enables powerful rhetors to 
exclude the boisterous voices of those groups who do not acquiesce in the 
establishment or discovery of the a priori standard for certified 
knowledge. Anti-rhetorics exist in both the arts and the sciences. Such a 
privileging of information is constantly presented to us in forms that invite 
the ‗universal affirmation from all rightminded people.‘443 
 
Through their appeals to ―facts,‖ ―reason,‖ ―information,‖ and ―objectivity,‖ anti-
rhetorics dissuade public participation in rhetorical individuation because ―technical 
knowledge [has become the] basis for deciding ‗what ought to be.‘‖444 In appealing to 
technical knowledge as fact, anti-rhetorics dissuade amateur participation. Instead, anti-
rhetorics proletarianize non-expert participants as lacking the ethos to challenge the 
technocratic authority of the anti-rhetoric. Without this ethos, any attempts by non-
experts to iterate a new individuation is deemed as illegitimate and disconnected from the 
official evolution of that particular rhetoric. 
 Ledgett fosters the proletarianizing drive of anti-rhetorics from the onset of the 
interview. Anderson begins by asking Ledgett to respond to the remarks Snowden had 
made on the same stage days earlier. Rather than address the specific content of 
Snowden, Ledgett instead frames the NSA‘s entire stance as anti-rhetorical: 
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I think that, like a lot of the things that have come out since Mr. 
Snowden started disclosing classified information, there were some 
kernels of truth in there, but a lot of extrapolations and half-truths in 
there, and I'm interested in helping to address those. I think this is a really 
important conversation that we're having in the United States and 
internationally, and I think it is important and of import, and so given that, 
we need to have that be a fact-based conversation, and we want to help 
make that happen.  
 
Rather than address Snowden as conveying a valid perspective, Ledgett frames 
Snowden‘s claims as containing ―kernels of truth‖ at best. By suggesting that Snowden, 
and all participants in the publics who agree with the value of having the PRISM program 
leaked, had a tenuous relation with the ―truth,‖ Ledgett identifies these rhetorics as 
lacking sufficient expertise and validity to individuate with the ―objective‖ position of the 
NSA.  
Ledgett‘s anti-rhetorical appeal is reaffirmed at the end of the interview. When 
asked for closing thoughts, Ledgett returns to an appeal to ―facts‖ as a justification for the 
superiority of the NSA‘s position, arguing,  
The issue of privacy and personal data is much bigger than just the 
government, and so learn the facts. Don't rely on headlines, don't rely on 
sound bites, don't rely on one-sided conversations. So that's the idea, I 
think, worth spreading….So that's the idea worth spreading. Look at the 
data. 
 
This statement reaffirms the supposed anti-rhetoricity of the NSA by aligning them with 
―facts‖ and ―data.‖ Conversely, anti-NSA positions are denied the same legitimacy within 
this anti-rhetorical frame because comments such as Snowden‘s are framed as 
―headlines‖ and ―sound bites,‖ implicitly suggesting they are tainted by sensationalism 
and ―one-sided‖ partisanship that denies ―the data.‖ By using the opening and closing 
statements to frame the entire interview as anti-rhetorical, Ledgett‘s rhetoric works to 
foreclose the possibility of alternative legitimate rhetorics on the issue of national 
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security. Because all other positions, including Snowden‘s, lack the facticity of the 
NSA‘s perspective, they can never properly individuate with the NSA‘s rhetoric. Such 
perspectives would corrupt the objectivity of the ―facts‖ that the NSA presents.  
The Rhetoric of (In)Security 
Once establishing an anti-rhetorical frame to limit objections to the NSA‘s 
arguments, Ledgett‘s discourse focuses on framing Snowden‘s actions within a rhetoric 
of (in)security. Robert Ivie and Oscar Giner note that since 9/11, (in)security emerged as 
one of the dominant rhetorical frames in American political and social life. They explain: 
American national security, considered from a rhetorical perspective, 
defaults to a discourse of national insecurity—to a political ritual of 
affirming national identity by articulating fear and loathing of a 
demonized enemy. It invokes a hyperbolic discourse of exaggerated 
danger, not unlike war propaganda, which Nicholas Jackson 
O‘Shaughnessy astutely defines as ―a fantasy of enmity, where we seek 
self-definition through constructing our antithesis.‖ Rhetoric, myth, and 
symbolism—and thus metaphor, narrative, and ritual—are endemic to the 
articulation of self-defining and affirming fear, especially in today‘s 
hypersymbolic state of governing imagery, which positions both the 
general public and political elites within its cultural circumference.
445
 
 
The ability to include a wide range of issues within its circumference gives insecurity a 
strong grammatizing force that enables proletarianizing politics to define the issue.
446
 
Specifically, it demands that all discourse fit within the ridged forms of <security>. The 
range of potential symbolic participation is limited and defined by the ways that these 
discourses fit within the frame of insecurity, because ―what more compelling interest 
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could one find than the defense of a nation that is trying to survive catastrophic 
terrorism.‖447  
 This grammatizing force drifts towards proletarianizing because it empowers 
technocrats as the dominant rhetorical actors and denies alternative participation. 
Ledgett‘s argues, national security policy, due in large part to its heavy reliance on 
classified information, is the near exclusive domain of technocrats with the necessary 
security clearances.
448
 Under these conditions, amateur participation is discouraged 
because such participation ―would distract the nation in a time of war, and compromise 
sources and methods of intelligence collection.‖449 Because of this, rhetorics of insecurity 
narrow issues and disqualify both topics and speakers from legitimacy within public 
deliberation; participants are strongly encouraged to unquestioningly consume 
technocrats‘ rhetoric, preventing any democratic individuation.450 A range of rhetorical 
resources help to foster rhetorics of insecurity.
 
However, in examining the 
proletarianizing rhetoric of Ledgett, the deployment of the ideograph of <security> as a 
god term creates a rigid terministic hierarchy that precludes symbolic participation from 
alternative perspectives. 
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 Ledgett‘s opening analysis frames Snowden‘s actions as increasing insecurity. 
Ledgett argued Snowden‘s actions were 
were inappropriate because of the fact that he put people's lives at risk, 
basically, in the long run, and I know there's been a lot of talk in public by 
Mr. Snowden and some of the journalists that say that the things that have 
been disclosed have not put national security and people at risk, and that is 
categorically not true.  
 
<Security> functions as a dominant ideograph within Ledgett‘s rhetoric. McGee defined 
an ideograph as ―an ordinary language term found in political discourse‖ and ―a high-
order abstraction representing collective commitment to a particular, but ill-defined, 
normative goal.‖451 While the most potent of these terms are those that undergird wide-
held social values such as <equality>, <freedom>, or <patriotism>, scholars have 
demonstrated how a range of terms can function ideographically.
452
 Moreover, rather 
than operating independently, ideographs are ―always understood in relation to 
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another.‖453 For example, the ideograph of <security> is often related to other concepts 
including <freedom> and <privacy>. 
Ledgett‘s deployment of <security> continues the individuation traditional to the 
ideograph – meaning that all other concerns must be placed as secondary. The link of 
surveillance policy to <security> is strongly rooted in political and judicial debates in the 
1970s. For example, the 1972 case United States v. United States District Court (often 
referred to as the Keith case) set the norm that the goal of security policy was to protect 
democracy by balancing appeals to <security> and <privacy>.
454
 Furthermore, FISA 
allowed for surveillance without warrants as long as it was in the name of national 
security, establishing security as a dominant term in relation to privacy.
455 
In this way, 
traditional deployments of <security> justify unrestricted surveillance, and discourage 
publics from challenging this particular individuation, as there is no space for political or 
judicial review. 
Ledgett draws from this traditional deployment of <security> by arguing that in 
making their complaints public rather than using internal channels of review, Snowden 
made Americans less secure. Ledgett argues: 
So the unconstrained disclosure of those capabilities means that as 
adversaries see them and recognize, ‗Hey, I might be vulnerable to 
this,‘ they move away from that, and we have seen targets in terrorism, in 
the nation-state area, in smugglers of various types, and other folks who 
have, because of the disclosures, moved away from our ability to have 
insight into what they're doing. The net effect of that is that our 
people who are overseas in dangerous places, whether they're diplomats or 
military, and our allies who are in similar situations, are at greater risk 
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because we don't see the threats that are coming their way. 
 
While Ledgett does not explicitly evoke the term security, these criticisms fit within the 
larger modal expression of <security>. Ledgett follows the ideographic understanding of 
<security> that insists concerns of national security trump issues of privacy and therefore 
are outside traditional spaces of due process. This deployment is consistent with the 
ideograph‘s tendency to ―outflank those who seek to question or revise the form and 
content of public good‖ through appeals to security456 This limits non-technocratic 
individuations by precluding deliberation over matters of surveillance and security by 
arguing that any dissent fosters insecurity.  
 Ledgett‘s use of <security> gains much of its proletarianizing force through 
warranting a prohibition on dissent. Specifically, because dissenting individuations are 
prohibited, consumers of political rhetoric are left only the option of accepting 
(consuming) Ledgett‘s vision of <security>, lest they be framed as enabling insecurity. 
However, the proletarianizing force is bolstered by the symbolic hierarchies created 
through the synchronic deployment of this ideograph. Therefore, I turn to Kenneth 
Burke‘s conceptions of god terms and terministic screens to examine the ways that the 
symbolic order created by this deployment of <security> further enhances its 
proletarianizing force.
457
 Burke argues that terministic screens motivate participants 
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towards particular modes of ―symbolic perfection‖ by implying a telos intrinsic in 
particular terministic relationships.
458
 This telos then sets the conditions for the 
individuation and/or proletarianization enabled by a particular term as ―a given 
terminology contains various implications, and there is a corresponding ‗perfectionist‘ 
tendency for men [sic] to attempt carrying out those implications.‖459 Central to these 
implications is the evocation of ―god terms.‖ Burke noted ―the Romans knew that you 
could get a god merely by taking an adjective and transforming it into an abstract 
noun.‖460 Consequently, ideographs, which are particularly salient examples of such 
terministic manipulation and deification via abstraction, are particularly suited to 
functioning as god terms. 
 Ledgett evokes <security> as a god term in the discourse surrounding Snowden. 
Although <privacy> and <security> traditionally function as opposing ideographs in 
debates over surveillance, Ledgett removes <privacy> from consideration through 
statements like  
And I think that people have legitimate concerns about the balance 
between transparency and secrecy. That's sort of been couched as a 
balance between privacy and national security. I don't think that's the right 
framing. I think it really is transparency and secrecy. And so that's the 
national and international conversation that we're having, and we want to 
participate in that, and want people to participate in it in an informed way. 
 
In framing <privacy> as a red herring, Ledgett places that ideograph – and all associated 
arguments, policies, and affective responses – as unwelcome in the debate. Furthermore, 
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privacy‘s replacements, transparency and secrecy, are not hierarchically equivalent to 
<security>. For example, in justifying previous surveillance, Ledgett argues,  
What we don't need to be transparent about, because it's bad for the 
U.S., it's bad for all those other countries that we work with and that we 
help provide information that helps them secure themselves and their 
people, it's bad to expose operations and capabilities in a way that allows 
the people that we're all working against, the generally recognized bad 
guys, to counter those. 
 
Through comments such as these, Ledgett establishes <security> as the force that 
mediates the decision between secrecy and transparency. It is the top of the terministic 
hierarchy that determines the value of NSA and other intelligence policies.  
Yet the proletarianizing force of <security> as a god term does not only come 
from its ability to dictate the possible directions for policy independent of collective 
participation. Rather as a god term, it creates rigid hierarchies of terms that preclude any 
participatory individuation. For Burke, god terms – with their roots in a perfectionist telos 
– utilize appeals to pure and evil motives to organize other terms.461 The resulting 
hierarchies function as a ―system builder‖ that decides ―what properly goes with 
what.‖462 For Ledgett and the NSA, if <security> is the god term, then terrorism is the 
devil. When asked the threats the NSA engages, Ledgett response ―terrorism is still 
number one‖ and that terrorist are empowered by a ―lack of governance.‖ This appeal to 
governance places NSA policies – and the proletarianizing systems that justify them – as 
the only way to access <security> and the order it promises.  
Conversely, any action that opposes the NSA is then terministically equated to 
terrorism. Describing varied networked communication systems, Ledgett notes that they 
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are used both by ―people who are working against us and our allies.‖ The moralistic 
binary of security-terrorism provides no middle ground, limiting the space of alternative 
individuations. In framing security as the god term, all related symbolic action is forced 
to either align itself with the ―purity‖ of security, or else be in league with the evils of 
terrorism. Such rigid and binary hierarchies preclude possibilities of amateur symbolic 
production. If participants in the publics around surveillance are not consuming the 
NSA‘s symbolic order, in Ledgett‘s words they are ―working against us.‖ Consequently, 
opposing viewpoints are entirely delegitimized and terministic orders that would emerge 
through participatory individuation are framed as aiding terrorism. The symbolic technics 
of the NSA must be consumed as is, otherwise participants violate the symbolic order and 
empower the rhetorical devil. Because of this, ideographs as god terms are particularly 
powerful technics of proletarianization because they work to both prevent the emergence 
of alternative polices and to preclude the possibility of any symbolic order that does not 
directly align with the interests of the technocrats charged with administering particular 
realms of policy and discourse.  
Networked Memes’ Reopening of Deliberative Spaces 
Although the technocratic anti-rhetoric of the NSA created conditions that limited 
the individuating potential of publics surrounding surveillance by preventing access to 
terministic participation, participants within networked public spheres were not without 
avenues of rhetorical recourse. The amateur participation afforded by networked memes 
allowed these technics to serve as locations that re-energized the individuating and 
deliberative potential that Ledgett‘s rhetoric sought to foreclose upon. The use of memes 
as networked commonplaces allowed for contested affects to deliberate about the tone – 
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if not the content – of the NSA‘s anti-rhetoric. Similarly, the ironic force of networked 
memes fractured the sanctity of security as a god term, creating varied narratives of the 
motives behind NSA policy and <security> itself.  
Networked Commonplaces and Affective Framing 
Anti-rhetorics, such as those deployed by Ledgett, seek to use expertise and the 
façade of objectivity to prevent alternative individuations. However, the deployment of 
popular image macros to comment on the Snowden leaks and the NSA response opens 
deliberative space around these anti-rhetorics. Their deliberative potential, however, 
stems less from the introduction of facts or authority that challenges the specialized ethos 
of the NSA. Rather, through mobilizing the rhetorical force of memes to evoke shared 
secondary retentions, memetic commonplaces use common understandings of the traces 
of past affects to create new and varied structures of feelings around this expertise. To 
explore this, I expand upon understandings of memes as commonplaces to evaluate the 
ways that memes asked networked publics to feel about and respond to the NSA and the 
Snowden leaks.
463
  
Commonplaces were distanced from invention in the late classical and modern 
eras when they were relegated to lists to be memorized.
464
 However, as part of the efforts 
to revitalize theories of invention, Richard McKeon rejects the notion that commonplaces 
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are simply catalogues of clichés or static wisdom. Instead, by bringing the familiar into 
contact with the unfamiliar, they function as ―places for the perception, discovery, 
explanation of the unknown.‖465 Commonplaces may be a container of wisdom, but it is 
the ability of these places to move and be redeployed that allows them to be a ―cauldron 
in which form and substance are brought together‖ to ―create material shaped for 
argument and persuasion.‖ 466 Thus while commonplaces are a location for the storage of 
wisdom and clichés, the mobility of this place allows them to be profoundly inventive.
467 
Such a move, McKeon argues, allows commonplaces to operate as ―sources of new 
perceptions operative in new directions in the thought and culture and philosophy of the 
twentieth century.‖468 
 The tension between this past rhetorical force and inventive iterations suggests 
that commonplaces are a profoundly individuating technic. As Michael Leff notes, since 
commonplaces are fundamentally tied to memory, they hold shared information and 
demand the internalization of collective wisdom/views/affects.
469
 In this way, 
commonplaces are a technic that enables the shared secondary retentions that are at the 
heart of rhetoric. Paolo Virno expands commonplaces‘ relation to the rhetorico-political 
by positioning the concept as the linguistic manifestation of Marx‘s ―general intellect.‖ 
Specifically, Virno draws on Aristotle‘s delineation between the ―special places‖ and 
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―common places.‖ 470 Virno notes that special places are localized and applicable only in 
particular situations. However, as conditions of political economy destabilize local 
communities and rhetorics, ―the ‗special places‘ of discourse and of argumentation are 
perishing and dissolving.‖471 Only those technocrats with dominion over particular 
special places can define these discourses and set the conditions for their individuation. 
For Ledgett, appeals to classified information and security expertise turn specific policy 
disputes into special topics, which most publics lack the rhetorical purchase to challenge, 
comment on, or more broadly participate with in an individuating manner.  
Against this, Virno argues commonplaces are ―the most generally valid logical 
and linguistic forms of all of our discourse (let us even say, the skeletal structure of it); 
they allow for the existence of every individual expression we use and they give structure 
to these expressions.‖472 Through their universality across contexts, commonplaces serve 
as repositories of the wisdom and experience of larger publics – the ―general intellect.‖ 
Through enabling the broadest realm of shared secondary retentions, the commonplaces 
as tertiary retentions offer ―a standard of orientation, and thus, some sort of refuge from 
the direction in which the world is going.‖473 As long as commonplaces allow 
participation by varied publics, they decrease the potential for proletarianization by forms 
of control. When commonplaces individuate, they demand that the participants ―echo 
back common sentiment‖ rather than try to dictate the conditions of individuations.474  
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The ability of commonplaces to echo common sentiment allowed them to 
challenge the anti-rhetorical frame of the NSA. Although there were technical debates 
regarding the nature of programs like PRISM, networked memes – functioning as 
commonplaces – focused on the broadest potential reactions, fostering a different mode 
of deliberation. Following Zizi Papacharissi‘s recognition that participatory networked 
media tends towards soft structures of feeling,
475
 these memes gave networked 
participants a range of ways to feel about the NSA, surveillance, and <security>. Through 
their ability to serve as common repositories for collective secondary retentions of 
affects‘ traces, memes as networked commonplaces allowed for the emergence of varied 
interpretations of how one should relate to NSA policies. To more fully understand the 
way that these affective commonplaces enable this mode of deliberation around anti-
rhetorics, I look at three of the most circulated memetic commonplaces around the NSA 
controversy: Condescending Wonka, Annoyed Picard, and Overly Attached Girlfriend.
476
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Figure 4.1 Initial iteration of Condescending Wonka (left) another popular iteration 
(right) 
 As one of the most popular networked memes, Condescending Wonka offered 
participants a range of targets for its circulation.
477
 Although the image of Gene Wilder as 
Wonka originally circulated as ―Creepy Wonka,‖ in 2011 the meme exploded across 
Reddit and the internet when it was tied to a feeling of condescension.
478
 The first 
iteration of Condescending Wonka was part of a Reddit thread titled ―every time I speak 
to a recent grad…‖ and featured the text ―oh, you just graduated // you must know 
everything.‖ (Figure 4.1).479 This form of the topline taking a comment by an implied 
interlocutor and the bottomline offering snide/condescending commentary quickly 
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emerged as the dominant mode tied to the image of Wonka.
480
 The toplines tend to focus 
on youthful arrogance. Other examples include ―you‘re only 18 and engaged // you must 
be really mature for your age‖ and ―Oh, this is the first election cycle since you turned 
old enough to vote // yes, please tell me more about your political wisdom.‖ However, 
any belief can be subject to condescension as long as the iteration follows the form of the 
topline as naive or overly simple and the bottomline as a condescending correction. 
Because this condescension is created by common understandings and functions as a 
general (non-contextual) mapping of shared understandings, the larger meme functions in 
a commonplace manner.  
Opening the interview‘s commentary on the leaks, Ledgett argues that Snowden 
could have reported within the system. Within the symbolic order of <security>, this 
frames Snowden‘s public leak as an act of treason that supported terrorism. Ledgett‘s 
admonishment of Snowden is a direct response to the narrative, popular across the 
networked public sphere, that Snowden was a hero for defending privacy.
481
 A range of 
arguments about Snowden‘s heroism circulated around the internet; however, two 
popular iterations of Condescending Wonka characterized the core of the debate (Figure 
4.2). Although they offer opposing interpretations of the heroism of Snowden, they do so 
without contradicting each other or the technocratic expertise of the NSA. The meme that 
villainizes Snowden reaffirms the viewpoint of the NSA that Snowden‘s leak may have 
aided terrorism. Conversely, the version that valorizes Snowden does not deny that 
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information may have reached to terrorist, rather it suggests that despite this, the risk of 
making NSA procedures transparent is a heroic act. This meme also does not contradict 
the NSA‘s practices, Ledgett notes that the NSA collects metadata on civilians and finds 
itself trying to maintain a balance between demanded transparency and the needs of 
secrecy. The evaluation offered by ether iteration of Condescending Wonka does not 
challenge the anti-rhetorical stance of the NSA – they are experts and their ―factual‖ 
claims are not refuted.  
 
Figure 4.2 Wonka Debates the Snowden Leaks. 
From these two memes two potential publics emerge, each offering a differing 
view of Snowden and the leaks. The point of stasis between these publics is not 
necessarily about particular policies, but rather over what or towards whom to be 
condescending. This condescension emerges as a site for deliberation over the NSA 
leaks. The varied iterations of the meme mobilize differing individuations to offer 
alternative readings for the ―proper‖ use of affect. This allows participants to deliberate 
outside the circumference of the NSA‘s anti-rhetorics and their proletarianization through 
―fact‖ based argument. Once outside this circumference, the meme allows participants to 
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reintroduce privacy to the conversation over the NSA policies. Rather than positing 
<security> as a god term that is in opposition to terrorism, by focusing on what 
participants ought to condescend towards, privacy and security are both held up as 
potential god terms. Support of Snowden – as the embodiment of a god or devil, 
depending on the terministic frame participants support – becomes a proxy for this larger 
struggle. Memetic participants may ―vote‖ via circulation to determine if Snowden was a 
traitor or a hero – not based on specific arguments or propositions, but rather based on 
broad feelings about the issue. 
  
Figure 4.3: Some of the earliest iterations of the Annoyed Picard meme. 
Condescension was not the only shared structure of feeling that networked 
participants were invited to place the leak within: another meme invited them to feel 
annoyed. Annoyed Picard is a popular networked meme for expressing excessive 
frustration with the views or actions of implied interlocutors. The meme is a screen 
capture of actor Patrick Stewart playing Jean-Luc Picard on the television show Star 
Trek: The Next Generation (Figure 4.3). Prior to its emergence as a full-fledged image 
macro, the image virally circulated with the static text ―WTF is this shit.‖482 Other 
                                                          
482.
 Don, ―Annoyed Picard,‖ Know Your Meme, http://knowyourmeme.com/memes/annoyed-
picard. 
180 
 
 
captions emerged on the Advice Animals subreddit, opening the meme to comment on 
specific actions worthy of Picard‘s visceral annoyed response. The modal form follows a 
topline that is merely an exclamation of outrage (most often ―[question word] the fuck‖) 
followed by a bottomline that describes the source of the annoyance.  
 
Figure 4.4: Picard is annoyed with the NSA controversy 
 In the face of the Snowden leaks, Picard found plenty to be annoyed about. 
Suprisingly, participants in this meme did not offer judgement about the NSA, Snowden, 
or the potential positive or negative ramifications of the leaks. Instead they focused on 
their annoyance with the people who seemed outraged to learn about the spying program 
(Figure 4.4). In the two most popularly circulated responses, the Picard suggests his 
annoyance that Americans were not already aware of domestic surveillance. The memes 
suggest that it should be common knowledge that the NSA spies, considering that the 
PATRIOT act authorized this surveillance twelve years prior. Similar to Condescending 
Wonka, this meme invites participation outside the anti-rhetorical frame offered by the 
NSA. Rather than debate the specific impacts of the PRISM program on security or 
privacy, the Picard memes‘ expression of annoyance implicitly suggests that PRISM is 
not unique. Participants who identify with the structure of feeling around the meme are 
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invited to consider the leak as a continuation of existing policies of surveillance. 
Ledgett‘s erasure of privacy sought to frame all surveillance as improving <security>. 
However, the Picard meme, while not offering judgment on the policy, uses the 
commonplace of annoyance to provide a larger historical perspective. This 
contextualization contradicts the hierarchies established by the NSA‘s valorization of 
<security> above all else.  
 Beyond historicizing the narrative, the Picard meme invites participants to 
identify with a sense of superiority over the ―masses.‖483 In expressing annoyance with 
those who are uneducated about surveillance, the meme positions participants something 
akin to a wise vanguard. The meme implies that while the masses may accept official 
rhetorics of security, it contends more enlightened members of the networked public 
sphere resisted these narratives. By evoking the PATRIOT act, the meme suggests that 
any participant who was not personally researching surveillance and participating in these 
longstanding debates is complicit in the consequences of current surveillance policy. 
Through this, the meme draws attention to the proletarianizing force of NSA rhetorics 
and gestures towards the possibility of resistive individuations by pointing out the need 
for critical scrutiny of the surveillance programs. This fractures the dominance of 
<security> as a terministic screen by highlighting that the NSA is actively selecting a 
particular (not universal) vision of politics. Such attention is important, because as 
Stiegler suggests, when controlling forces gain sway over attention, resistive retentions 
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and individuations becomes impotent – not because they do not exist, but because 
participants do not know they are options.
484
 
 In the prior memes, the evocation of commonplaces was largely confined to 
placing affective judgment onto the ways that publics interacted with the leak 
controversy. Wonka was condescending towards those who thought Snowden was a hero 
or traitor and Picard was annoyed with uneducated netizens. However, image macros as 
commonplaces also offer the potential to reframe the participants in the controversy 
itself. Most notably, the meme Overly Attached Girlfriend was used to recast the motives 
(but not the policies) of the NSA.  
  
Figure 4.5: Early Iteration of Overly Attached Girlfriend (left) the NSA iteration 
(right). 
A screen cap from a parody music video about clingy relationships, this picture of 
a wide eyed young woman is one of the most popular image macros circulating around 
the internet [Figure 4.5].
485
 The combination of the intense facial expression, series of 
pictures in the background, and narrative of the video (which garnered over 1.3 million 
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views on YouTube) led participants to attach this image to the social narrative of a clingy 
or attached teenage girlfriend. In contrast to Wonka and Picard, new iterations of Overly 
Attached Girlfriend are used not to comment on specific conversations, instead new 
iterations function to add new and funny examples to the narrative behind the meme. To 
begin, the very name of the meme places all content within a affective frame. Every 
iteration must demonstrate a stance that is ―overly attached,‖ just as the iterations of 
Picard must be annoyed and Wonka condescending. Within this condensed structure of 
feeling, particular iterations then circulate examples of this attachment. The toplines 
typically feature a reasonable action by the implied boyfriend while the bottomlines 
responsivity frame the girlfriend as unreasonably attached. Iterations create a story of 
rampant jealousy ―I was looking through your texts earlier // who‘s mom?,‖ tricks to 
prolong the relationship ―I poked holes in all the condoms // now you have to love me 
forever,‖ and obsession bordering on stalking ―You forgot to tell me where you were 
going on a trip with your friends // good thing I installed GPS on your car so I could tag 
along.‖ Across the iterations, the meme develops a commonplace centered on narratives 
about the intensities and excesses of youthful romantic relations. 
 The memetic Girlfriend‘s predilection towards stalking/surveillance made this 
commonplace a fitting tool to parody the NSA [Figure 4.5]. In the most common iteration 
commenting on the NSA controversy, the pictures on the girlfriend‘s wall are replaced 
with the seal of the NSA and the meme features the text ―I stole your Facebook login, 
cellphone records & email password // but its [sic] cool, you have nothing to hide right?‖ 
In framing the NSA as the girlfriend, the meme reframes the actions of the NSA as 
juvenile and obsessive, rather than necessary for security. While not challenging any 
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particular factual claims made by the NSA, the meme does challenge the motive of the 
PRISM program. Instead of a reverence for security, the meme suggests the possibility 
that the NSA acted out of its own selfish interests. Further, the bottomline reframes a 
common argument made by the NSA, which was explicitly made by Ledgett, that law 
abiding citizens should have no need for privacy. Ledgett uses this claim to suggest that 
anyone who opposes surveillance must have something to hide. Moreover, couching the 
argument in the commonplace of the attached girlfriend meme suggests that the civilian 
openness demanded by the NSA is unreasonable and violates acceptable norms of 
privacy. By suggesting an impurity of motives, this meme implies that <security> is not a 
god that should be sanctified. Instead the meme returns privacy to the terministic mix, 
suggesting that privacy is the only way to be protected from the irrational impulses of the 
Overly Attached NSA.  
 Combined, these memes challenge the proletarianizing force of Ledgett‘s rhetoric. 
The varied commonplaces destabilize <security> as a god term by re-introducing 
<privacy> as a rival symbolic deity. Moreover, although the technical nature of security 
policy allows an anti-rhetorical frame that discourages amateur participation, the 
imposition of networked commonplaces enables networked participants to engage in the 
construction of structures of feeling that circulate around that anti-rhetoric. Depending on 
the meme, they negotiate the direction of common affects such as annoyance, 
condescension, and emotional attachment as they apply to the leaks. As participants 
position themselves in relation to these memetic publics, and expand on them through 
circulatory practices, they spread these affective reframings of the controversy. This 
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allows democratically created and directed frames to counter the technocratic force 
offered by Ledgett.  
Irony, Memes and Comic Remediation 
While each of these image macros relies on varied commonplaces to challenge the 
anti-rhetoricity of the NSA and the sanctity of <security>, irony is also central to the 
ways that networked publics challenged the proletarianizing rhetoric of the NSA. A series 
of memes built around the Verizon slogan ―can you hear me now‖ were used to ironically 
deploy special topics to disrupt the NSA‘s technocratic valorization of security. 
Therefore, this chapter now turns to discussion of the functioning of networked irony 
before using the ―can you hear me now‖ meme to explore its individuating force.  
At its most basic, Burke defines irony as a reversal where ―a returns as non-a.‖486 
The juxtaposition of normative expectations with some indecorous element (funny or not) 
provides an incongruity that Burke argues challenges informationist motion. Burke 
argues perspective by incongruity is the engine that drives poetic action – and by 
extension the possibilities of meaningful individuation. Because of this relation between 
humor and incongruity, rhetoricians posit that humor can have serious political 
consequences. Robert Hariman argues that parody opens up democratic space by de-
privileging traditional institutions of power and creating alternative affects against 
dominant structures.
487
 Tønder extends this potential to all forms of irony, arguing that 
irony (as a series of reversals which need not be dialectical negations) always remediates 
messages, undercutting their dominant force and refiguring them in such ways that they 
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may be used in different in non-dominant forms.
488
 Through its reliance on juxtaposition 
and remediation, irony tends towards democratic rhetorics. Ironic rhetorical techne open 
multiple modes of individuation. Combined these individuations open new and diverse 
rhetorical spaces that function in opposition to the consumptive proletarianization of 
control. 
  
Figure 4.6 Sample tweet parodying Verizon. 
When The Guardian first made public the scope and reach of the PRISM program 
on June 5, 2013, it did so with the headline ―NSA Collecting Phone Records of Millions 
of Verizon Customers Daily.‖489 While it would later be revealed that other cellphone 
providers were also complicit in the PRISM program, this early disclosure, as well as 
Verizon‘s status as the United States‘ largest cellular provider, made it central to the 
memetic responses across networked publics. Within hours of the online posting of The 
Guardian article, Twitter users were making jokes playing off the Orwellian undertones 
of the Verizon slogan ―can you hear me now‖ and their ―share everything plan‖ (Figure 
4.6). By 10 am that morning, these slogans had been translated into a variety of memes 
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and drawn enough attention that Buzzfeed posted an article featuring a range of them.
490
 
Rather than centering on a particular image, the modal conditions of the meme are 
primarily defined by the ironic juxtaposition of Verizon‘s marketing rhetoric with a twist 
gesturing towards the NSA leak. These memes provide different affective castings of the 
controversy, providing an opportunity to explore the role the ironic plays in 
individuation, especially to create a range of potentialities that subjectivities must then 
negotiate. 
 
Figure 4.7 Refigured Verizon advertisments   
 The most basic iterations of the meme make subtle alterations to already existing 
Verizon advertisements (Figure 4.7). For example, one meme added an asterisk to a share 
anything plan advertisement, adding the text ―with the NSA.‖ The ad valorized Verizon‘s 
efforts to let you share communication resources with members of your cell plan. 
However, the memetic addition reframes this virtue as a simultaneous vice because the 
information also goes to the NSA. Similarly, at the time Verizon relied heavily on 
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mapping their coverage of the US compared to AT&T. Using an image from this 
campaign, participants substituted words to promise ―5 times more government 
monitoring.‖ This iteration challenges Verizon‘s assumption that more reach and 
coverage always benefits the consumer, enthymematically positing that if Verizon can 
reach more of America than ever before then so can the NSA. 
 These memes use perspective by incongruity to disrupt the perfection demanded 
by the NSA‘s valorization of security. A central component of irony as a trope, is that it 
enhances the perspective by incongruity enabled by metaphor by creating a deliberate 
misnomer through the pairing of antithetical terms.
491
 Our consumptive practices and 
personal communication are supposed to be independent of security practices. However, 
by juxtaposing the Verizon advertisements which are tied to everyday behaviors to 
security, these memes create a new mode of seeing, inviting memetic participants to 
reconsider the NSA‘s ties to their everyday lives. While this frame still valorizes security 
as a motivating term, the juxtaposition prevents the closure that gives this god term its 
proletarianizing force. Because perspective by incongruity foregrounds contradictions, 
participants are asked to create alternative readings, rather than simply consuming 
dominant ones.
492
 Although the NSA promotes <security> as noble, the ironic reframe in 
these memes makes it more mundane, disrupting the deification that justifies the 
proletarianizing hierarchies.  
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Figure 4.8 “Can you hear me now?” parody memes. 
Another strain of the meme specifically riffs on the ―can you hear me now?‖ 
advertisements that Verizon had run until 2010. Starting in 2002, these adds featured Paul 
Marcarelli as the ―Test Man.‖ In these immensely popular commercials, Test Man is 
featured going around the country to check the reliability of the Verizon system serving 
as a stand-in for frustrated cell phone users.
493
 Recontextualized into the meme, the NSA 
is positioned as answering the slogan‘s question (Figure 4.8). This positions consumers as 
complicit in the surveillance, as though they are actively asking to be surveilled. 
Moreover, by evoking the ads, these memes reaffirm the ubiquity of surveillance. This 
refigured narrative disrupts the notion that the NSA is the heroic protector of passive 
Americans. Instead it suggests that the NSA both works with and uses Americans to 
expand its surveillance power. Following Burke, this move both destabilizes the piety of 
established discourses and re-moralizes them by using juxtaposed narratives to offer a 
more complete understanding of the controversy.
494
 By juxtaposition of consumer 
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practice through Test Man with the NSA van, the second iteration complicates the 
narrative of the NSA and reopens the closed by the terministic deification of <security>. 
 A third grouping of the memes introduces another actor into the drama of the 
leak, president Barack Obama (Figure 4.9). One iteration of the meme shows Barack 
Obama on a cell phone asking for Verizon‘s ―share everything plan.‖ This iteration 
positions Obama as initiating the relationship between the NSA and Verizon. The second 
iteration returns Test Guy, but rather than the NSA answering the slogan, Obama is 
pictured responding ―yes we can.‖ Aside from repeating the assertion that Obama as 
president is directly complicit in the surveillance programs, the second meme also 
generates additional force through its use of Obama‘s 2008 campaign slogan as the 
answer. This slogan was used in the election to position Obama as the political 
manifestation of mass agency, hopes, and ideals. However, by recontextualizing it within 
the NSA scandal, the meme suggests this idealism is incompatible with the realities of 
politics. 
 
Figure 4.9: Obama focused iterations of anti-NSA surveillance memes. 
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 These incongruities move the NSA‘s rhetoric into a thoroughly comic frame.495 
Of Burke‘s three frames, the comic is most suited to democratic politics as it does not 
assume an intrinsic morality to actors, but rather that social ills come from human 
error.
496
 For example, the ―yes we can‖ slogan suggests that although NSA surveillance 
seems to work against Obama‘s electoral mandate, the president supported the policy in 
what seemed to be the best interests of the people. Robert Ivie argues comic reframes 
such as this necessitate deliberation, noting, 
Burke‘s notion of the comic corrective acknowledges that political 
relations are agonistic and recognizes that social cohesion and tolerance 
are promoted by people ‗acting rhetorically upon themselves and one 
another.‘ It does not . . . assume that agonistic politics are inherently self-
correcting or that their potential for realizing democratic ideals is easily 
fulfilled.
497
 
 
By positioning the NSA, Obama, Verizon, and the consuming public as all complicit, 
imperfect, and effected by these policies, the translation of the hierarchies of the NSA 
into this comic corrective begs participants to recognize and work through contradictions. 
It is not Ledgett‘s limiting frame of security above all. It is the messy recognition that 
security, privacy, democracy, and safety are all important, but no one policy can meet 
these needs equally. By providing multiple incongruous perspectives, the grammars of 
technocratic rhetorics are never allowed to stabilize. This allows each participant to place 
themselves within competing, complex, and open narratives, rather than consuming a 
hierarchical order which prevents individuation.  
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Participatory Networked Technics and Terministic Democracy 
Each of these memes that emerged around the Snowden leaks work in different 
ways to disrupt the proletarianizing force of the NSA‘s deployment of <security>. This 
terministic fracturing would seem to disrupt the potential for unified opposition to the 
policies of the NSA. However, because they offer a variety of affective frames, 
terministic relations, and narratives around the leaks, these memes open the democratic 
space around the controversy. Memes create the space for multiple perspectives by 
incongruities. This allows for the democratic transindividuation of a particular 
preindividual state and the creation of multiple individuations related to a particular 
controversy that then must be democratically reconciled. Because of this, memes – and 
similar participatory technics – suggest the possibility of engendering terministic 
democracy through the destabilization and public negotiation of controlling rhetorics. 
Two features demonstrated in this case study contribute to this terministic democracy: 
incongruous remediations and commonplace repetition and difference. 
Democratic Remediations 
As each of these memes provides a different affective casting of the controversy, 
this case provides an opportunity to expand explorations of the role comic remediation 
plays in individuation, especially to create a range of individuations that subjectivities 
must then negotiate. Speaking on the organizing force of singular terministic screens, 
Burke famously notes that ―even if any given terminology is a reflection of reality, by its 
very nature as a terminology it must be a selection of reality; and to this extent it must 
function also as a deflection of reality.‖498 This power was highlighted as Ledgett‘s 
rhetoric reflected the need for security, selected terrorism as the terministic devil term, 
                                                          
498.
 Burke, Language, 45, emphasis in original.  
193 
 
 
and deflected privacy concerns through reframing the issue into a secrecy/transparency 
dialectic. While the varied memetic responses offered a range of ways to feel about 
security, new actors to the narrative, and sought to re-introduce privacy as a terministic 
foil, none of them explicitly reject the importance of security as an organizing term. 
Rather through their (primarily ironic) remediations of the term, they each attach it to a 
different set of selections, reflections and deflections. Ledgett‘s proletarianizing rhetoric, 
with its seemingly stable and singular symbolic force, is transformed into a pluralism of 
related symbolic orders, each commenting on the other and fighting for public 
acceptance. 
This terministic pluralism creates spaces for individuation in the face of the 
proletarianizing rhetorics of the NSA. The memes provide a way for participants to 
debate the meaning and feeling of <security> outside the policies and politics of 
government institutions. As the process of individuation necessarily produces 
transformation, the process is decisively political. This individuating potential is 
democratic and grounded in the common use of terms. Barry Brummett argues one of the 
most important tasks of rhetorical criticism is not to disprove the arguments around god 
terms, but rather to disrupt the aura of perfection.
 499
 Once this aura is tainted, alternative 
individuations can engage the symbolic order previously closed by god terms. 
Furthermore, as the organizing force of god terms establishes technical grammars, their 
disruption opens the processes of individuation related to the term. As long as 
individuation happens, transformation is inevitable as new symbolic orders will 
individuate through each iteration of a technic.  
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Because individuation is accompanied by symbolic pluralism, it is a necessary 
precondition for democratic action. This is not a representative democracy, which is 
fraught with concerns regarding the reductive nature of (mis)representation.
500
 Instead, 
individuation, enabled by technics like memes, enables a direct democracy where all 
participants can engage in the creation of terministic conditions that define political 
issues. This terministic democracy limits the direction that influential symbols may 
individuate. Further, the comic remediations enabled by individuating technics creates 
varied structures of feelings around any singular issue, providing multiple avenues for 
individuals to not only engage the issue by feeling their way into relation with particular 
clusters of terms, but also democratically restructure these feelings through their 
participation in the memes. Each posting of a meme creates a new potential affective 
public seeking the attention of networked participants. This attention, and the subsequent 
expansion of the force of a particular affective public, gives each participant the 
possibility to ―vote‖ on the rhetorical order they want to dominate rhetorical spaces. In 
this light, terministic democracy functions to shape rhetorical order through participants‘ 
transindividuation with these rhetorical technics.  
Repeating Differing Commonplaces 
 Beyond the comic remediation of proletarianizing technics, those memes which 
function as networked commonplaces also enact democratizing force through their 
performance of repetition and difference. For example, while the NSA version of Overly 
Attached Girlfriend is a repetition of the form of the original meme, it is included in the 
larger meme only because the repeated elements lead to a different iteration. Through this 
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process, the commonplace knowledge stored within the meme is expanded to a new 
context. Aside from highlighting the inventive power of commonplaces, this repetition 
and difference also enhances the individuating potential of memes.
501
 In operating 
through a logic of repetition, individuation functions as a sort of apprenticeship: we learn 
to do by repeating the externalized retentions of others.
502
 Following this, a commonplace 
can only be understood through comparison to the similarities and differences of its past 
uses. It is the comparison of participants‘ own condescension with the NSA to the social 
understanding of Wonka‘s condensations that gives this intersection of controversy and 
commonplace meaning. Conversely, if participants are always encountering the novel, 
there is little capacity to form meaningful retentions because there is no preexisting 
technic to individuate from.
503
 Ultimately, if repetition becomes a process of sameness, or 
if difference exists without repetition, the connection between the preindividual and the 
singularity is severed, disrupting the possibility of individuation.  
This process of commonplace individuation is transformative of social conditions. 
Paolo Virno argues that it is the general (common) nature of commonplaces that enables 
their political force. As technocrats detach individuals from special topics, publics 
increasingly become nomadic. Under these conditions, Virno argues commonplaces 
provide political strength:
 
Those who do not feel at home, in order to get a sense of orientation and 
to protect themselves, must turn to the ‗common places,‘ or to the most 
general categories of the linguistic intellect… not in order for them to 
learn something about biology or advanced mathematics, but because they 
turn to the most essential categories of the abstract intellect in order to 
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protect themselves from the blows of random chance, in order to take 
refuge from contingency and from the unforeseen.
504
 
 
As commonplaces emerge as the only technics that larger publics can individuate in 
relation to, they become increasingly political. Other technics, with their ties to special 
topics can always be directed by technocrats with expertise in that specialty. However, 
the very commonness of commonplaces suggests that these rhetorical technics – above all 
others – may be central to the establishment of a political voice less encumbered by the 
influences of control. 
Despite the controversies engendered by Snowden‘s leaks and the subsequent 
memetic response, the PRISM program continues to surveil Americans – albeit in a more 
transparent and limited fashion.
505
 Certainly, these memes are neither solely responsible 
for these limited reforms nor inadequate because of a failure to enact larger change. 
Instead, these memetic responses provided a larger range of symbolic technics with 
which participants may individuate. Increasing this range is important because as Burke 
notes the very quality and shape of our political world is tied to the quality and shape of 
our symbols.
506
 Therefore, the common quality of these memes, as well as the competing 
interpretations offered through their remediation increases the odds of a democratically 
fostered individuation that enables a better quality of collective life. 
Chapter 5  
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Putting Putin on the Ritz: Memes Making Cosmopolitan Memories 
 
Figure 5.1: One of many memes playing off the pun “Putin on the Ritz.” 
The image of Russian president Vladimir Putin riding shirtless on a cracker is 
remarkable in many ways: it is visually intriguing, it is a great visual pun, and circulating 
it in Russia could land you in jail (Figure 5.1). In April of 2015, the internet was aghast 
when news spread that Russia was taking steps to ban memes that disparage public 
figures.
507
 Bradley Wiggens notes that although the Russian use of memes operates 
similarly to western and global networked meme culture, within sectors of the ―Russian 
Internet,‖ memes unique to Russian culture and politics circular dominate the rhetorical 
landscape.
508
 Prior to the ban, Russian internet culture features rich memetic circulation 
commenting on politics, current events, and popular culture. Popular memes lambasted 
Putin, Russian driving, and the latest gossip with celebrities. However, as memes adopted 
more aggressive political commentary, the Russian government used a lawsuit from 
Russian singer Valeri Syutkin accusing a meme of defamation (figure 5.2) to justify a ban 
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on any meme that specifically disparages a public figure.
509
 The willingness of the 
Russian government to specifically target internet memes for censorship suggests a 
growing recognition by political leaders of the rhetorical (and perhaps anti-authoritarian) 
force of networked communication.
510
 Specifically, these memes operate in conversation 
(and conflict) with official representations of public figures. For example, many memes 
engage the public persona of Vladimir Putin, offering satirical commentary on the ethos 
of masculinity and Russian tradition carefully crafted by government communication 
experts. 
 
Figure 5.2: The meme that launched the ban. Translates as “smack the bitch in the 
face.” 
  As the face of Russia, Vladimir Putin, together with his public relations apparatus, 
has carefully constructed a public image designed to reify Russia‘s ideological 
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commitments to masculine, authority-driven politics.
511
 This cult of personality, and the 
resulting policies, are rooted in allusions to a nostalgic memory of the Soviet Union as a 
dominant authority in geopolitical affairs. In opposition to this carefully crafted memory 
of Putin, memes built around his persona disrupt this well-manicured façade, and have 
continued to do so even after the announcement of legal restrictions. These memes 
highlight the particular power of the amateur creation of narratives. Specifically, these 
memes are the re-articulation of a specific and focused control based narrative built upon 
the authority of Vladimir Putin into a vernacular narrative open to varied individuations. 
The interplay between these two discourses creates a space that makes apparent the 
conflict between official efforts to craft proletarianizing memories of Russian leaders – 
and by extension the nation – and the memes which function to open individuational 
space through the construction of ironic counter-memory.
512
 Therefore, in this chapter, I 
argue that with their capacity to externalize shared secondary retentions, internet memes 
function to destabilize official rhetorics that mobilize memories to create static and 
controlling national identities. Such clash over public memory is particularly significant 
because, as Hannah Arendt notes, political identity comes directly from our capacity to 
remember.
513
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My analysis of the interplay between this official public memory and its memetic 
counterparts proceeds in three sections. I first situate the official narrative of Putin within 
the context of technics and their relationship to public memory. I next explore both 
Russian and international Putin memes to evaluate the unique affordances digital technics 
provides for the construction of counter-memory. I conclude by arguing that memetic 
counter-memories are uniquely suited to negotiating the limitations of political 
censorship. Further their potential to affectively reframe politics increases space for 
public deliberation through fostering democratically created vernacular memories that 
promote a networked cosmopolitan virtue. 
Visual Technics and National Memories 
Vladimir Putin is revered by his citizens to an extent that ought to makes other 
democratically elected heads of state jealous. His approval ratings frequently hover in the 
70 percent range and only dipped into the high 40s during economic contractions and 
electoral scandals.
514
 Much of Putin‘s popularity results from presiding over economic 
and political prosperity after the tumultuous Yeltsin years. However, the Russian leader 
has been able to maintain this approval for fifteen years through the construction of a 
carefully crafted persona that is equal parts protector, object of desire, and nostalgia for 
the memory of Soviet Power.
515
 The resonance of this persona is such that Putin is 
globally popular. He was the top recipient of votes in Time’s 2015 most influential person 
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poll.
516
 As Russian officials carefully use varied rhetorical technics to craft Putin‘s image 
through the management of public memory, this image functions as the official 
embodiment of a public memory of what Russia once was and can be again.
517
 This 
rhetoric transforms the memory of Putin into a consumable technic that is profoundly 
proletarianizing.
518
 For Russians, not accepting the state vision of Putin can lead to both 
social and political sanction. The centrality of Putin to Russian individuations of self-
concept and collective identity helps explain the restrictions on memes, as they enable 
individuations that threaten to destabilize the ―postmodern cult of personality‖ built on 
equal parts authority and commercial appeal that is central to the Kremlin‘s vision of 
Russian politics.
519
 However, prior to examining this memetic destabilization, I first 
expand on the relationship between technics and memory before exploring how the 
Russian government uses these technics (particularly the visual) to develop official 
memories constructed around the public persona of Putin. 
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Technics and Memory 
Because technics externalize human functionality, they are tied to memory. Fire is 
only useful as a technic insofar as users also have the social memory of the ways that it 
can be mobilized to cook, heat, etc. In this sense, technics are a connection to social 
memories that create a sense of historical identity.
520
 Yet these memories are not simply 
created through the repeated use of technics.
521
 Instead, recognizing the social force of 
technical memory, Stiegler is most interested in the capacity of technics to function as 
―mnemotechnics.‖ A focus on mnemotechnics draws attention to the ―objects and 
techniques able to preserve and make accessible experiences which I have not myself 
lived.‖522 Technics‘ transformations of secondary retentions into technical memories that 
allow collative unity built around events one has not lived. These externalized memories, 
are the foundation of collective identities, they ―authorize particular historical 
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narratives... to serve the interests of particular groups.‖523 Because of this, even 
contemporary events ought to be understood, in part, through the lens of memory. But 
this memory is always mediated through technics. The grammars of participation in 
particular mnemotechnics set the conditions by which participants can individuate current 
events into prior tertiary retentions, generating their political force.
524
 A focus on 
mnemotechnics orients the critic towards the way that technics are currently mobilizing 
and authorizing new memories, rather than focusing only on the way that past memories 
are mobilized and materialized. 
In this capacity, mnemotechnics ―constitute an intergenerational support of 
memory which, as material culture, overdetermines learning and mnesic activities.‖525 As 
the material limits of public memory, mnemotechnics are subject to ritualization, 
resignifying uses, and debate. Because of this, mnemotechnics that are publicly mobilized 
are inherently rhetorical.
526
 As communities deploy technologies that evoke particular 
memories, they bring a vision of historical events to bear upon contemporary action.
527
 
Moreover, in connecting individuals to visions of past retentions, mnemotechnics also 
authorize particular protentions based on the form of the mnemic collectivity.
528
 
Consequently, political conflict is often rooted not only in the struggle between contested 
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public memories,
529
 but also in the very availability and form of the technics that allow 
these memories to circulate and individuate.
530
 These different memories create the 
collective identities that enable different individuations.  
Accordingly, the collective secondary retentions enabled by technical memory 
align strongly with the rhetorical concept of public memory. For memory scholars, public 
memory resides in any location (read: technic) where the past becomes active by either its 
literal enactment or its continuous presence, enforcing an authoritative rhetorical 
narrative.
531
 The capacity to be active renders memory a public phenomenon constructed 
between individuals and communities in a ―dialectic relationship‖ where ―public 
memories influence collective identities and collective identities shape public 
memories.‖532 This relationship, akin to transindividuation, creates a public memory as ―a 
body of beliefs and ideas about the past that help a public or society understand both its 
past, present, and by implication its future.‖533 Therefore, public memories are a political 
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tool par excellence because they assist in constituting the definition of the citizen.
534
 The 
deployment of mnemotechnics does not tell us what it means to be ―Russian‖ or 
―American,‖ rather they function as a ―rhetorical vocabulary‖ that imbues these 
subjectivities with political meaning.
535
 Once individuated into these subjectivities, 
individual political action is limited because the memory leaves ―residues that construct 
and confine how we understand the world and how past and present govern our 
preconceptions and actions.‖536 
 Considering this political potential, it is hardly surprising that state actors are 
heavily invested in the manipulation of public memory. Thomas Dunn contends, 
Within the frame of public memory, the past operates not as historical fact 
but as historical interpretation for the purposes of making public 
argument. Through framing the past, we serve a present need. Those most 
likely to do this memory work – nations, governments, institutions—
occupy a position of power in society. These ―official‖ memories are 
powerful rhetorical forces that reproduce existing power relations and 
minimize meanings of the past that run counter to currently accepted 
grand narratives.
537
 
 
Consequently, romantic visions of the past are central to political identity across 
ideologies ranging from authoritarian nationalism to radical Marxism.
538
 State investment 
in mnemotechnics such as monuments, memorials, and other mnemonic efforts 
transfigure memories into a material form, injecting these memories into everyday 
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experience.
539
 As the material form of memory, individuated with as part of regular social 
interaction, mnemotechnics naturalize the ideological myths underlying the official 
construction of public memory into the fabric of social interaction – limiting 
individuations that vary from this normative memory. 
Official Russian Visual Memory  
Kremlin image-makers have positioned Putin as a living figure of memory that 
embodies the Russian people. Insofar as the head of state functions in epideictic 
discourses, such officials are largely concerned with the demarcation of national 
values.
540
 Consequently, Shawn and Trevor Parry-Giles argue, ―collective memory works 
as an interpretive strategy for the definition of political image, as political actors seek to 
link their character to familiar and secure markers of collective identity drawn from the 
community‘s shared past.‖541 Russian leaders are clearly aware of the need for a 
controlled public persona rooted in national memory. The Kremlin has staged a variety of 
events to further Putin‘s image and bolster his ego, ranging from shirtless photos to 
singing American standards.
542
 Although Putin cultivates this image through myriad 
technics, his mnemonic persona is primarily rooted in the visual.
543
 Mnemotechnics such 
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as photos, videos, and press events construct him as the strong and virile father of Russia, 
a visual orientation nostalgically drawing on memories from the Soviet era.
544
  
Although official Soviet policy sought to deconstruct many of the patriarchal 
legal structures that had existed under the Tzars, media and propaganda still relied 
heavily on tropes of masculine strength and paternalism.
545
 Propaganda posters of 
leaders, particularly Stalin, featured them as paternal figures looking caringly over 
assembled groups of women and children.
546
 In these photos, Stalin is the proud father of 
Russia, using his masculine presence to organize the Soviet Union to greater international 
strength. Stalin, as the embodiment of a ―New Soviet Man‖ became the embodiment of 
the strength and leadership that are nostalgically remembered as the pinnacle of Soviet 
strength and leadership.
547
 This time period also saw an increase in the glorification of 
male athletes, suggesting that masculine virility was central to model citizenship.
548
 
Combined, these modes of visual communication set masculine authority as the frame 
through which idealized Soviet politics should be understood. 
 Despite a democratic transition in the 1990s, Soviet rhetorical styles have 
remained prominent because the Russian polity lacked a clearly articulated alternative. 
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David Cratis Williams argues ―Russia‘s ‗instant democracy‘ lacked both engrained 
social, cultural, or political traditions of deliberative public discourse and sufficient 
human resources prepared by disposition or training to establish such traditions.‖549 
Drawing on the traditions of the Tzars and Soviet Premiers, Russian civic rhetoric curtails 
democratic participation, instead focusing on rhetorics that enable promulgation of 
executive mandates.
550
 Despite claiming to be a defender of democratic principles, Putin 
has continued this autocratic political rhetoric. While autocratic and democratic rhetorics 
are seemingly at odds, for many Russians ―the very term ‗democracy‘ became conflated 
with blue jeans, free market capitalism and prosperity through its presentation as a 
‗democratic market system‘.‖551 In the process, concepts such as deliberation and 
participation have become dissociated with ―democratic governance.‖ With democracy 
tied to neoliberal values and consumptive practices, rather than participatory civics, Putin 
has carefully constructed an image as a rugged individual – the model neoliberal subject 
– to position himself as the embodiment of the ideal citizen and state. This idealization of 
Putin is then naturalized through the circulation of varied technics that reify this memory 
of masculine Russia as normal.
552
 Contemporary Russia exists as a near literal example of 
Stiegler‘s definition of proletarianization – individuals are managed through the 
consumption of products and narratives foreclose participation. 
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Figure 5.3: Examples of publicity photos demonstrating Putin’s rugged Masculinity 
 Central to the connection of Putin to the memory of the USSR are visual technics 
that highlight masculinity. Putin‘s symbolic masculinity was a strategic contrast to the 
enfeebled Yeltsin and late Soviet leaders. The memory of these leaders as old and out of 
shape became a visual representation of the decline of the Soviet Union and failings of 
Russia in the immediate wake of the collapse of the USSR.
553
 Against this memory of 
emasculation, Putin‘s public relations team took a relative unknown politician and 
constructed an idealized persona for the president that described Putin through his 
―sobriety, intelligence, competence, vigorous physical and psychological health, and, 
above all, his manliness.‖554 Officially released shirtless vacation photos featuring him 
fishing, riding a horse, and carrying a gun to hunt are the primary technics used to 
translate Putin‘s masculine image into public memory (Figure 5.3).555 These images 
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convey Putin as rugged, tough and virile, with a powerful physique – the ideal masculine 
leader.  
 
Figure 5.4: Putin: the strong but caring father of Russia 
Aside from the shirtless photos, official photos consistently display Putin engaged 
in feats of masculinity, codifying a rugged masculinity as the normative value of Russian 
political culture.
556
 These images connect Putin to memories of Soviet strength and are 
central to efforts to restore ―the image of the Leader as the Father of the Nation in the 
post-Soviet condition.‖557 Even those images that show his softer side, posing with 
animals or children, reify this paternal association by implying Putin is strong enough to 
fight for Russia, but is willing to care for you (Figure 5.4).
558
 This totalizing ―muscle‖ 
memory of Putin has become a metaphor for the future of Russia; Putin‘s physical 
presence will be replicated in domestic and international politics. 
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These official images of Putin are widely circulated throughout Russia, appearing 
in media ranging from billboards and TV screens, to playing cards and action figures.
559
 
This commodification into technics of mass communication and consumption transforms 
Putin‘s masculine visage into a memory consumed by the Russian public.560 In focusing 
on consumable, rather than individuating technics, these rhetorics are controlling. Oleg 
Riabov and Tatiana Riabova posit that such circulation of masculine memory is central to 
the Russian assertion of government authority.
561
 As part of this remasculization of 
Russian society, visual technics built around Putin allow his body to stand in for the 
nation as a whole. Andrew Foxall contends, 
The images of Putin serve as a cultural product that connects the viewer, 
through the body of Putin, to the scale of the nation. This bridging of 
scale, from the individual body to the body politic, is ‗necessary for the 
construction of a territorially bounded state occupied by a cohesive 
nation.‘ As well as demonstrating Putin‘s domination of space, the 
photographs also illustrate his domination of technology, nature, his own 
emotions (he is often pictured alone), and other bodies (both male and 
female).
562
 
 
Commandeering visual technics to laud the prowess of Russian leaders furthers nostalgic 
ties to Soviet visual rhetorics.
563
 Putin‘s politics are the continuation of Soviet technics 
and therefore force contemporary political individuations into this formal frame. By tying 
his vision of masculinity to idealized technics tied to the Soviet Union, these 
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mnemotechnics root Putin‘s authoritarian tendencies in community ties to a proud past.564 
Through the nostalgic valorizing of his masculinity, Putin glorifies a system that 
privileges authority, action, and domination, over democratic values such as equality, 
deliberation and freedom. 
 The strength of this mnemotechnicnical frame is such that it is also replicated 
outside official technics. Across ―the Russian Internet‖ many memes draw from this form 
of leadership as masculine authority.
565
 Specifically, Bradley Wiggins notes that many of 
these memes continue the hypermasculine framing of Putin, explaining that  
Russian netizens recursively consume and produce memes either specific 
to or related to Putin to further the personalization of politics as 
spectacle... his virtue as a virile, masculine heterosexual is implied when 
memes accuse Russia‘s opponents of homosexuality. Equally, Putin‘s 
moral purity, love of animals, devotion to the Russian Orthodox Church, 
and his tireless efforts at building a better Russia for Russians are implied 
when memes associate urine and excrement with Ukrainian leadership and 
the European Union.
566
 
 
Even memes which do not explicitly draw on these tropes further the masculine authority 
of Putin. For example, one meme features an image of Joffrey from the HBO show Game 
of Thrones (Figure 5.5).
567
 This character, known for being petty and authoritarian, shouts 
―Hey you! Get down from there.‖ The next frame shows, Putin sitting on Joffrey‘s 
throne, showing the target of Joffrey‘s admonishment. The final frame shows an 
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apologetic picture of Joffrey with the text ―Excuse me, Vladimir Vladimirovich. I thought 
you were someone else.‖ This exchange positions Putin as a figure of such masculine 
authority that he can bend the will of national leaders and displace their authority with his 
own. This meme demonstrates that for many Russians, Putin is influential not because of 
his policies or status as a democratically elected leader, but because he is a king above all 
kings. 
 
Figure 5.5: Putin takes the Iron Throne 
 The domestic and global popularity of Putin suggests this rhetorical framing is 
decidedly successful, however, it has not been without detractors. Pro-democracy 
advocates in Russia have used similarities between the visual styles of Putin and Stalin to 
argue for the dictatorial tendencies of the current regime.
568
 Accordingly, the Russian 
state has taken great pains to prevent efforts that undermine their romantic memory of 
Putin as the rebirth of the strength of the Soviet Union in a ―democratic society.‖ Russia 
frequently censors media that is critical even if only in a mild or humorous way.
569
 That 
Russia clarified press restrictions also apply to memes suggests their potential to 
challenge the official public memory of Putin. They use the force of the state to enhance 
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the proletarianizing force of official technics, as those technics that might enable 
individuation are prohibited. Despite this, the dominance of official mnemotechnics, the 
range of ways that both the Russian Internet, and global participants in the networked 
publics sphere, used memes to challenge this official memory demonstrates that memes 
also may resist this control. Serving as a counter to official public memories, memes – as 
a mode of individuational technics – provide an opportunity for participants to circulate 
affective contrast to hegemonic constructions of memories. That is not to say that all 
memes enable individuations that resist control. The presence of many pro-Putin memes 
demonstrates that these technics may be used to simply expand the circulation of 
proletarianizing rhetorics. However, across the global and Russian internets, a range of 
memes challenge this proletarianizing force. Therefore, this chapter next explores the 
potential democratic individuations afforded internet memes.  
Memetic Challenges to Official Memory 
While the rhetorical technics circulated by public figures such as Putin dominate 
public memory, these are by no means the only way that memory manifests itself in 
public discourse. Publics can be built around any technic. Therefore, a variety of socially 
constructed memories exist, each with differing claims of authority and legitimacy in 
larger rhetorical ecologies.
570
 A useful heuristic for understanding the tension between 
official public memories and other mnemotechnics is ―counter-memory.‖ Broadly, 
counter-memories refer to any force that has the potential to disrupt or displace dominant 
memory.
571
 Counter-memories exist in many forms ranging from the official, e.g. Truth 
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and Reconciliation Commissions, to ironic re-individuations of mnemonic texts.
572
 More 
specifically, counter-memories are those perspectives ―in which metanarratives are 
parodied, identities destabilized, and the impartiality of supposed historical knowledge is 
exposed.‖ 573 Beyond that, ―counter-memory also evokes the multiple forms of 
counterpublicity that clash, not just with official forms of public discourse, but also with 
simultaneous, alternate, counterpublic discourses.‖574 Specific technics—museums, 
statues, paintings, speeches—serve as spaces to make visible particular memories; their 
multivocality can highlight the tensions in disputed or redirected memories.
575
  
Counter-memories may occasionally emerge as discrete technics; however, in 
many cases they are derivative of official memory. Specifically they are created as 
amateur publics engage in individuating uses of these technics as either a re-performance 
of, or conversation with, official texts.
 576
 Visual forms, particularly those of public 
figures, can be prolific sites for the multivalent readings that enable counter-memories to 
form. As differing iterations complicate individuations, variations on the image of a 
figure function as a ―Prism for reflecting multiple versions of civic values and mythic 
meanings.‖577 These reflected versions become spaces where amateur vernacular 
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memories emerge. With localized interests that can disrupt with official public memories 
at any number of intersections, these memories have rich potential to open 
individuational space, creating the conditions for political action outside the boundaries 
of official public memory.
578
  
Non-digital memories tend to coalesce around static memories imbued in material 
objects. Conversely, networked technics function as a ―malleable yet somewhat durable 
surface‖ for memory.579 Although digital iterations allow for an interactivity that changes 
the content, digital archiving and ease of access ensures that the majority of these 
memories are publicly available for future invention (individuations).
580
 Johanna 
Hartelius notes that key features have emerged as central to the digitization of memory: 
The internet represents a different mode of publicity than physical and 
geographical markers. In part, this difference is one of audience and scale. 
But, importantly, differences can be traced to interactivity, and the 
necessity of interactivity for public deliberation… [Digital 
mnemotechnics] are living texts. While a statue or a paper archive is static, 
any virtual discourse is radically live - moving, evolving, growing.
581
 
 
The scope of the audience and the availability of storage space increases the size and 
reach of these memories. However, these factors are mediated by attention; regardless of 
the potential size and reach of a digital memory, its rhetorical force can only be measured 
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by the degree to which it demands and organizes attention. The interactivity and 
renegotiation enabled by online mnemotechnics produces the potential for digitally 
mediated memories to continually grow and evolve, increasing their capacity for resistive 
individuations. 
Seemingly aware of this potential, Putin‘s government has demonstrated itself 
wary of memes, prompting the further evaluation of the memeification of Vladimir Putin. 
I analyze both English and Russian language memes, however, much of the focus is on 
English memes.
582
 While many of the Russian language memes featured content unique 
to the Russian Internet, because popular memes transcend language and boarders, the 
form of many popular memes remains consistent across languages. Russian language 
sites and threads often feature English memes interwoven with Russian ones. For 
example, alongside unique references to the Orthodox Church, RUNetMemes included 
references to popular English language memes like Bad Luck Brian, Go Home You‘re 
Drunk, and cat pictures.
583
 Combined, the corpus of these memes exists at the intersection 
of localized and international memes negotiating the public memory of Putin. This trend 
is consistent with Andreas Huyssen‘s observations that while memories are still firmly 
rooted in national identity, they increasingly act and are acted upon by global structures 
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of memory.
584
 Putin memes take a variety of forms, suggesting it would be impossible to 
address all the iterations in this chapter. Instead, I will analyze early forms of the 
memeification of Putin and then move to how participants mobilized these memes to 
enact counter-memories during a string of political controversies. 
Early Putin Memes: ―Badassery‖ and Sex Appeal 
  
Figure 5.6: Memes built on Putin’s dictatorial ethos 
Shortly after Putin‘s accession to the presidency of Russia, participants in 
networked publics took notice of the visual campaign creating a cult of Putin by using 
modern mnemotechnics to remobilize Soviet collective memory. In an act of ironic 
appreciation, these memes quickly extended the effort through the reinterpretation of 
these mnemonic photographs. Specifically, participants created a variety of stock 
character macros and single-issue blogs that accelerated the circulation of official 
Russian images of Putin into an ironic commentary regarding the official memory of his, 
and by extension Russia‘s, masculinity. 
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 Although the topline/bottom lime form can be imposed onto specific images to 
respond to the context of that image, most stock image macros are circulated in a way 
that transcends the context in which the photo was taken.
585
 As image macros of Putin 
originally emerged, they quickly moved outside the context of Russian politics and 
culture. To date, Putin is the subject of at least 15 image macros.
586
 These macros feature 
images of Putin that tend to frame him as either cunning or powerful (Figure 5.6). One 
popular meme features Putin sitting in a throne-like chair with a commanding gaze. It is 
often used to issue humorous threats such as ―you break in // I break you.‖587 Another 
titled ―Cunning Putin‖ features Putin sporting a coy smile and texts like ―illegal to be 
president again // change the law.‖588 These memes, often circulated as part of trivial 
internet disputes, serve to translate the fatherly authority of Putin into a form so 
exaggerated that it seems frivolous – casting him more as a parody of a dictator that a 
powerful father. The only popular Putin meme that does not rely on mocking of Putin‘s 
authority is ―give that man a cookie‖ (Figure 5.7).589 This image focuses on a picture of 
Putin pointing a pen at something behind the camera. Participants use it as an 
representative image of the affective experience of seeing something so phenomenal that 
it demands immediate praise, hence giving them a cookie. 
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Figure 5.7: The Give that Man a Cookie meme 
 While the stock character macros tend to parody the authority of Putin, the 
collections of single-issue blogs hyperbolically glorify the official memory. These blogs 
select an element of the Putin persona – him being shirtless, the preponderance of official 
photos that are action shots, the general masculinity of his photos – and situates them in 
collections that ironically praise these traits.
590
 Early forms of these blogs simply 
collected alike photos with little commentary. Viewers could see collections of Putin 
posing with animals, or ―50 pictures of Vladimir Putin looking like a complete 
badass.‖591 Although these collections do not overtly challenge the official memory of 
Putin, by collecting the accumulation of similar photos in one place, they de-naturalize 
the individual photos, instead positioning them as part of a concerted campaign. Later 
single-issue blogs enhance this evaluative move. The blog ―Vladimir Putin Doing 
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Things‖ circulated images of Putin in active poses.592 However, the titles of each post 
provided an ironic commentary. A picture of Putin at a ballot box circulates with the title 
―scoring zillion votes,‖ and a picture of Putin shirtless with a horse includes the title 
―Bringing Brokeback Mountain Back.‖ These titles linguistically unsettle the authority, 
legitimacy, and masculinity of Putin; images of action become political theater, 
democratic leadership translates into authoritarianism, and Putin‘s masculinity takes on a 
homoerotic tone.
593
 By accelerating and refocusing the circulation of the official memory, 
these blogs undermine the authenticity and authority of that memory by translating it into 
a parody of itself. 
Putin Memes during Times of Political Crisis 
As a mockery of official efforts to memorialize Putin as the paragon of fatherly 
masculinity, the memetic recirculation of ―official‖ photos has been a constant counter-
mnemonic act during Putin‘s 15 years in power. However, in times of crisis not only are 
Putin‘s hyper-masculine and authoritarian tendencies highlighted, but external memes, 
functioning as topoi for networked argument, enter the rhetorical fray to re-interpret 
Putin‘s public memory.  
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Figure 5.8: Popular memes comment on the 2011 election controversy 
 Although existing for over a decade, Putin memes coalesced into a common 
argumentative force as part of protests over Russian elections in 2011. During these 
elections, Putin‘s United Russia party eked out victories in a series of local elections. 
Protests emerged because official results varied from exit polls and had voter turnout as 
high as 140 percent.
594
 Sharing in the outrage, memes joined the protest, focusing 
primarily on the absurdity of 140% turnout.
595
 Many intertextually juxtaposed Putin with 
established memes. For example, his face was placed on the ―Most Interesting Man in the 
World‖ – a meme dedicated to parodically highlighting masculinity and decadence – with 
the text ―I don‘t always rig elections // but when I do more than 140% of people come out 
to vote‖ (figure 5.8).596 This juxtaposition transforms Putin into a caricature of his official 
image, a man who will openly and proudly flaunt democracy. 
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Other popular memes offered commentary from their narrative and affective 
perspectives. ―The rent is too damn high,‖ the meme form of New York politician Jimmy 
McMillian, paraphrased his popular slogan to show his exacerbation at the results ―Putin 
140% // is too damn high‖ (Figure 5.8). McMillian, whose image circulates as a 
demonstration of frustration, allowed users to demonstrate the incredulity felt upon 
seeing the results. Another meme featured a picture of Chuck Norris proclaiming, ―I 
voted for Putin // that‘s why the results are over 140%‖(figure 5.8).597 This image played 
off the ―Chuck Norris Facts‖ meme, where the hyper-masculinity of Norris is 
demonstrated by his ability to accomplish otherwise impossible feats.
598
 By filtering the 
election results through Norris, the meme demonstrates a sense of ironic amazement: it 
would take the pseudo-divinity of Norris to make the results plausible. Through their 
force as mnemotechnics they limit the boundaries of what is an acceptable understanding 
of the election outcome. In each of these cases, participants‘ interactions with well-
known memes placed particular affective overlays onto Russian efforts to proclaim the 
elections legitimate, creating a tension between the official memory and individual 
experience.  
 Memes protesting Putin as authoritarian did not just appear in English. A series of 
popular Russian memes also circulated, undermining the ―democratic‖ ethos of official 
mnemotechnics.
599
 One meme features a screenshot of a Russian official asking readers 
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to vote for a profile picture and features the caption ―The only honest election‖ (Figure 
5.9).
600
 This meme argues that the marketing of visual technics is the only participation 
that is officially sanctioned. Beyond this overt observation, many of these memes 
generate their commentary by merging the image of Putin with western icons of popular 
culture. One image features a picture of Dora the Explorer and her sidekick monkey 
Boots. However, their faces are replaced with those of Putin and Dimitri Medvedev. This 
image is accompanied with the text ―Help Vova and Dima [Putin and Medvedev‘s 
nicknames] put together the USSR‖ (Figure 5.9).601 This meme magnifies the official 
memory‘s nostalgia for the USSR, removing the romanticism and demanding the viewer 
reflect on the reality such a return would bring. Another meme features Putin‘s face 
imposed onto Gollum from Lord of the Rings, with the text ―I will never give you to 
anyone // my Russia‖ (Figure 5.9), transforming Putin‘s pro-Russia politics into a 
destructive compulsion.
602
 Aside from casting a negative structure of feeling onto Putin‘s 
policies, both of these memes challenge his masculinity by transforming him into a young 
girl or a decrepit monster respectively. Because these memes insert Putin into new 
narratives, they disrupt his relationship with the narrative offered by the official memory. 
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Figure 5.9: Russian language memes respond to the election 
 While the circulation of these memes challenged official public memories tied to 
Putin, the Russian censorship apparatus largely ignored them. However, as memes began 
to more dramatically, and publicly, respond to political controversies, they drew the 
attention of the Russian state – becoming part of the (unofficial) impetus for the 
restrictions on memes.
603
 Specifically, two memes are understood as initiating the 
Russian restriction: the internet‘s responses to Russian involvement in Crimea/Ukraine, 
as well as the ―#wheresputin‖ response to Putin‘s mysterious absence from politics in 
2015.  
In late 2013, crowds amassed in Kiev, Ukraine to protest President Viktor 
Yanukovych‘s decision to focus on relations with Russia rather than the West.604 By 
February of 2014, they had ousted the president. In response to the protesters‘ anti-
Russian rhetoric, Putin supported Russian separatists throughout Ukraine and annexed 
Crimea after a questionably legitimate election where the region voted to join Russia.
605
 
                                                          
603.
 Dewey, ―Internet Memes Illegal.‖  
 
604.
 ―Ukraine Crisis: Timeline,‖ BBC News (November 13, 2014), 
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-26248275.  
 
605.
 David Adesnik, ―How Russia Rigged Crimean Referendum,‖ Forbes (March 18, 2014), 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/davidadesnik/2014/03/18/how-russia-rigged-crimean-
226 
 
 
Although international leaders condemned Russia, they tempered their rhetoric and 
policies for fear of escalating tensions beyond Ukraine.
606
 
 
Figure 5.10: Memes respond to the Ukraine crisis 
 Memes, however, were not nearly as tempered in their responses. Putin-based 
stock character macros, previously used primarily outside of Russian politics, reemerged 
to condemn the actions of Russia. A photo of Putin donning sunglasses, often used to 
demonstrate an affect of nonchalance, was redeployed with the text ―Spends 7 years and 
50 billion dollars on the Olympics to improve Russian relations // ruins it in one day‖ 
(Figure 5.10).
607
 The bottom line clearly delineates that Putin‘s ambition has moved 
beyond protecting Russian interests, questioning the adequacy of his fatherhood. 
Similarly, multiple images of Putin pointing two fingers at the camera centered on the 
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pun ―Crimea River‖ (Figure 5.10).608 Both the carefree pose and the levity of the pun cast 
Putin as a B-movie villain, a megalomaniac bent on world domination. The parodic tone 
dictated by the form of the macros opened a space where the official memories could be 
individuated into more anti-Russian directions. 
 
Figure 5.11: Challenges to masculinity with youthful text (left) and lolcat speak 
(right) 
Beyond redeploying existing Putin memes to challenge the crisis, visuals of Putin 
were also deployed to directly challenge Putin‘s masculinity. One features the image of 
shirtless Putin carrying a rifle, with the text ―BRB [be right back] // Got to take care of 
some sh*t in Ukraine‖ (censorship in original) (Figure 5.11).609 By using youth oriented 
speech patterns, the meme takes Putin at his most masculine, hunting shirtless with a 
large rifle/phallic symbol, and recasts him (and by extension Russia‘s involvement in 
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Ukraine) as juvenile hyper-masculine posturing. Similarly, a Russian language meme 
borrowed from the popular grammatical forms of LOLcats to caption a picture of Putin at 
a podium with the text ―Can I haz already sent troops?‖ (Figure 5.11).610 The stately 
authority of Putin is reframed as the language of a kitten, translating Russian threats into 
adorable and playful pleas. The memes that emerged as compartmentalization of the 
affective dimensions of the official memory returned to it, using their affective judgment 
to problematize the central premises of that memory. 
  
Figure 5.12: Shirtless Putin makes the front page 
The association between the memetic parody of Putin‘s masculinity and the 
Crimean annexation was so pronounced that The Economist magazine used shirtless 
Putin in its coverage of Crimea. Its cover on March 22, 2014 featured the headline ―The 
new world order‖ with a photoshopped image of shirtless Putin driving a Russian tank 
past a stop sign (presumably into Crimea) (Figure 5.12).
611
 The usage of a shirtless Putin 
placed the annexation of Crimea as part of the discourse of his hyper-masculine 
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performance, complete with the barrel of the tank serving as a hyperbolic phallic 
extension. Contextualizing the Crimean crisis through the formal expectations of these 
anti-Putin memes, The Economist framed the conflict as an effort for Putin to 
demonstrate his personal masculine prowess, rather than as reasoned foreign policy. The 
grammar of the meme operated as a topos, directing participants to the suggestion that 
Putin‘s virile image may be a façade that will imperil, rather than protect, Russia‘s future. 
Although Crimea allowed the networked opposition of Putin and the international 
press to coopt Putin memes as an inventional resource, the hashtag #wheresputin 
demonstrated the ability of memes to mobilize the press to foment chaos. In the period 
between March 7
th
 and 17
th
 of 2015, Putin did not make any public appearances. 
Recognizing that such a prolonged absence was unusual for such a publicly oriented 
leader, the hashtag quickly spread around Twitter and Facebook.
612
 Many of the memetic 
posts were humorous in nature, one posited that Putin was ―practicing for a surprise entry 
into Eurovision‖ and another featured an image of European leaders looking around as 
though they were searching for Putin.
613
 The popularity of the hashtag led the press, 
including both online outlets like Mashable and Bustle, as well as mainstream press 
including The Guardian and BBC News, to ask the same question.
614
 Aside from drawing 
attention to his absence, the press coverage also led to wild speculation, ranging from 
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romantic interests and medical concerns to a coup. Upon his return, Putin dismissed the 
absence proclaiming, ―It would be boring without gossip.‖615 The meme was able to set 
the media agenda by highlighting how contemporary events were a stark deviation from 
Putin‘s carefully managed public persona. It is ultimately disruptions such as those 
enabled by this meme and the affective revaluing afforded by the Crimea memes that 
prompted the new restrictions. 
Making Memes Illegal… but the Memes Strike Back 
Against the backdrop of rising criticism, as well as the destabilization of Putin as 
the re-embodiment of the memory of Soviet power and masculinity, the Russian 
government decided to take action. In April of 2015,  
The Roskomnadzor, Russia‘s federal executive body responsible for 
overseeing the media, … posted the following announcement on social 
network Vkontakte (essentially Russia‘s version of Facebook): ‗Violation 
of legislation on personal data in relation to public figures includes use of 
the photo of a public person to impersonate popular Internet memes, 
unrelated to the identity of the ‗celebrity.‖616 
 
A few days later press outlets clarified that the Roskomandor had not issued a new 
prohibition on internet memes, but rather a clarification of existing law that gives the 
government the ability to censor offending texts and sue the creator.
617
 Officially, the 
ruling was the result of a defamation lawsuit by Russian singer Valeri Syutkin.
618
 
However, analysts argue that the Roskomnadzor was willing to make the ruling, and 
ruling party elites supported the ban, because it gave them an avenue to respond to 
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threatening memes such as those critical of recent Russian involvement in Ukraine and 
those that created rumors of a coup during Putin‘s 10-day absence.619  
 
Figure 5.13: The Russian Internet responds to the ban 
Immediately after the publicizing of the so-called ―ban,‖ the internet quickly 
made memes commenting on this turn of events. Russians responded primarily through 
memes that tangentially referred to the ban without targeting any one figure (Figure 
5.13). Most prominent was a screen capture from Back to the Future II where Marty tells 
Doc Brown they must return to the past. Brown replies that this is impossible because 
―The past has been blocked by @roscomnadzor.‖620 @RUNetMEmes also reposted a 
Reddit thread which listed a series of Russian theme puns, accompanied by the line ―this 
post is illegal in Russia.‖ Both these memes avoid the use of images or names of current 
figures to avoid the specific provisions of the ban. Instead, they use global media and 
English language puns to draw attention to the ridiculous nature of the ban. The ironic 
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expectations these mnemotechnics create the conditions where even a purported ban on 
memes can be individuated into memetic logics. 
 
Figure 5.14: International memes respond to the ban 
Not under the threat of Russian sanction, the global networked public sphere was 
much more overt in their criticism of Putin. The majority of these memes intertextually 
linked Putin to more popular internet memes (Figure 5.14). One meme put the backward 
hat of ―Scum Bag Steve,‖ with the text ―I Don‘t Like Meme // So I outlaw them.‖ 
Another showed ―Rare Pepe,‖ an image of a frog used to mock the claims of ―rare‖ web 
images, distributing memes from inside a trench coat.
621
 These memes argue an effort to 
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regulate discourse on the internet is fruitless as the restrictions will anger users, who 
would view Putin as a ―scumbag‖ and promote further circulation – evidenced by Pepe 
promising a new black-market. Even the Putin-based meme ―Give that Man a Cookie‖ 
joined the commentary, proclaiming, ―Give that meme-maker life imprisonment.‖ This 
iteration highlights that Putin‘s very nature is authoritarian, as his first response to 
criticism is imprisonment, framing the anti-meme clarification as another example of the 
non-democratic reality of Russian life. 
Once these critical individuations of memes began to emerge, the English 
language press joined in the memeification of the controversy. Many of the articles 
describing the alleged ban used memes of Putin to explain the controversy. The 
Washington Post’s Intersect Blog, their chief location for reporting about the internet, 
published a story explaining the restrictions that opened with a meme as the first 
symbolic content after the headline (Figure 5.15). The meme featured a picture of Putin 
sitting at a desk, looking to explain something.
622
 Imposed over the photo is the text ―all 
your memes are belong to me.‖ The textual content alludes to the classic meme ―all your 
base are belong to us,‖ an example of broken English from the 1989 video game Zero 
Wing.
623
 The meme commemorates a victory or dominance, usually by a megalomaniacal 
character, and is a deeply ingrained part of internet vernacular. This allusion allows the 
Washington Post to frame the policy as out of touch with the realities of the internet. 
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Figure 5.15: Putin and the “All your base” meme 
Marketwatch’s coverage of the law similarly tapped into the individuational 
potential afforded by anti-ban memes. Rather than using them to explain the story, the 
author simply added them to the end, proclaiming, ―if you are reading this story from a 
computer in Russia, you probably won‘t see these.‖624 This epilogue features a series of 
memes that mock the hyper-masculinity of Putin (Figure 5.16). The memes include him 
shirtless and riding a kitten (instead of the horse) as well as a Ritz cracker (Putin on the 
Ritz) (Figure 5.1). The final meme is a picture of Putin with a big smile that says 
―Ukraine? // No. Mykraine.‖ While these articles themselves present an ―objective‖ 
narration of the facts, English language media used the restrictions as an occasion to 
increase the circulation of those memes that hyperbolically deconstructed the masculinity 
and imperialist rhetoric of Putin. The memes, presented as a triviality, provided the onus 
for the mainstream press to circulate commentaries of Putin usually reserved for internet 
forums – allowing a wider range of audiences to participate in the individuation of this 
anti-Russian stance. In total, the memeification of the anti-meme statement functions as 
an ironic comment on official memories of authority. The restrictions read more like a 
                                                          
624.
 French, ―Russia Just Reminded‖ 
235 
 
 
Yaakov Smirnoff joke about Soviet censorship, rather than a return of the memory of 
Soviet power.  
  
Figure 5.16: The English language press joins the anti-masculine memes 
Memes as International Resistance to Control 
Aside from being a demonstration of the inability of technocrats to control the 
production and force of networked mnemotechnics, these memes highlight the particular 
power of the amateur creation of narratives. While each of these cases feature amateur 
meme production, these Russian memes are the re-articulation of specific and focused 
control based narratives regarding the authority of Vladimir Putin. In this context, they 
are not simply memes that emerge from collective (rather than technical) expertise, but 
rather they are indicative of direct transformation of a proletarianizing hypomnemata into 
a participatory amateur form. The political force of these Russian memes highlights three 
ways that mnemotechnics resist controlling rhetorics. First the individuational form of 
memes resists censorship and other impediments to the circulation of networked technics. 
Second memes are particularly suited for promoting mnemotechnics that enable counter-
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memories. Finally, networked hypomnemata are uniquely suited to promote 
individuations that promote a cosmopolitan ethic of care. 
Networked Individuations as a Response to Censorship 
 The proliferation of memes in response to a restriction on memes demonstrates 
the restive orientation that networked technics – and memes in particular – have towards 
efforts at censorship. The tendency of online censorship to result in an increase of 
circulation of censored information is so abundant that it has gained its own term in 
online vernaculars, ―the Streisand Effect.‖ The term, coined by blogger Mike Masnick, 
began as an allusion to a legal battle where Barbra Streisand's attempts to stop the digital 
circulation of a picture of her beachfront mansion only prompted increased circulation.
625
 
In networked rhetorics, which are premised on the freedom of information flow and 
amateur participation, censorship itself becomes a kairotic moment where individuations 
that circulate the silenced speech are situated as the only ethical response. The 
recognition of the Streisand effect in Russia even manifested itself in meme form. One 
iteration had Putin‘s face over ―Bad Luck Brian,‖ a meme dedicated to explaining 
seemingly ―good‖ ideas that inevitably go wrong (Figure 5.17).626 The text reads ―Bans 
Memes // Victim of Streisand Effect.‖ By using the Brian meme, this iteration suggests 
that Putin ought to have known that the ban would backfire as it violates the ethos of an 
internet that demands openness in the face of censorship, particularly of online content. 
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Figure 5.17: Initial, and typical, Bad Luck Brian meme (left), Putin ban iteration 
(right) 
This movement of memes is demonstrative of Richard Lanham‘s observation that 
―Electronic information seems to resist ownership."627 While Lanham was referring 
primarily to monetary ownership, this elusive nature also potentially frees such 
information from the bounds of censorship. As technics that demand individuation and 
circulation, memes‘ participatory form pushes them to resist the limitations of censorship. 
Further, because memes are, almost by definition, unsigned texts where form obfuscates 
the subjectivity of the creator, and because they are created and hosted on external sites 
that often do not demand identification, they afford an anonymity not available in other 
networked texts. Because of this they are an ideal mnemotechnic to resist efforts at 
official control. 
 Further, because memes often take the form of trivialities with a pop and often 
ironic sensibility, they are easy to ignore in their early stages. However, as 
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mnemotechnics that connect the present to an evaluative form, they can grow to carry 
populist political sensibilities.
628
 #Wheresputin did not draw media attention until it had 
circulated well beyond the control of any network or government. Similarly, the protests 
of Crimea took Putin memes, which had been relatively benign, and mobilized them to 
offer stark commentary on Russian aggression in Ukraine. Individual utterances of a 
meme are easy to ignore, and thus hard to censor, but as they emerge as individuations 
that include numerous participants, they provide a profound tool for the evasion of 
censorship. In the face of Russian policy that includes international conflict, questionable 
democratic practices, and a hit or miss economy, the Russian and international meme-
scape has commented on dominant ideologies, questioning and inverting them.  
In a state full of press censorship, memes replicate what Michael Gurevtich and 
Jay Blumer recognize as the expected functions of a free press.
629
 By commenting on 
Putin‘s absence these memes demonstrate the capacity to monitor politics and set the 
public agenda. In protesting Crimea, they gave voice to the interests of non-state groups. 
As memes also support Putin, they also gave voice to individuals who support the state, 
promoting an open dialogue. Further, their participatory form invites networked users to 
join politics. In sum, although memes may lack the analytical depth of long form articles, 
at their least they work to open the same democratic ruptures as is traditionally expected 
of a free press. 
Memes as Deliberative Counter-Memory 
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Considering their potential to reorient official public memories, memetic 
mnemotechnics have the capacity to foster rhetorical conditions favorable to the 
individuation of counter-memories. However, memes perform this role in a unique 
fashion. Counter-memories, particularly in digital spaces, often function through the 
provision of information to contradict official public memory.
630
 However, none of the 
memetic representations around Putin challenged the factual accuracy of the official 
public memory. Instead, the individuations enabled by memetic counter-memory operate 
through a logic of increased participation, cooperative construction, and affective 
recasting through vernacular experience.
631
 Combined these factors utilize the formal 
expectations of memes to recast ―facts‖ into individuations that challenge proletarianizing 
memories proliferated through bureaucratically controlled technics.  
As noted, the unsigned form of memetic texts affords them freedom from 
ownership. While this works to evade the censorship and control of official public 
memories, the separation from the memetic creator is equally important. Because the 
rapid circulation and recontextualization of memes quickly dissociates the authors of 
memes from the rhetorical force of the text, the content and form of the meme end up 
belonging only to the meme itself – increasing the ease of individuation and circulation. 
This ease is promoted because when these individuating technics are unencumbered by 
past participants, mnemotechnics function in a method akin to prosthetic memory. 
Allison Landsburg explains that prosthetic memories 
circulate publicly, and although they are not organically based, they are 
nevertheless experienced with a person‘s body as a result of an 
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engagement with a wide range of cultural technologies. Prosthetic 
memories thus become part of one‘s personal archive of experience, 
informing one‘s subjectivity as well as one‘s relationship to present and 
future tenses. Made possible by advanced capitalism and emergent 
commoditized mass culture capable of widely disseminating images and 
narratives about the past, the memories are not ―natural‖ or ―authentic‖ 
and yet they organize and energize the bodies and subjectivities that take 
them on.
632
  
 
As memes allow individuals to add their unsigned memories into technics that circulate 
as public counter-memories, they function as a prosthesis detached from a singular 
participant in the individuation. The formal elements of memes, such as shirtless Putin, 
are rooted in the narratives of the official public memory – in this case is representative 
power and masculinity. However, the re-articulation of these memories enabled by 
memes allows individual participants to deposit their narrative experience into the 
affective form of the meme. Following Stiegler‘s theorization of memory and technics, 
digital memes – as a mnemonic prosthetic – serve as a species of affective archive. 
However because these affects are not attached to individuals, this ―choir of orphaned 
utterances‖ becomes an inventional resource for deliberation.633 As official memories 
often rely on an affective connection to a nostalgic past, the ability to deploy alternative 
affective readings, in the form of memes, allows for the destabilization of dominant 
memories through affective contrasts that are afforded by networked mnemotechnics. 
Beyond the anonymity afforded by networked rhetorics enabling affective 
memetic prosthesis, memetic counter-memories also generate collaborative unfinished 
texts. While official memories often function as closed texts immune to discussion, the 
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juxtaposition created by memes re-opens them to deliberative individuation. A single 
iteration does not make a meme; rather they are the byproduct of negotiating social 
expectations. Because of this, memes – like many digital mnemotechnics – almost 
demand interactivity, as ―each new digital expression extends opportunities to participate 
in the discussion and ‗share‘ (repeat, rewrite, reinterpret, represent) experience within and 
beyond users‘ personal networks.‖634 The collaborative form of memes allows each 
participant, content creator or circulator, to alter the form of the counter-memory. This 
transforms a mnemotechnical space, such as an image of Putin, from a hegemonic source 
of argument – to a space that revolves around multiple competing arguments.635 These 
competing affective interpretations foster a contrast that prevents the dominant memory 
from stabilizing, disrupting the displaying boundaries imposed by official memory.
636
 
 Yet, it is not simply collective authorship, and the diverse opinions/structures of 
feeling this invites, that generates the deliberative potential of counter-memories. 
Because memes are socially individuated, they demand interaction between individuals. 
In this sense, memes are ―unfinalizable.‖637 Because there is always a new context to 
deploy a meme, or a new iteration that can be made, the official memory cannot be 
finalized, turning static sites of memory into active sites of individuated deliberation. The 
memeification of these images prevents the consistent circulation of a dominant memory. 
Instead, memes subject official memories to an alternative read that circulates ever faster. 
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This reread disrupts the ideological interpellation afforded by the repetition of official 
public memory. If Putin‘s authority as a father is ever changing, it is harder to trust the 
selflessness of his actions. 
Finally, memes help engender deliberation by translating official public myths, 
which are rooted in exclusionary cultural norms, into a participatory vernacular form. 
Peter Dahlgren notes ―For democracy to happen, citizens must be able to encounter and 
talk to each other. They need access to each other to develop their collective political 
efforts, and contexts in which they can act together.‖638 While the press in Russia is 
largely restricted from criticizing Putin or official narratives, memes circulated across the 
Russian internet translate political controversies into the experiences of everyday 
Russians. In commenting on Crimea, these memes bolstered Russian patriotism, 
highlighted the human costs of enlistment in a time of crisis and both celebrated and 
vilified Ukrainian pro-democracy protests.
639
 Such understanding demystifies official 
public memories by rooting them in everyday language and experience. Moreover, as 
memetic counter-memories can be constructed and edited by anyone with an internet 
connection, they have the capacity to function as democratic online memories capable of 
critiquing the traditional modes of mnemonic production that privilege academics and 
historical institutions.
640
 By allowing individuations that included everyday 
understandings of the conflict and allowed participation by Russians on both sides, these 
memetic mnmeotechnics function as one of the few truly democratic media in Russia.  
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Internationalizing Networked Values 
Although the memes of the Russian internet served as a conduit for everyday 
Russians to meme politics at one another, they also invited global response to the 
assorted Putin-related political controversies. Despite being rooted in Russian political 
context, many of the memes around this controversy were composed in English and 
circulated by global participants. Because of this, the individuations enabled by the 
memes were able to transcend national boundaries, languages, and values. Consequently, 
I conclude by arguing that these international individuations of memes suggest a capacity 
of networked hypomnemata to promote an ethic of cosmopolitism rooted in care. 
 The internationalism of the memes in responding to varied Russian crises is 
partially enabled by their function as an internationalizing discourse. Part of this is 
enabled by the fact that the English language constitutes over 50% of internet content, 
with Russian being the next largest at 6.3%.
641
 While the predominance of English is 
declining, Zazulak notes that when participants in the networked public sphere want to 
speak to international audiences they almost exclusively communicate in English.
642
 
Because of this, many memes that originally circulated in English are familiar to 
networked participants regardless of their nationality or language.  
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Figure 5.18: Popular meme forms Disaster Girl mocks Dmytro Yarosh (left) and 
Rage Comics comment on Russian involvement in Ukraine (right) 
Moreover, because memes only minimally rely on linguistic content, they are 
particularly suited to function as an internationalizing hypomnemata. Ryan Milner notes 
that with their focus on form and visual content ―memes can become a lingua franca for 
mediated cultural participation.‖643 Anyone familiar with Jimmy McMillian and seeing 
the number 140 would be able to conclude that the subject of the meme is ―too damn 
high.‖ Similarly, Russian memes‘ use Bad Luck Brian, Disaster Girl, and Rage Faces 
combined with Cyrillic text to translate Russian politics into these international 
networked forms (Figure 5.18).
644
 While they require translation to be understood by 
outside audiences, the form of the memes provides a context that allows the affect 
surrounding the mnemotechnic to be interpreted by any networked user. When networked 
hypomnemata are used to foster global understanding, the values of networked publics – 
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particularly an orientation towards irony – becomes the dominant frame available to 
participate in this internationalized memetic discourse.  
Similarly, although I do not read Cyrillic, the imposition of Putin into the form of 
Gollum (Figure 5.8), allowed me to read the meme as criticizing Putin as selfish without 
any textual evaluation. The proliferation of global mass media culture provides a referent 
for cross cultural memetic understanding. As international markets such as China and 
Russia expand, much of Hollywood production has shifted with a focus towards these 
global audiences.
645
 The result of this is that larger budget films ―have fairly universal 
ideas and themes, they‘re not really culturally specific.‖646 This move has widely been 
criticized as lessening the quality of major studio films, decreasing the individuational 
depth of these movies as technics. However, this same shallow universality ensures that 
these texts are widely accessible to international audiences. Understanding the 
childishness of Dora or the exasperation of Doc Brown allows audiences around the 
world to interpret these controversies even if they are not conversant in the typical uses of 
network native image macros.  
That is not to say that all memes participate in this internationalizing trend. In 
studying @RUNetMeme‘s response to Crimea, Wiggins notes that memes that tended 
towards support of Russia used national symbols and culturally grounded jokes – 
frequently evoking homophobic, sexual, and excretory references associated with hyper 
masculine humor.
647
 Conversely, directionally Ukrainian memes, a position which tends 
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to ideologically align with more pro-western/internationalist ideologies, featured a wider 
range of intertextual references, pop culture, and adherence to memetic formal norms.
648
 
My own surveys of international memes and @RUNetMemes corroborates this 
observation across controversies. Memes that draw on networked conventions or global 
pop culture tended to be overwhelmingly critical of Putin, while supportive memes were 
more likely to draw on the same masculinity and cultural references as the official 
discourse.  
Although networked memes may often rely on intertextuality and irony, when 
circulated in the service of more proletarianizing rhetorics, such as masculine 
nationalism, the memes can only individuate within the narrow confines of these 
discourses. Some memes only individuate within the confines of particular cultural 
identities, such as the Russian internet. However, because the form of memes opens them 
to proairetic modes of invention, even these will tend towards individuations that 
permeate across the networked public sphere. Because of this, these Russian memes 
suggests that networked hypomnemata – particularly memes – are especially suited 
towards promoting a cosmopolitan ethic that enables a politics of care.
649
  
As was briefly considered in chapter 2, care is central to Stiegler‘s vision of the 
future of politics. Because the proletarianizing force of technics in the service of control 
tends to distance individuals from one another, care is first and foremost about 
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individuations and the role they play in ―constituting the social.‖650 Even though care is at 
its base level about preventing conditions of inhumanity, Stiegler argues it is more than 
this: 
Care cannot be seen as the basic conditions for survival, as subsistence. 
Care, ‗strictly speaking,‘ always works through the care one takes of 
oneself through the care one takes of others, in that they are constituent 
elements of that ‗self‘ as the transformation of individuation.651 
For Stiegler, care is rooted in the ways that technics, as the materialization of retentions, 
facilitate individuations that force an awareness of others with similar retentions.
652
 
While this may begin with an awareness only of those who are close to us, as technics 
draw this attention to these others they force attention onto ―the world we share with 
others‖ in a way that gestures towards more universal issues and concerns.653 As the 
tendencies enabled by particular techniques enable the frameworks that constitutes 
systems of care, the potential for a politics of care can only be understood through the 
particular technics used to promote it.
 654
  
Memes‘ ability to refigure localized political controversies through the lens of 
networked affective frames suggests that their ability to foster care resides in their 
capacity to evoke a sense of ironic cosmopolitanism. Seeking to establish a system of 
virtues for cosmopolitanism that are neither culturally imperialist nor politically impotent 
(read: proletarianizing), Bryan Turner turns to Socratic irony as the ideal driving force of 
cosmopolitanism. Turner explains:  
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Cosmopolitan virtue requires Socratic irony, by which one can achieve 
some distance from the polity. The principal component of cosmopolitan 
virtue is irony, because the understanding of other cultures is assisted by 
an intellectual distance from one‘s own national or local culture. If 
Nussbaum‘s plea for global civic education can work, then understanding 
other cultures presupposes that we could treat our own culture 
disinterestedly as an object of inquiry. As such, cosmopolitan virtue also 
requires self-reflexivity with respect to both our own cultural context and 
other cultural values. Such an orientation of irony and reflexivity produces 
a humanistic skepticism towards the grand narratives of modern 
ideologies. As a result, cosmopolitan irony would share much in common 
with the pragmatism of Dewey and Rorty in that tolerance of others must 
start from a position of some uncertainty as to the ultimate authority of 
one‘s own culture.655 
 
Turner‘s call for detachment and ironic perspective mirrors Burke‘s perspective by 
incongruity. Memes, as products of a globalized networked public sphere have the 
capacity to transcend particular cultural grounding, destabilize localized narratives – such 
as Russian masculinity – asking participants to reevaluate this frame from outside their 
narrow (officially sanctioned) subjectivity. This comic orientation then demands 
tolerance because no single orientation can claim ―truth.‖ Instead, different orientations 
are fostered through competing individuations. 
Despite promoting an internationalized distance, this cosmopolitanism demands 
neither a forsaking of national identity nor localized conflicts. Stiegler is wary of national 
identity as a technic because homogenization precludes individuation.
656
 Instead, such 
collectivities must be built around identifications, where the individuation of national 
technics allows a unity that does not deny the process of individuation. Memes‘ 
cosmopolitanism works to strike this balance. Turner notes, ―Cosmopolitanism does not 
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mean that one does not have a country or a homeland, but one has to have a certain 
reflexive distance from that homeland.‖657 This distance is the space of individuation.  
Many of the memes that are critical of Russia do not call for individuals to reject 
identifications with Russianness. Such simple rejections only breed conflict. 
Consequently, Turner contends that ―The cosmopolitan intellectual does not argue that 
fundamentalism is, in some simple sense, wrong or dangerous. The cosmopolite joins, 
rather, with local voices to probe and if necessary to problematize debate.‖ 658 Through 
their ironic recasting of troubling memories and technics, Russian memes ask that 
participants demand that Russianness is refigured in a more virtuous form. Even as 
international voices joined the conflict, they mocked the faux-masculinity of Putin, 
poking at the validity of mobilizing this particular memory, rather than simply 
antagonizing Putin or Russia writ large. Turner argues that if oriented towards this 
Socratic Irony (comic orientation), these distanced perspectives will promote an 
international ethic predicated around care for the other.
659
 By adopting the 
internationalizing identifications of cosmopolitanism, memes enable Socratic Irony in a 
way that fosters attention to collective care.  
To expand the appeal of Socratic Irony, William Smith turns to Hannah Arendt 
(who is also influential in Stiegler‘s theorization of spirit and care) to further elucidate 
ways to manifest a cosmopolitan ideal. Specifically, Smith turns to Arendt‘s concept of 
―worldliness‖ to argue ―why citizens should be motivated to act on their cosmopolitan 
                                                          
657.
 Turner, ―Cosmopolitan Virtue,‖ 57. 
 
658.
 Ibid., 59. 
 
659.
 Ibid., 52. 
250 
 
 
obligations.‖660 For Arendt, the world is not the same as the earth, rather it is the product 
of human action created in common.
661
 In the language of Stiegler, the world is those 
technics that are produced through broad social individuations (in common). 
Consequently, localized interests undermine worldliness by undermining common ties, 
and in doing so undermine the capacity for non-violent politics; if we cannot appreciate 
and care for the works of others, humans are doomed to the singularity that Stiegler 
warns is at the heart of proletarianization. Arendt notes ―without being talked about by 
men [sic] and without housing them, the world would not be a human artifice but a heap 
of unrelated things to which each isolated individual was at liberty to add one more 
object.‖662 Arendt‘s focus on the ways that talk and housing (both as individuating uses 
of a technic) that organize the world and worldliness gesture to the idea that such an ethic 
resides only in transindividuation. 
Yet if cosmopolitanism at its heart promotes care, and in the process resists 
proletarianization, this is largely achieved through its mobilization of competing 
opinions. Stiegler argues that opinion is ―like that fire that must be maintained in the 
hearth, and at the same time monitored, since it can either heat the house or burn it down, 
and, beyond the house, the city itself.‖663 Similarly, Smith argues that competitive 
discourse lies at the heart of a cosmopolitanism. Commenting on Arendt‘s comparison of 
politics to performing arts, Smith notes:  
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This line of thought highlights the discursiveness of the political realm, 
indicating that being worldly involves talking with others, seeing things 
from alternative points of view, formulating an opinion on the matter at 
hand and seeking to persuade others of the soundness of one‘s view.664 
 
Both political individuation and cosmopolitanism function through the circulation of 
technics that allow free individuation of opinion, proletarianizing rhetorics function 
through ―diverting the energy that is doxa.‖665 To participate in Russian memes, one has 
to both understand the Russian conflict, have a critical/ironic distance from it, and care 
about the outcome. Because memes – via their form – encourage the incorporation and 
competition of singular opinions into larger social individuations that will clash through 
competing individuations, they ask participants to be worldly. 
 Yet worldliness need not always be the civil persuasion suggested by Smith. 
Many of the Russian memes that challenge the masculinity of Soviet memory and Putin 
function through their incivility. Not only does the incongruity promoted by this incivility 
further promote the plurality of discourses at the heart of worldliness, but their polemical 
functions may be key to using memetic cosmopolitanism to promote care. Writing on the 
possibility of politics in the face of proletarianized doxa, Stiegler argues that social 
critique must be grounded in polemics ―struggling for the life of the spirit.‖666 As memes 
that mock Putin as a tyrant that relies on an unnatural masculinity, the energy of this 
discourse has the potential to mobilize collective passions. Moreover, because these 
polemics are rooted in incongruity, this fire is not a grounded in destruction or sacrifice, 
but rather a competition seeking the higher understanding and care of comic 
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cosmopolitanism. In this sense, networked hypomnemata may be an ideal tool for the 
implementation of a cosmopolitan virtue of care. When we joke with the world, we are 
more likely to care for it. 
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Chapter 6 
 The Potential of Memetic Criticism 
Across the course of this dissertation, I have made the case that although the 
primary use of memes may be to function as networked entertainment, when deployed 
within larger political conversations, memes are far more than trivial cultural phenomena 
or diversions from more ‗productive‘ politics. Memes continue the long practice of 
participatory visual rhetorics challenging more traditional and elite controlled political 
rhetorics. In continuing this tradition, networked memes commenting on economics, 
security, and national memory demonstrate this digital technic‘s capacity to live up to the 
rhetorical force of its classical namesake – mimesis. Goodnight and Green illustrate the 
power of mimesis in the classical tradition, noting that,  
when deployed rhetorically, mimetic influence may cultivate ritualistic 
participation, call out common sense observation, affirm virtuous conduct 
as the link to just reward, distill desire through moments of compelling 
display, oppose dialectically shared opinion and refined knowledge, 
authorize expert models, justify actions that fulfill situated best practices 
for a recognized craft, and engage or extend media-blended, reputation-
risking cultural performances.
667
 
 
In their ability to create new enthymematic narratives, destabilize antirhetorical 
ideographs, and affectedly recast collective memory, networked memes demonstrate how 
networked repetition and difference engenders a politics that resists technocratic control. 
That is not to say that these are monumental political victories; dominant forces often 
react to critical theorization through social regulation via competing forms of controlling 
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affect.
668
 Despite this fleeting, and often-unrealized potential, such ruptures represent one 
of the few resistive opportunities in the face of ubiquitous control. Consequently, I 
conclude by considering that the potential of memes lay not just in their ability to 
illustrate Stiegler‘s political ethic, but in their capacity to function as collective rhetorical 
critics. 
 From the onset, the proairetic construction of memes positions the modal 
assemblage built around a particular meme as a rhetorical critic. None of the individual 
iterations may contain the elements of effective criticism. However, once they emerge as 
a modal assemblage – the formal stance of the meme created through its varied 
individuations – this larger collection of fragments combine to enact criticism 
independent of particular human agents. Michael McGee asserts that it is impossible to 
consider any particular act of communication as a complete text. The interplay between 
text, context, and audiences, renders discursive acts as fragmented parts of larger, not 
fully knowable, texts.
669
 Consequently, McGee argues the role of the critic is first the 
construction of a meaningful text out of these fragments, and then using this constructed 
text to examine ideological forces and material affects of particular rhetorical contexts.  
As a group of fragments that participants cannot understand outside their memetic 
assemblage, individual iterations of a meme – especially stock character macros – 
exemplify this concept of fragments. They derive their force only from the juxtaposition 
of formal context, textual particulars, participants‘ experience and affect, and their 
interrelation with socially negotiated understandings of stock character archetypes. 
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However, as participants use the proairetic forces within the initial form of a meme to 
explore varied iterations, they individuate those fragments into a unified sense of form, 
content, and perspective. It is only across the repetitions of politically enacted memes that 
the criticism of neoliberalism, securitization, and official national memories emerge. 
From the enthymemes, terministic deliberation, and counter-mnemonic iterations, a 
critical reading of controlling technocratic discourses comes out of the communal reading 
and production of the meme. In this sense, the modal assemblage of these memes 
functions as a collective cultural/ideological critic.
670
 
Moreover, the vernacular nature of memetic theorization bolsters the force of 
memetically generated social criticism. Specifically, because it is generated from the 
lived experiences of collective participants in politics, rather than from technical or 
academic elites, memetic criticism has the potential to be particularly impactful. Antonio 
Gramsci argues that any theorization of oppressive forces that does not originate from the 
lived experience of the oppressed ought to be suspect, as it likely originates in – and 
supports, intentionally or not – hegemonic ideologies.671 Memetic criticism evolves 
organically, apart from traditional structures of criticism, because it is generated across 
the individuations of networked participants. If memetic criticisms were not 
representative of identifiable collective experience, participants would not propagate the 
meme – individuating within the publics connected with these technics. Because they are 
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rooted in aggregated vernacular experience, the narratives, terms, and memories 
constructed around memes provide alternatives to the dominant technocratic rhetorics 
that justify control. Moreover, since memes often rely on ironic modes of commentary, 
they pluralize this form – increasing the number of individuations and in the process the 
space for democratic deliberation.
672
 However, as I will explore further in this chapter, 
this is a deliberation of the composition and interrelation of subjectivities, rather than a 
Habermasiean deliberation seeking consensus of policy and polity. 
Through their capacity to use broad affective frames to reconstruct individual 
textual fragments into a collective comic meta-narrative, terministic dispute, or 
countermemory, the stock image macro has the potential to serve as a powerful venue for 
generating social criticism from the lived experience of internet users. The power of 
collective theorization led Deleuze to argue that it would be ―user groups‖ not ―wise men 
[sic]‖ who would give voice to revolutionary politics in the era of control.673 The 
emergence of user groups as a defining term of digital culture – one that easily defines 
participants who individuate through networked memes – makes this gesture towards 
memetic criticism all the more prophetic. Memes are not just a subject for rhetorical 
critics to engage, they may very well function as a premier public intellectual for 
networked rhetorical ecologies.  
 
 
Form, Irony, and Identification: Rhetoric as the Entelechial Individuating Technic 
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Central to understanding the critical power of digital memes is an awareness of 
their capacity to function as an individuating technic. If participants could not engage in 
evolving individuations through memetic participation, there would be little capability for 
memes to comment on, let alone resist the proletarianizing rhetorics of technocrats. While 
this relationship was posited from the onset of this dissertation, form, irony, and 
identification, have emerged through my analysis as central rhetorical concepts for 
understanding the individuating force of rhetorics. Yet, it is not enough to simply glue 
these ideas onto Stiegler‘s theorization of individuation, as these Burkean concepts must 
also be rethought in relation to technics and individuation. Therefore, I will explore each 
in turn to make the case that a clear grasp of the evolution of these rhetorical concepts 
into an ecology of networked technics is key to understanding rhetoric as the central 
individuational technic in politics.  
To begin, as networked technics push rhetoric to become increasingly proaretic 
and remixable, form emerges as dominant in driving understandings of both rhetorical 
force and individuation. While proletarianizing rhetorics function through establishing 
strict grammars centered around terministic features such as meaning and definition, the 
rapidly individuating movement of memes hold latent critical political potential that 
eschews these rigid grammars for force exerted primarily through form. Memes‘ 
participatory form enables a productive orientation that ruptures otherwise 
proletarianized existence because memetic technics are particularly oppositional to 
terministic stability. Their drive for circulation via imitatio transforms traditionally 
consumptive acts, such as the perusing of information on the internet, into the production 
of collective knowledge.  
258 
 
 
In transforming static information into individuating knowledge, particularly 
through enthymematic narratives, terministic destabilizations and countermemories that 
exist across a particular modal assemblage, memes encourage productive collectivities be 
formed by participants.
674
 Participants cannot understand a meme if they do not 
understand its context, therefore they must engage the form not only to produce new 
memes, but even to circulate or consume them. As they do so, participants are afforded 
the resources to engage in the positive production of alternative affective theorization. In 
this sense, to understand the scope and potential directions of particular individuations, a 
critic must begin by understanding their formalistic expectations.  
Beyond providing a tool for understanding individuation, a formalistic orientation 
also demands a refiguring of the terministic focus central to Burkean understandings of 
rhetoric. Because it is predicated on form, rather than meaning, networked rhetoric may 
be more driven by ―formulistic screens‖ than terministic ones. Memes draw their force 
through the formal expectations that have individuated across their repeated iterations. 
The expectation that Steve will be out of touch, a meme will twist a Verizon slogan, or 
that Putin‘s masculine memory is a joke, is more important than the specific propositional 
content of any single iteration of these memes. Therefore, while memes‘ formal elements 
are relatively stable, their terministic content is open and unstable; any terministic 
iteration that fits the form can individuate with the meme. Because of this, the organizing 
power of the form overrides that of any particular term. The outraged annoyance of 
Picard becomes a meta-frame through which security must be read. Such formal 
preeminence demands a degree of leveling and incongruity. Any concept can be leveled 
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into the same affective frame through its incorporation into the form of a particular 
meme. As the formal expectations of the mode supersedes the content of a particular 
iteration, the modal assemblage becomes a formal screen through which varied terms 
(and their resultant screens) are mediated. In this way, memetic formulistic screens are 
antagonistic to the stability of god terms and ideographs, which often function in support 
of proletarianizing rhetorics, as their openness prevents the terministic stability that gives 
these technics their rhetorical force. 
 A focus on formulistic screens does not deny the continued power or utility of 
terministic screens. Burke rightly notes that, ―we must use terministic screens, since we 
can‘t say anything without the use of terms; whatever terms we use, they necessarily 
constitute a corresponding kind of screen; and any such screen necessarily directs the 
attention to one field rather than another.‖675 Certainly, the efforts of memes to 
reintroduce privacy to the security debate, or unemployment to discourses of markets, 
demonstrate the continued reliance on terministic screens. However, modal expectations 
are built from more than terministic expectations. Anticipations of affective consistency 
with the formal assemblage – both in terms of matching the embodied emotion of a 
particular advice animal or just the broader memetic demands for irony – will 
undoubtedly tint whatever term is enfolded into the mode. In this way, formalistic screens 
organize terministic screens within particular affective and technical frames, creating a 
mosaic whereby each term has its own force and form, but, given their inclusion in the 
larger form, these terms cannot be read outside the larger modal context.  
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 While formulistic screens are the lens through which individuation may be 
rhetorically understood, the politics of these individuating rhetorical technics are 
mediated through a strong reliance on irony. This is not necessarily an irony of humor, 
but rather a Burkean irony predicated on a movement of reversal where ―what goes forth 
as A returns as non-A.‖676 Stock image macros intensify this ironic imitatio grounded in 
repetition through difference. Thus, through their reliance on amateur recreation, by 
definition memes only exist as ironically re-iterated texts (otherwise they would be 
classified as virals). Therefore, when memes intervene in a specific context, by bringing 
new forms – and their embedded affects – to comment on a particular controversy, these 
new individuations return that controversy to public use through different structures of 
feeling, memories, and narratives: returning it as non-A.  
 Conversely, proletarianizing rhetorics demand a non-ironic finality. Certainly, 
their formal elements do allow a degree of personalization. After all, the same appetite 
may be fulfilled through a variety of technical options. Stiegler notes that 
proletarianization functions through the ability to appeal to niche interest of consumers in 
a manner that is so singular that it prevents collective individuations.
677
 An individual is 
free to engage the new economy in myriad singular ways and Russian national identity 
can be expressed through a variety of rhetorical performances. However, these individual 
iterations built around proletarianizing technocratic forms demand that these different 
iterations return to the order of the key terms. The varied manifestations of privacy one 
could express are acceptable as long as they are still subservient to <security>, iterations 
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of Russian identity must not challenge the memory of masculinity, performances of the 
new economy will be dismissed if they interfere with the rationality of the market. For 
proletarianizing rhetorics, while A might be iterated through a variety of performances, it 
always returns as A. Stiegler refers to this movement as ―idiomatic exhaustion,‖ as 
communication is no longer function as individuating symbols but rather as ―digital 
pheromones,‖ that demand a specific response.678 Because of this, the foreclosure of 
ironic symbolic action becomes the foundation for a symbolic politics of control.  
 If an anti-ironic orientation is at the heart of proletarianization, irony may be the 
central trope for rhetorical technics that promote individuated resistance. Irony may not 
be just one of the master tropes, but instead a master among masters. Because 
individuation can only function through a repetition that also allows difference (returning 
as non-A), if a technic lacks the capacity for ironic use it is non-individuating. 
Conversely, technics, such as memes, which draw on the networked affordances of 
remix, proairesis, and imitatio, not only allow ironic deployment, but through their 
remediations of narratives, memories, affects, and other collective modes of sense 
making, they create a variety of perspectives, all at least partially incongruous with stable 
and proletarianizing rhetorics. In this sense, irony is more than a trope that rhetors can 
draw on; rather, it must be reconfigured as a technical property – pre-existing particular 
rhetorical deployments. The individuated pre-individual form of a technic must be such 
that it affords irony. If affording irony, these technical properties allow rhetors to deploy 
them to manifest particular incongruities. Further, it is only through these ironic technical 
forms that amateurs can participate in creation. If A must return as A, there is no space 
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for an amateur to remake the technic, they can only consume it. Conversely if a technic 
allows a different return, each user is now a co-participant in the collective 
transidividuated renegotiation via imitatio. 
This reliance on ironic technics for enabling transindividuation suggests that there 
is a greater space of amateur participation than Stiegler originally allowed for. In 
explaining symbolic misery, Stiegler argues that the transference of music to recordings 
removed their individuational capacity because the songs are replayed without 
difference.
679
 However, if we take seriously the conclusions of this dissertation that 
individuation relies more on form than on specific iterated content, there may be 
individuational potential even if the propositional content never changes – suggesting that 
even virals may individuate. For many memes, the visual form never changes – 
analogous to the music on a record. However, as the picture is moved into different 
contexts and controversies, it allows new individuations, just as a record played in 
different audiences, temporalities, and cultures, may individuate through cultural 
resignification.
680
 Such potential for resignification is particularly pronounced in digital 
spaces because networked logics encourage remix.
681
 This individuating, ironic 
resignification, through contextual resignification opens even the seemingly most static 
technics to potential new individuations. As long as there is a space for some kind of 
formal or contextual irony, proletarianization can never be complete. New incongruities 
and perspectives will emerge through any range of resignifying performances. 
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These varied perspectives gesture towards the deliberative/democratic potential of 
memes and similar networked technics. Specifically, as ironic variations create a range of 
technical perspectives, participants engage in a mode of deliberation through their ability 
to foster identification.
682
 Specifically, identifications with particular technics enable the 
creation of democratically constructed subjectivities. Again this is neither a politics of 
traditional subjects nor of deliberation, but rather examining ―the various ways 
individuals and groups constitute themselves as subjects through processes of 
subjectification‖ and the ways that these processes both elude established and create new 
modes of power.
683
 Because each meme – or other individuating technic – allows the 
creation of a different collective we, each technic must also be considered as affording a 
unique mode of subjectification. Consequently, as participants move to individuate with 
one technic instead of another – e.g. a memetic narrative over a technocratic one – they 
are implicitly endorsing the mode of subjectivity that transindividuates with that 
particular form or iteration of a technic. 
Through this process of negotiating varied technics and their differing processes 
of subjectification, the deliberative and democratic tendency of individuational politics 
becomes apparent. In negotiating varied individuations and their varied perspectives, 
networked participants do not come to agreement over the ideal vision of a particular 
policy or the polity writ large, rather they identify with a commonness in a particular 
mode of subjectification as it individuates in a particular context. In this sense, 
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individuational deliberation is not a measured negotiation of arguments and policies, but 
rather the social creation of a technic that invites a wider range of identification. Those 
technics whose memories, narratives, and forms are identifiable will invite greater 
participation and thus have the potential to exert a wider social force. Old Economy Steve 
does not advocate a specific policy or renegotiate the tenants of economics. However, 
through the collective creation of a technic that houses an identifiable narrative, the 
meme creates space where participants can both negotiate the nature of their collective 
subjectivity through the inclusion of new iterations, and exert a greater pressure on 
dominant rhetorics through the creation of a larger collective that opposes technocratic 
rhetorics.  
Consequently, this individuational democracy is not one of a singular public 
sphere – networked or otherwise. The existence of a ―Russian internet‖ vs a more 
cosmopolitan in the battle over Russian memory, demonstrates that networked spaces, 
although affording greater international reach, are still comprised of multiple competing 
publics defined by rhetorical technics that are not always compatible. Networked 
publicity, just as other modes publicity, can enclave from, resist, or reify dominant 
publics. Moreover, these spaces have a nebulous tie at best to the policies and politics 
that dominate more conventional understandings of democracy and deliberation. Steve, 
the NSA memes, and Russian memes do not ask participants to vote differently, instead 
they hope these individuations identify with the experiences of the participants who 
might circulate them. In doing so, they present subjectivities that reject the very 
assumptions that drive traditional politics. The democracy of networked technics is one 
of ever mutating publics, who are democratically negotiated through the new unities of 
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participants who identify with the forms and collective identities of the technics that 
serve as the foundations of these publics. This is a democracy of everyday symbolic 
participation, not the speeches and elections of Liberal Western Democracy. 
That does not mean that memes are without consequence in the realm of 
traditional politics. Rather than explicitly directing publics, these memes provide an 
affective bridge which has the potential to link memetic participants with already existing 
publics and political action. Certainly this move has less discernible effects than other 
political rhetorics. However, Jessalyn Keller notes that only focusing on ―a direct tangible 
and measurable ‗effect‘ of activism ignores results like the production of feeling.‖684 It is 
precisely the potential of texts like memes to evoke particular structures of feeling that 
led Papacharissi to theorize the role digital technics play in the formation of ―affective 
publics.‖685 
Broadly, Papacharissi argues that texts proliferated by networked technologies 
often do not overtly seek deliberation or consensus. Rather they use affective gestures to 
attune participants to particular publics. Papacharissi notes, these technologies permit 
people to feel their way into politics …[they] engage in practices of 
rebroadcasting, listening, remixing content, and creatively presenting their 
views – or fragments of views – in ways that evolve beyond the 
conventional deliberative logic of a traditional public sphere.
 686
 
 
The affective publicity enabled by networked media enables participants to connect to 
existing politics through an affective gesture by internetworked media. Specifically, 
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Papacharissi argues that through their mass circulation, technics such as hashtags and 
memes remediate personal experience in the way that they identify with the experiences 
of others. A meme like Old Economy Steve publicizes participants‘ personal angst at the 
current state of the economy and the NSA memes highlight dissatisfaction with security 
policy. Beyond articulating these particular stances, using these circulated texts connects 
these users to other participants who share similar evaluations. Papacharissi argues this 
move allows the connectivity, rather than collectivity, that is central to networked 
publics.
687
 A meme which connects or alludes to larger public attitudes through 
identification with a particular structure of feeling can direct participants into larger 
publics without overtly demanding political action itself. 
In this context, it is easy to read a meme as personal gratification without any 
larger political potential.
688
 However, Papacharissi does not argue that affective publics 
have the same force as more traditional social movements and other mass publics. 
Papacharissi instead argues the structures of feeling tapped into by native internetworked 
media are ―soft.‖689 Alone, they may not motivate action. However, in allowing 
participants the ability to connect with larger publics, affective publics re-interpellate that 
participant as more attuned to a particular mode of political being. Such attunement then 
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provides an opportunity for that participant to engage in more traditional modes of 
publicity – something that may not have been possible had the originating affective 
gesture (e.g. circulating a meme) not provided the participant the resources to ―locate 
private thoughts in a public setting.‖690 This performance both draws and manages 
attention, making issues visible to a broader public – all while placing ideas in conflict, 
rather than consensus. In doing so, memes, as one of the dominant texts of networked 
public spheres, contain the potential to constitute networked publics 
Memetic Multitudes 
As memes emerge as a space for the negotiation of politics through identification 
with competing individuations, they demonstrate that the processes of individuation are 
intrinsically rhetorical, and that rhetoric cannot function without individuation. However, 
this individuational democracy, built on the connection of diverse participants around 
common production and uses of technics, also suggests that the political subjectivity that 
may best describe the individuational politics of networked rhetorical technics is that of 
the multitude.
691
  
Many theorists who draw inspiration from Deleuze recognize that if control 
society is reliant on new modes of economic production, it also necessarily mobilizes a 
new political subject: the multitude. Because it exists outside the biopolitical logic of 
population, the multitude challenges the dominant conceptions of collective arrangement. 
Virno notes:  
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The contemporary multitude is composed neither of ―citizens‖ nor of 
―producers;‖ it occupies a middle region between ―individual and 
collective;‖ for the multitude, then, the distinction between ―public‖ and 
―private‖ is in no way validated. And it is precisely because of the 
dissolution of the coupling of these terms, for so long held to be obvious, 
that one can no longer speak of a people converging into the unity of the 
state.
692
 
 
In existing between the individual and the collective (to which Stiegler would add the 
technical) the multitude exists in a parallel space to individuation, rather than to more 
traditional associations of politics and collectivity. Rather than relying on traditional, 
representational conceptions of collectivity, the multitude is ―an irreducible multiplicity; 
the singular social differences that constitute the multitude must always be expressed and 
can never be flattened into sameness, unity, identity, or indifference…[it is] singularities 
that act in common.‖693 This relation of singularities in common is exemplified by the 
ability of memes to balance individual stories through particular iterations of memes with 
a sense of collective purpose found across the form of each meme.  
In this way, form, which is produced across multiple singular iterations that find 
relation through a memetic technic, must be understood as a manifestation of the 
common – or that which is produced through relations of participants in the multutude. 
Hardt and Negri explain how exploitation of the common demands the emergence of the 
multitude. 
Since we have begun to recognize (from the standpoint of the critique of 
political economy) how the singular figures of postmodern labor do not 
remain fragmented and dispersed but tend through communication and 
collaboration to converge toward a common social being, we must now 
immerse ourselves in this social being as in something that is at once both 
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rich and miserable, full of productivity and suffering and yet devoid of 
form. This common social being is the powerful matrix that is central in 
the production and reproduction of contemporary society and has the 
potential to create a new, alternative society.
694
 
 
As the new subject called forth by the conditions of communicative labor, the multitude 
is the central target for control. Moreover, as control breaks the logic of the population, 
the multitude emerges to explain how mobile individual consumers have the potential to 
exist in some collective capacity.  
 Although the multitude is central to contemporary understandings of control, this 
concept is largely absent from Stiegler‘s work. Recognizing that collective struggle is 
best embodied by ―user groups,‖ Deleuze gestures towards a multitude-oriented 
understanding of political subjectification.
695
 Therefore, as a response to Deleuze‘s 
control thesis, which includes consideration of the very modes of immaterial production 
that define the multitude, some gesture towards the multitude can add further depth to 
Stiegler‘s understanding of control. In working with individuation, Stiegler moves 
towards a political subject akin to the multitude (or at least with a multitudinous 
character).
696
  
 Foucault famously notes that in understanding power, resistance comes first.
697
 
Drawing from this observation, both Hardt and Negri and Virno note that control 
functions through efforts to contain and direct the multitude. Virno directly links this 
struggle to individuation itself. In arguing that capital seeks to appropriate the common 
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(which Virno notes is literally the space between individuals), Virno is speaking of the 
preindividual milieu created through the process of transindividuation.
698
 As 
demonstrated by the memetic resistances to technocratic control, the struggle to 
reestablish spirit and care is precisely the effort to find a space for an individuating 
multitude to exist within current industrial technologies. For Virno the individual is the 
manifestation of the potentiality of the common – a process strongly akin to Stiegler‘s 
spirited individuation.
699
 Therefore, while proletarianization represents a multitude 
detached from itself, reduced to pure singularity, a politics of care opens the space for a 
multitude that is at once the many and the one – a multitude that constantly challenges the 
forces of proletarianization. 
Further, the tendency of networked publics towards cosmopolitan irony further 
enhances the argument for the multitudinous tendency of networked subjects. Not only 
does the worldliness of cosmopolitism rely on care for the common – the very conditions 
from which the multitude arises – but it does so by distancing one from their sense of 
home. Although the ironic cosmopolitan can comment on national and local conflicts, the 
enactment of this virtue destabilizes a sense of home. Turner explains: 
Ironists are often homeless people who are in some sense dislodged from 
their traditional worlds and find themselves in new situations where old 
answers no longer work. Cosmopolitan virtue may well turn out to be the 
ethic of exile.
700
 
 
When participants joke about the falsity of Russian masculinity, the American security 
state, or the American dream, they may be seeking to improve these conditions. 
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However, by imposing distance through incongruous application of memes to these 
conditions, they also cannot return to the stable (if controlling) home of these discourses. 
To paraphrase a popular networked meme ―incongruity: what has been seen cannot be 
unseen.‖701 
 However, the very alienation engendered by participation in networked, ironic, 
cosmopolitanism also helps to enable the development of a multitudinous subjectivity. As 
control replaces the biopolitical logic of populations with a focus on singular consumers, 
the multitude, as the manifestation of the general intellect, becomes the only productive 
collective subjectivity in a post-Fordist economy.
702
 Although Hardt and Negri argue the 
capacity of the multitude to engage in immaterial labor exceeds the reach of capital, and 
in doing so has a resistive orientation,
703
 Virno is more ambivalent towards the potential 
of the multitude. Virno notes that as control breaks down the boundaries of biopolitical 
power, it also destabilizes a sense of home within the many that make up the multitude.
704
 
Although a nomadic sense of withdrawal enabled by this lack of home is part of the 
political force of the multitude, this same lack can prompt the multitude to reproduce the 
very structures of control in order to fabricate the sense of home lost. While the multitude 
can be locations of resistance to control, it is not necessarily so, as it can often be easier 
and more comforting to simply reify control. As memes move participants outside the 
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normative subjectification of control, they gain the capacity to produce new and differing 
modes of social relation, but as pharmakon this move always risks a return to control. 
A central example of the relation between networked nomadism and the multitude 
is the use of memes as a cultural commonplace. As Virno notes commonplaces, as 
products of the multitude are central to both communicative production and 
individuation. Specifically, Virno‘s use of commonplaces is a pun referring both to the 
classical concept of cultural bound meaningful stories as well as the common as the place 
where publics are both produced and reside.
705
 However, this double entendre is key to 
understanding the multitude. While a variety of technics may be shared across a wide 
range of human relations, it is only the symbolic – as the home to the general intellect – 
that is both the engine of capitalism and individuation of the multitude.
706
 In this sense, 
commonplaces are the only location that the common (the foundation of individuation) 
can reside. And only a multitudinous subjectivity can fully embrace the individuational 
potential of commonplace technics. The greater difference of subjectivities unified in 
common, the greater range of individuations that a technic may take in opposition to 
controlling forms.  
In this way, a multitudinous subjectivity, grounded in mimetic uses of technics, 
always exceeds the bounds of control. Certainly, much of their rhetorical production will 
be re-enfolded into capitalism. The majority of the memes explored in this dissertation 
are circulated for the profit of various media agencies. However, the collectivities created 
by these technics also express narratives, memories and other affective forces that do not 
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get fully contained by this capitalization. Specifically, the individuation of multitudinous 
subjectivities allows for the constant renegotiation of the relations of varied individuals. 
As I transindividuate with new (and constantly changing) technics, I am moving across a 
range of potential subjectivities. This reorganization allows each act of individuation to 
be a process of direct democracy. If the multitude‘s social conditions are those of 
individuation, every utterance is an enactment of an individual‘s democratic influence on 
those social conditions. 
 Moreover, if the political subject of networked individuation is the multitude, this 
dissertation suggests that the resistive potential of the multitude may have a dominant 
rhetorical orientation, that of a networked sophistic. Specifically, with their focus on 
irreverence and play, memetic rhetorics align with the Sophists. Although the list of 
individuals who fit under the label sophist include figures with a range of varied 
philosophical and rhetorical views, Nathan Crick argues that they were unified by a 
common ―democratic ethos rooted in an experimental attitude that draws on the resources 
of speculative reason to serve the purpose of radical invention necessary for a 
democratization of the productive arts.‖707 This unified stance includes a range of 
conceptual commitments including, rhetorical experimentation, dissoi logi, imitation as 
improvement, and a valorization to play, all in the name of improving the polis.
708
 
Despite these elements, all of which are central to the political use of memes, Crick 
asserts the ―greatest legacy‖ of the Sophists may be their ―artistic commitment to 
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form.‖709 Specifically, the Sophists recognized that using commonly understood 
communicative structures (form) was the only way that collective experience could 
manifest influence in contingent rhetorical situations.  
Although Aristotelian and Platonic rhetorical values tend to be central to 
contemporary understandings of politics, the sophistical attitude of experimental play and 
manipulation of form has also performed an influential role in American political 
discourse. Sophistic influences are present in parodic media and in satirical performances 
like the White House Correspondents dinner. However, sophistic styles have also found 
spaces outside dominant media and political institutions., most notably in guerrilla theatre 
and performance politics. By using hyperbolic, ironic, and intertextual performance, these 
presentations – and the publics they form – work to establish spaces for the articulation of 
voices traditionally excluded by dominant discourses.
710
 For example, the Guerrilla Girls, 
a feminist art collective, used a range of visual juxtapositions and public performances to 
challenge the dominance of men in the art world. These sophistic, styled, performances 
provided a comic incongruity to dominant attitudes, prompting not revolution, but rather 
reconsideration of established social norms.
711
 
While this sophistic tradition certainly influences the contemporary individuations 
of memes, the networked return to sophistry may be more than a reemergence of its 
classical namesake. Instead, commenting on the digital circulation of visual rhetorics 
Damien Smith Pfister and Carly Woods argue that contemporary visual culture might 
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best be understood as ―hypersophistic.‖712 Although they note that ―As a prefix, ‗hyper-‗ 
means ‗over, above, beyond.‘,‖ they also use the prefix to ―signal how these sophistical 
attitudes are intensified through the affordances of hypertext, or the hyperimage, made 
available by digital media technology.‖713 As demonstrated through the move of memetic 
sophistry to varied cosmopolitan modes of expression, memes follow Pfister and Wood‘s 
observations that the hypersophistic is more rapid in circulation, diverse in location, and 
varied in participants. Moreover, as irony via imitatio emerges as the dominant logic of 
memetic technics, play is no longer simply a way to experiment with rhetorics, but 
instead may be the default mode of rhetorical production.  
This default ironic play highlights the potential link between multitudinous 
subjects and hypersophistic orientations. Crick notes that for the sophists rhetorical 
experimentation was key to mastering the ―contingencies of life.‖714 However, for the 
multitude, not only is life contingent, but the very nature of subjectivity and collective 
existence is rooted in constant flux.
715
 While a memetically constructed public may draw 
on its form for some stability, every new iteration transindividuates this form, always 
already reforming it for its new contingent deployments. Therefore, as networked 
technics pull participants into increasingly multitudinous subjectivities, they are similarly 
further called to engage in sophistic rhetorical orientations to negotiate this politics of 
individuational flux. 
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Limitations and Future Directions 
Although this dissertation certainly offers useful insights into the nature of digital 
rhetorics and technics, this study is not without limitations. Most notably because my 
analysis was grounded within a Stieglerian perspective it is bounded within the limits of 
this perspective. Specifically, in focusing on technics and individuation, other meaningful 
dimensions of both memes as well as specifics of the specific rhetorical controversies 
may have been under covered. Similarly, other rhetorical and philosophical approaches, 
such as phenomenology, argumentation, and others could yield different insights. 
However, I see this limitation not as a fault of this study, but rather something inherent to 
the nature of rhetorical research. This study offers but one of the many perspectives, that 
when combined, help to yield a richer and more full understanding of rhetorical 
phenomenon. As such, simply considering these contexts from other perspectives is a 
needed step for future research. Beyond this need for diverse approaches to memes, this 
dissertation also suggests a range of other directions of new research.  
First and foremost, although memes, with their highly mutable and participatory 
nature, are a natural fit for understanding the relation between individuation and rhetoric, 
this relationship should be explored further. Following the insights of Stiegler, all 
technics have the potential for individuation. Therefore, it follows that other rhetorical 
technologies – including varied media forms, tropes and figures, as well as particular 
addresses might be understood through the logic of individuation. The assumption that 
rhetoric is a techne suggests a particular technical leaning across the history of rhetorical 
studies. Consequently, future research should explore the relationship between 
individuation and rhetoric writ large. Such an orientation has potential to help mediate the 
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divisions between more object oriented approaches and the humanistic tradition. A 
rhetorical theory of transindividuation, while grounded in complex rhetorical 
relationships between the technics of the material world, also recognizes that the human 
subjectivity – as another product of transindividuation – is one of the many objects that 
exerts force and shifts the direction of the rhetorical forces circulating in contemporary 
rhetorical ecologies.  
Furthermore, this dissertation – in highlighting the role of technics in not only the 
contemporary production of – but also the classical understandings of – rhetoric suggests 
the need for a further rhetorical turn in contemporary theory. Certainly continental 
philosophy and other theorizations have made significant moves towards the centrality of 
symbolic action. However, frequently they do so by thinking of language without a 
technical history.
716
 If the force of technics is their capacity to function as repositories of 
memory, the individuating force of all technics is always mediated through the rhetorical. 
We cannot individuate with any technic without some symbolic understanding of how it 
has been used in the past. Consequently, it is time not for rhetoric to turn to philosophy to 
keep up with its insights about the human condition. Instead philosophical thought should 
return to rhetoric, particularly a pre-Platonic sophistical rhetoric, because a rhetorical 
outlook has long attended to the role technics play in the understanding of politics. 
Finally, memes through their highly individuational nature are a natural text for 
the construction of multitudinous understandings of networked publicity. However, 
following the insights of Virno, subjectivities in networked spaces – particularly when 
understood through the logic of a hypersophistic – are increasingly mobile, diverse and 
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diffuse – all conditions for the manufacture of the multitude. However, this same subject 
is often theorized as existing either in opposition to, or without interest in, the modes of 
representative government, deliberative discourse, and other more modern political and 
rhetorical figurations that have dominated contemporary politics and rhetorical studies.
717
 
Across these cases, we have seen how memetic technics orient multitudinous 
subjectivities around particular anti-control stances, narratives and memories, in a way 
that could potentially effect representative politics. However, the ability of such 
subjectivities to influence and exist within more traditional rhetorical spaces is still 
unclear. Consequently, rhetorical critics ought to take seriously the contention that 
networked technics individuate towards multitudinous subjects, and explore further the 
relations between these publics and the dominant political spheres that still govern 
contemporary life. Can multitudinous subjectivities exert direct rhetorical force, are they 
vocal critics, or do they simply provide a shared feeling that must then be directed into 
more traditional movements and other representative politics? Such research not only 
would increase our understandings of the ways that networked technics participate in 
politics, but also more importantly the potential of resistance that truly exists in 
networked publics spheres.  
Conclusion 
Although not all memes are politically revolutionary, when used to mobilize 
alternative individuations memes are technics particularly suited to resisting control. 
While such interactions have always been possible, digital media have expanded the 
speed and scope by which such networks of indiduation can develop, circulate and 
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expand. Following the warnings of Johanna Hartelius, I am reticent to overly romanticize 
memes, or any digital space, as a democratic panacea because ―Making content public 
does not automatically amount to genuine participation in the civic sphere.‖718 However, 
if nothing else, memes trouble proletarianizing rhetorics by making them less certain. 
Thus, despite Hartelius‘ warning, I am cautiously optimistic because as David Cratis 
Williams notes, ―Democracy occurs in the domain of the uncertain.‖719 
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